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 Abstract 
In 2014 three new procurement directives were adopted at European level, replacing the 
previous generation of directives from 2004. These directives regulate how approximately €2 
trillion of public and semi-public money is spent in the member states, aiming to ensure the 
free movement of goods and services and competition in the award of public contracts. 
Environmental and social provisions figure prominently in the 2014 directives, including a 
number of new rules which must be implemented at national level. The 2014 directives 
embody the concept of a social market economy as set out in the Lisbon Treaty, and 
represent an increase in EU integration in the public procurement field.  
 
This thesis analyses the role of the European Commission, Council, Parliament and Court of 
Justice during the reform process, as well as the policy preferences of France, Germany, the 
UK and civil society groups. It asks whether the EU institutions acted as supranational policy 
entrepreneurs or as agents of the member states in introducing the new social and 
environmental provisions, testing hypotheses derived from two competing theories of 
integration. It draws conclusions about the nature and causes of European integration in this 
field, and develops the concept of trusteeship in relation to the Court of Justice and 
European Parliament as a means of understanding democratic governance in the EU. 
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Reform of EU Public Procurement Law: Intergovernmental or Supranational 
Policy-making? 
Introduction 
The award of public contracts sits at the intersection of three politically contested domains 
within the European Union. The first concerns the role of the state vis-à-vis the market, and 
the way in which competition is encouraged and regulated. The second is the role of social 
and environmental protections within Europe's internal market, and their interaction with 
the free movement principles set out in the Treaties. The third is the division of powers 
between local or regional, national and supranational authorities. All three of these conflicts 
came to the fore in the reform of EU public procurement law which took place from 2011-14, 
leading to the adoption of new directives governing procurement in the public and utility 
sectors.1 This thesis evaluates both the process and outcomes of the reform, in order to place 
it within the broader context of the debates about the nature and democratic legitimacy of 
EU integration. I argue that the reform of EU public procurement law can be seen as an 
instance of increasing integration, provided this is understood as involving not only states 
but also subnational and transnational actors. Analysing the environmental and social 
aspects of the reform as an instance of integration, I ask whether intergovernmental or 
supranational theory provides a more convincing explanation of why and how this change 
happened.  
One criticism of theoretical approaches to EU integration is that they have relied too 
much either on cases which are large-scale and highly politicised such as Treaty changes, or 
on the other hand on policy areas which are obscure and technocratic. Traditionally, 
intergovernmentalism has been more concerned with Treaty making and neofunctionalism2 
with day-to-day policy-making. However much of EU law and policy lies somewhere between 
these two extremes – significant to a range of political and economic actors but only 
occasionally becoming prominent in national political debates. Public procurement falls 
within this middle spectrum. Its economic importance is widely recognised (some €2 trillion 
or 14% of EU GDP is spent on public contracts)3 and it affects a large number of public and 
                                                          
 
1Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the award of concession contracts (the 
Concessions Directive); Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (the Public Sector Directive); and Directive 2014/25/EU on 
procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sector and repealing 
Directive 2004/17/EC (the Utilities Directive). 
2 The terms ‘neofunctionalism’ and ‘intergovernmentalism’ denote the two main strands of theory regarding EU 
integration. Chapter one distinguishes the more recent incarnations of these theories in supranationalism and 
new intergovernmentalism from the classic versions put forward by Haas and Hoffmann. 
3 European Commission (2016) Public Procurement Indicators 2015. Only around a quarter of the €2 trillion 
figure is fully covered by the EU directives – many contracts fall below the relevant thresholds or are excluded for 
other reasons.  
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private sector bodies, however it is seldom the stuff of high politics. Compared to the 
neighbouring policy areas of competition and state aid regulation, the procurement rules are 
both further reaching (affecting contracts worth as little as €135,000)4 and less reliant on EU 
institutions for enforcement, due to the existence of a remedies regime which allows 
companies to enforce the rules in national courts. As such, public procurement reform may 
be considered a good testing ground for theories of EU integration, because it affects 
interests which are largely the preserve of member states (decisions about public spending) 
as well as those which are transnational (interests of companies bidding on a cross-border 
basis) and supranational (development of the internal market). Plausibly, any of these 
interests could dominate the reform of the rules, meaning it is not an ‘easy case’ for either 
supranational or intergovernmental theory. 
History of EU Procurement Law 
The EU legal framework for public procurement first emerged in the early 1970s, 
however it was not until the late 1980s that it became prominent within internal market 
policy.5 The primary motive of successive procurement directives has been to remove 
barriers to the free movement of goods and services, specifically those linked to national or 
local preferences in public purchasing. This was intended to increase the number of 
contracts awarded on a cross-border basis and thereby enable efficiencies in supply markets, 
moving away from the dominance of nationally championed companies.6 The directives set 
out rules intended to ensure the equal treatment of bidders and transparency of procedures 
– objectives derived from the Treaty principles of non-discrimination and free movement of 
goods and services. However public contracts have always also been seen at national and 
sub-national level as a means of implementing policies not linked to such market opening 
objectives, such as the support of particular industries or disadvantaged groups.7 From the 
1990s onwards, the use of public procurement to further environmental and social policies 
became well established, particularly amongst local authorities. Support for this activity 
                                                          
 
4 This is the lowest threshold for application of the 2014 directives to supply/service contracts awarded by central 
government authorities. However, as noted below, the CJEU has also applied the Treaty principles to public 
contracts below this threshold, provided they are of certain cross-border interest. 
5 The first procurement directive (70/32/CEE) was concerned with supplies and laid down basic requirements for 
non-discrimination against imported goods in government procurement; this was followed by a more detailed 
directive relating to the award of public works contracts (Council Directive 71/305/EEC). In 1989, the Public 
Sector Remedies Directive (89/665/EEC) was adopted, allowing private enforcement of the EU procurement 
rules by bidders. This was followed by the Utilities Sector Remedies Directive (92/13/EEC).  
6See Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) at p 117-143 for an account of the factors driving regulation of public and 
utilities sector procurement, and linkages with other policy areas such as technical harmonisation, sectoral 
liberalisation and competition policy.  
7 McCrudden (2012) traces the development of such policies internationally, including in Europe, from the late 
19th century onwards. Going back further, it is possible to identify local environmental and social objectives being 
balanced against broader economic concerns in the procurement of Rome's first aqueduct in 312 BC, by censor 
Appius Claudius Caecus. See Oakley, S. (2005) at p 367 and Faletti, R. (2010). 
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came from a variety of NGOs operating both at the local and EU levels. Initially, the 
European Commission made clear its view that the scope for incorporating such non-market 
considerations in contract award decisions was limited. It issued guidance cautioning against 
such practices, and pursued infringement actions against member states applying 
environmental and social criteria in tenders.8 
The Commission was obliged to rethink its approach following the judgment of the 
Court of Justice in the Concordia Bus Finland case,9 just prior to its proposals for the 2004 
directives. This concerned environmental criteria in tenders, with the Court clearly 
endorsing the legitimacy of such criteria. As a result, the 2004 directives contained a number 
of references to environmental considerations which could be taken into account in the 
award of public contracts, provided the basic principles of transparency and equal treatment 
were observed. By the time the Concordia judgment was delivered, many local authorities 
already had green public procurement (GPP) policies in place, with national governments 
beginning to adopt similar strategies. By 2008, the European Commission was actively 
promoting GPP, including by developing common criteria to address the environmental 
impacts of goods and services frequently purchased by the public sector.10 At the same time, 
it maintained a restrictive position towards social criteria in public contracts, for example 
those linked to labour protections.11 The ability to use public procurement to implement 
labour protection measures was cast into further doubt by a series of judgments from the 
Court of Justice regarding the posting of workers and enforcement of collective agreements, 
including in public contracts.12 
Despite the restrictions under EU law, the financial crisis which began in 2008 lead 
many public authorities to place renewed emphasis on using public contracts to achieve 
social policy goals linked to employment, skills and wages. Such policies were combined with 
environmental aspects in what became widely known as sustainable public procurement 
(SPP).13 This development must be seen in the context of the changing nature of what was 
being procured and by whom. The scope of procurement regulation within the EU has grown 
                                                          
 
8 European Commission, COM (89) 400 final Public procurement: Regional and social aspects. In Case C-
228/98 Nord-Pas-de-Calais the Commission challenged the use of award criteria targeting unemployment in the 
French region (see discussion in Chapter 4). The Commission also issued a reasoned opinion against Austria in 
1997 concerning the application of environmental criteria in a contract for the purchase of lorries.  
9 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne (Concordia) 
10 These policies were set out in COM (2008) 400 Public procurement for a better environment 
11 This more restrictive position is evident in the Commission’s 2010 Buying Social guidance. 
12 The four cases comprising the Laval quartet (discussed in Chapter 4): Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al (Laval); Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ 
Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP et al (Viking); Case C-319/06, Commission v 
Luxembourg; and Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen (Rüffert).  
13 This term incorporates both green public procurement (GPP) and socially responsible public procurement 
(SRPP). The European Commission’s support policy is primarily limited to GPP, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
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over time, so that it now covers a wide range of service contracts and concessions  - including 
outsourced services which traditionally have been provided by the public sector directly in 
areas such as health, social care, education and prisons.14 It also covers contracts and 
concessions awarded by various semi-state bodies and even private undertakings operating 
in the utilities sector, if they have been granted special or exclusive rights by the state.15 
Given that service and works contracts awarded by local or regional governments in 
particular have long been seen as a means of implementing various social policies,16 it is not 
surprising that the increased scope of the procurement rules has been accompanied by 
increased conflict between the free movement principles set out in the Treaty and these 
policies. Cases such as Rüffert caused widespread disquiet amongst local and regional 
authorities, as well as amongst trade unions in wealthier member states.17 However the 
newer accession states for the most part welcomed this confirmation that barriers to free 
movement could not be erected via public contracts, thus allowing them to realise 
competitive advantages based on their lower cost base.  
From the European Commission’s point of view, the 2004 directives had not 
achieved the creation of a single market in public procurement. In addition to the low rate of 
cross-border awards, significant difficulties with compliance existed in most member states 
– despite vigorous use of the remedies regime by businesses.18 Implementation of the 
procurement rules in the new accession states was seen as particularly challenging. The 
Court of Justice has frequently been called upon to interpret and apply procurement law, 
delivering some 500 judgments on the topic since the mid-1980s.19 The volume of 
procurement cases before the CJEU increased significantly in the period preceding the 2004 
directives and has averaged between 15-20 new cases each year since that time, the vast 
majority of which are preliminary references from national courts.20 These judgments relate 
not only to the interpretation of the substantive rules set out in the directives but also to the 
scope of contracts which are covered by them. The directives have never provided for 
complete harmonisation of all public sector or utilities procurement; they apply only to 
                                                          
 
14 It is important to note that the decision about whether to outsource a service remains outside of the scope of 
EU law. However, where a decision is taken to award a contract or concession, the directives will apply if the 
value exceeds the relevant monetary threshold and if there is no exemption based on the subject-matter.  
15 The first utilities sector directive, covering the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, was 
adopted in 1992 (Directive 92/13/EEC). Directive 2004/17/EC added postal services to the scope of the utilities 
regime but removed telecommunications, on the grounds that this sector was subject to adequate competition. 
16 For example, requirements relating to training and apprenticeships on local works contracts have aimed to 
combat unemployment and skills shortages in the UK, France and Germany amongst other jurisdictions.  
17 For an overview of the response, see Bücker and Warneck (2010). 
18 For discussion of the reasons for and nature of non-compliance see Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen (2010) 
19 These cases are unfortunately not grouped under a single classification in the Court’s database. The figure of 
500 is based on the author’s own compilation of cases concerning procurement (including by EU institutions).  
20 Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report for 2017 and previous years.  
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contracts valued above certain monetary thresholds, with numerous exemptions based on 
the subject-matter of the contract. The Court's jurisprudence in this area is a microcosm of 
its classic case law on free movement of goods and services. In particular, it developed the 
idea that contracts which were not covered by the directives might nonetheless be subject to 
the Treaty principles, if they were of 'certain cross-border interest'.21 This mirrored its earlier 
development in the Dassonville line of cases of the idea of 'measures with equivalent effect' 
to quantitative restrictions, to address barriers to free movement which did not take the form 
of quotas or tariffs.22  
In both situations, the Court relied upon a purposive interpretation of the Treaty to 
extend its principles beyond the explicit scope of coverage of internal market legislation. The 
question of whether a public contract is of cross-border interest, like the question of whether 
a measure actually or potentially hinders trade, is inherently open-ended and indeterminate. 
This has allowed the Court to apply stricter or looser versions of these tests over time, 
without discarding its fundamental approach. In the procurement context, this 
indeterminacy affects not only national legislative and administrative measures, but the 
individual decisions of tens of thousands of contracting authorities making purchases on a 
daily basis. Prior to the Court’s cross-border interest jurisprudence, they would have applied 
purely national rules to contracts excluded from the directives. To date, no presumed or 
categorical exemptions from cross-border interest have been developed by the Court akin to 
those applied to selling arrangements in Keck and Mithouard,23 meaning that all public 
contracts, regardless of value, may in theory be subject to the Treaty principles.24 The 
expansion of the scope of EU law in relation to public procurement via the cross-border 
interest test has not been uncontroversial – in 2006 Germany, supported by six other 
member states and the European Parliament, brought an application for the annulment of a 
Commission communication which purported to set out the obligations arising from the 
Court’s case law.25 While this challenge was unsuccessful, it signalled a rejection at national 
level of unbounded integration in this domain.  
The effectiveness of EU legal integration in public procurement remains open to 
question. Despite over 40 years of EU directives, the number of contracts awarded on a 
                                                          
 
21Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria and Herold Business 
Data AG. The Court's approach in this case was foreshadowed to some extent in Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy 
('Re: Data Processing Contracts') and was further developed in C-231/03 Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v 
Cingia de’ Botti and C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG. 
22Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville. 
23Joined Cases C-267 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
24 In the recent case C-486/17 Olympus Italia, the Court did hold that cross-border interest could not be merely 
hypothetical, with the burden of proof to establish this resting on the complainant.  
25 Case T-258/06 Germany v Commission. See discussion in Chapter 4 of this case.  
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cross-border basis has remained stubbornly low, amounting to under 2% of public 
procurement across the EU at the time of the 2011-14 reform.26 A 2017 study found that 
‘local’ companies were over 900 times more likely to be awarded public contracts than 
‘foreign’ bidders (Herz and Varela-Irimia, 2017). Even within the same country, a sizeable 
local advantage could be observed. These effects cannot be entirely explained by the low 
frequency with which companies participate in bids outside of their home area. The 
directives do not require complete harmonisation of procedures, and significant national 
variations in practices continue to apply. In 2016, more than 80% of all contracts were 
awarded on the basis of price alone in eight member states (the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Greece, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia), whereas in five member states less 
than 20% of contracts were awarded on price alone (France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Poland and the United Kingdom).27 These divergences, together with problems with 
compliance, mean that public procurement remains an unfinished corner of the internal 
market puzzle, and one in which national interests can be difficult to reconcile.  
In 2011, the Commission set out its proposal for new directives which, while 
increasing references to environmental and social aspects of procurement, stopped short of 
introducing any new mandatory policies. A two-year negotiation process within and between 
the Parliament and Council resulted in amendments which significantly expanded the social 
and environmental provisions of the directives, introducing a number of new mandatory 
elements. The CJEU’s judgment in the Max Havelaar case,28 delivered at a key point in the 
negotiation, served to legitimise social criteria much as Concordia had legitimised 
environmental criteria a decade earlier. In her opinion in the case Advocate-General Juliane 
Kokott noted that: 
For a long time the pursuit of environmental and social objectives was disapproved of 
in public procurement law, as was manifested not least in the use of the phase 
‘objectives irrelevant to the contract’. However, it is now generally recognised that 
contracting authorities may also take account of environmental and social factors 
when awarding contracts…In practical terms, however, the conditions under which, 
and the form in which, the contracting authorities’ environmental and social views 
may affect a specific award procedure is fiercely disputed.29 
This case however related to fair trade criteria affecting wages and production practices in 
third countries – a much less controversial domain than the questions of intra-Union 
enforcement of wages and labour conditions addressed in the Laval quartet. As will be seen, 
the latter issue remained fundamentally unresolved in the 2014 directives, although signs 
                                                          
 
26 European Commission (2010a), p 15. 
27 European Commission (2017a), p 7. 
28 Case C-368/10 European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands (Max Havelaar) 
29 Case C-368/10, Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott at paras 36-37 
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have since emerged of a new political and judicial approach which is more favourable to the 
imposition of host state working standards.30 
While the 2014 directives go much further than their predecessors in endorsing 
environmental and social objectives in procurement, they also create more detailed rules in 
this area and consolidate the power of the Court of Justice to adjudicate disputed uses of 
SPP. The directives invoke esoteric concepts such as 'characteristics which do not form part 
of the material substance' of goods or services being purchased, 'factors which are not 
attributable to an economic operator', and the 'link to the subject-matter' test – all of which 
invite judicial interpretation. As with the previous revision completed in 2004, the text of the 
2014 directives bear the hallmarks of compromise. As Roberto Caranta put it: 
[T]his was not a simple maintenance exercise. Deep changes have been introduced in 
the EU regulatory framework. All parties involved – EU institutions and the Member 
States – brought to the process their preferences, agendas and strategies. Conflicts 
were in plain view and tripartite dialogue was needed to iron them out (or sweep 
them under the carpet.)31 
The result is that social and environmental objectives are balanced - sometimes precariously 
- against the imperatives of competition and free movement. In the period following the 
adoption of the 2014 directives, many Member States were slow to implement them in 
national law (the UK was a notable exception, adopting regulations in early 2015). In May 
2016, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to 21 Member States who had failed to 
transpose one or more of the new directives by the deadline, following up with reasoned 
opinions issued to 15 of those countries in December 2016.32 As the directives begin to be 
implemented in practice, the contours of the bargains struck during the legislative process 
have become clearer, as have the powers which these effectively place in the hands of 
individual public authorities, national governments, the Commission and the Court of 
Justice. This allows for analysis of both the process and substantive outcome of the reform in 
terms of the preferences of these actors.  
Research Question 
 The question I seek to unravel here is – what caused the shift in EU procurement 
regulation from minimal tolerance of environmental and social objectives to endorsement of 
their legitimacy and even enforcement of certain common mandatory standards? This 
                                                          
 
30 See discussion of the RegioPost case and the Commission’s 2016 proposal for revisions to the Posted Workers 
Directive in Chapter 4.  
31 Caranta (2015) at 409.  
32 On 8 December 2016, the European Commission sent reasoned opinions to Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, 
requesting them to fully transpose one or more of the three new directives on public procurement and 
concessions into national law. 
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change can be observed by comparison of the text of the 2004 and 2014 directives, although 
legal commentators disagree about the significance of some of the new environmental and 
social provisions.33 In Chapter one, I argue that the changes constitute a case of further EU 
integration in a deeply contested area. As the discussion above suggests, a number of 
potential proponents and opponents of these changes can be identified, and the role of each 
of these dramatis personae is evaluated in the course of this study. Long term commitment 
to sustainable procurement amongst local and regional governments, supported by an active 
network of NGOs, was balanced by less fulsome support at national level in most member 
states. Businesses tendering for public contracts were generally resistant to onerous 
environmental or social standards, although some did support greater harmonisation of such 
measures at EU level. The Court of Justice and Commission had in turn accepted the 
legitimacy of green procurement, but continued to enforce barriers to social criteria which 
were seen as a greater threat to the single market, particularly where they concerned wages. 
This view was supported strongly by the newer accession states, where wages remained 
below the European average. This meant that support on the Council for deeper integration 
of minimum social standards in public contracts was not assured at the time of the reform. 
On the other hand, the European Parliament had expressed its commitment to reforming the 
social dimension of the procurement acquis to allow enforcement of minimum labour 
standards.34 
 The methodology applied to identify the causes of this change is one of process 
tracing, defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed 
in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011). By 
deriving specific testable hypotheses from two major theories of EU integration, I seek to 
compare their explanatory power in this case. Following Popper (1963), I rely upon 
falsification to evaluate the robustness of the hypotheses – looking for evidence which 
contradicts them. The evidence I consider is drawn from the legislative file relating to the 
reform of the procurement directives, from the broader context of EU law and policy during 
the relevant period, and from primary and secondary national sources. This is supplemented 
by interviews carried out with key individuals involved in the reform at EU and national 
level. The primary sources relied upon are catalogued in the appendices. Process tracing is 
widely deployed in EU studies, international relations and the social and natural sciences 
more broadly. Compared to quantitative research, it typically offers a more nuanced 
understanding of causality due to the close attention played to sequences of events and 
                                                          
 
33 The contributions in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer (2014) and Sjafjell and Wiesbrock (2015) include a range of 
perspectives on the meaning and effect of the new environmental and social provisions of the directives. 
34 European Parliament (2010). 
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possible alternative explanations. However due to the small scale of testing, single cases may 
be insufficient to prompt reorientation of theory without corroboration from additional cases 
or large-n studies. In the concluding section, I develop alternative hypotheses based on my 
findings which are suitable for further qualitative or quantitative research.  
Structure of Thesis 
Chapter one orients this study within the existing framework of intergovernmental 
and supranational theory, aiming to define the dependent variable of 'integration' in a way 
which is conceptually robust. I examine recent refinements to both theories as well as their 
classic formulations in the work of Ernst Haas and Stanley Hoffmann and development in 
the work of Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet and Andrew Moravscik, amongst others. I 
also consider the contribution of other theoretical trends in EU studies, such as multilevel 
governance and Europeanisation, to answering questions about the causes and nature of 
integration. Having adopted a working definition of integration and found preliminary 
evidence of an increase in EU integration associated with the public procurement reform, I 
turn to potential explanations for this. While supranational and intergovernmental theory 
offer distinct visions of how and why EU institutions accumulate and exercise power, many 
of their claims regarding the institutions are not in fact incompatible. This study focuses on 
two areas where I argue that they do advance incompatible claims. The first is the question of 
whether EU institutions act as supranational policy entrepreneurs or as agents of the 
member states. The second is whether the powers they exercise are irreversible, or are 
subject to recall by the member states. The hypotheses I develop test these competing 
accounts of the role of EU institutions in integration. Chapter two reviews the literature on 
each of the EU institutions involved in the reform process, in order to focus the empirical 
enquiry into their role in the procurement reform. I highlight ways in which each institution 
might act as a supranational entrepreneur or agent of the member states, and the ways in 
which their actions are either insulated from or subject to reversal by member states.  
Chapters three to six present empirical evidence regarding the role of the 
Commission, Court, Member States, business and civil society groups, Parliament and 
Council in the public procurement reform. Chapter three analyses policy developments in 
the period immediately proceeding the Commission’s 2011 Green Paper, including the 
attempted ‘relaunch’ of the single market in the wake of the financial and euro crises. It then 
turns to the specific environmental and social measures contained in the Commission’s 
proposal, asking whether these introduced substantive new obligations on member states 
and/or individual contracting authorities. Chapter four evaluates the role of the Court of 
Justice in developing environmental and social criteria in procurement, and the impact 
which its judgments in this area had on the reform process. These judgments reflect the 
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Court’s evolving attempts to reconcile non-market and market objectives over the past 20 
years, and I examine this broader case law alongside its appraisal in the legal and political 
science literature. Chapter five identifies the domestic policies and preferences for the 
procurement reform in Germany, France and the United Kingdom, drawing on published 
and unpublished sources. It also analyses the role of civil society including business 
associations and environmental and social interest groups in the reform. The impact of the 
Right2Water campaign, the first successful European Citizens’ Initiative, on the scope of the 
concessions directive, is highlighted.  
The negotiation of the directives within and between the European Parliament and 
Council took place over 18 months in 2012-2013, with a further six months spent on legal 
tidying and translation prior to adoption of the directives in February 2014. Chapter six 
follows this process, from the preliminary work undertaken by the Parliament’s Internal 
Market and Consumer Affairs (IMCO) committee in 2010 and 2011 through to the trilogues 
conducted under the Irish presidency of the Council in the first half of 2013. In addition to 
the interinstitutional file, I draw upon documents released under freedom of information 
requests and interviews with individuals involved in the negotiation on behalf of both 
institutions. By comparing the positions taken by the Parliament and Council, as well as the 
Commission and Court, to the preferences expressed by member states on environmental 
and social aspects of the procurement directives, it is possible to test the hypotheses 
regarding entrepreneurship and agency, recall and irreversibility. In Chapter seven, I draw 
conclusions regarding the capacity of intergovernmental and supranational theory to explain 
the inclusion of environmental and social objectives in the public procurement directives. 
Based on my findings, I develop the idea of trusteeship as an alternative model to explain the 
causal role of the Court of Justice and European Parliament. I then turn to the implications 
of this analysis for questions of democratic legitimacy and institutional design in the EU. 
Why it matters 
 The research question addressed here speaks to broader questions of how power is 
exercised in the EU and other jurisdictions. Understanding how and why procurement 
regulation came to incorporate non-market considerations may cast light upon similar 
developments in other areas of EU law, under international trade regimes and in national 
regulatory systems. It elucidates the role of EU institutions and other actors in resolving 
questions which deeply engage public opinion, such as the balance between the market and 
the state in allocating resources and determining social outcomes. The engagement of the EU 
with such questions can be seen as a relatively new phenomenon, and one which remains 
controversial. Floris de Witte argues that: 
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The integration process was meant to expand the size of the (economic) cake, and the 
Member States were meant to redistribute that cake internally…one integrated 
market and many different national social policies. In this way, the national political 
establishment would ensure that the functioning of the internal market remained 
sensitive to the social demands of the electorate.35 
This runs counter to the vision of Friedrich Hayek, whose suspicion of national politics was 
one of the intellectual inspirations for the fundamental freedoms established in the Treaty of 
Rome. While the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly endorses the idea of a ‘social market economy’, it 
does not resolve the question of who decides on the appropriate balance between ‘social’ and 
‘market’. The answer to this question has profound implications for democratic governance.  
The social and environmental provisions within the 2014 directives form a novel and 
controversial aspect of the broader procurement acquis, and present considerable 
implementation challenges at national and subnational level. They can and should be seen as 
part of a larger movement in EU law – as well as in other international regimes – to integrate 
non-market considerations within instruments which have hitherto been driven purely by 
market or economic concerns. This movement was given renewed impetus by the global 
financial crisis, which also spurred the backlash against liberal economic governance which 
continues to play out in many western countries. However, its origins go back much further, 
with precedents in the nineteenth century initiatives on fair wages in public contracts cited in 
Chapter five. In the EU context, the idea is embedded in the Treaty of Lisbon, with Article 
3(3) committing Europe to a 'highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress'. The term 'social market economy' (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) has its origins in German ordoliberal theory, in particular the mid-century 
work of Alfred Müller-Armack.36 Article 3(3) assumes that competition and market freedoms 
are compatible with social protections. It is important to recognise that this has not always 
been accepted within the EU legal order; single market orthodoxy was grounded in the idea 
of unfettered competition, largely following Hayek’s suspicion of state intervention.37 Until 
2004, the procurement directives embodied this orthodoxy, and only in 2014 did social 
market economy principles become clearly embedded in the directives.  
The rejection of the Hayekian view is evident not only in the language of the Treaty of 
Lisbon but also in other substantive areas of EU economic law, such as state aid. The rules 
on state aid, like those on procurement, have a primary objective of promoting undistorted 
                                                          
 
35 De Witte (2017), p 117.  
36 A member of the Cologne school, Müller-Armack first used the term in 1946 in his Wirtschaftslenkung und 
Marktwirtschaft. For discussion of the origins of the concept see Watrin (1979) and Goldschmidt (2012). 
37 In The Road to Serfdom (1944) Hayek argued that extensive redistribution of income via taxation and the 
welfare state would give rise to authoritarian regimes. Beyond his well-known influence on Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher, Hayek was also profoundly influential on dissenters within the former soviet republics. In the 
EU context, the central place of the four freedoms within EU law owes an intellectual debt to Hayek.  
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competition. However, as can be seen clearly from the General Block Exemption (GBER) 
adopted in 2008, EU state aid law now also acknowledges various other policy goals, from 
environmental protection through to social inclusion and promotion of research and 
development.38 Some EU scholars see the social market principle as becoming embedded in 
the EU’s constitution prior to the Treaty of Lisbon (Paellemarts 2011; De Witte 2012), while 
others remain sceptical that social objectives have achieved parity with economic freedoms 
even in the post-Lisbon era (Scharpf 2010). Under the sceptical view, the environmental and 
social aspects of both state aid and public procurement law amount to tokenistic gestures - 
giving back a small amount of the policy space which member states have ceded in the name 
of internal market integration. The question of how social and economic objectives are 
balanced is one which matters to citizens throughout Europe, and thus plays a central role in 
establishing the democratic legitimacy of EU policy making. It goes to the heart of why 
intergovernmental and supranational theory matter – because they allow us to understand 
who decides upon the appropriate balance between market and non-market objectives 
within the EU, and how this power is exercised in practice.  
 These tensions are currently playing out in national politics across Europe and in 
other western countries. Alongside the rapid expansion of international commerce, a 
widespread backlash against liberal economic governance has taken place, with the EU 
providing a particular focal point for this rejection. Political parties on both the left and right 
have sought to distance themselves from supranational structures and ideas such as freedom 
of movement – and met with considerable electoral success in doing so. While this may or 
may not pose an existential threat to the European Union, it is clear that it cannot ignore the 
increasing chorus of discontent with the principles of economic governance laid down after 
the second world war, which are widely seen as being responsible for the financial crisis and 
the longer-term social disruption caused by globalisation. In this context, intergovernmental 
and supranational theory offer two distinct answers to the question of whether the EU is 
‘here’ or ‘over there’ – and thus who should be blamed when things go wrong or given credit 
for policies which successfully reconcile economic, social and environmental interests. The 
answer to this question tells us not only where citizens, businesses or NGOs should focus 
their lobbying efforts but also points towards future reforms of EU and national institutions 
to ensure they are held accountable for the powers they truly exercise.   
                                                          
 
38 For discussion of these dimensions of state aid law see Ferri and Marquis (2011). 
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Chapter 1 - Defining EU Integration and Identifying its Causes: Theory 
Most of the analysis carried out of the 2014 public procurement directives has been from a 
legal perspective. This includes work mapping the evolution of the social and environmental 
aspects of the directives, and linking them to relevant Court of Justice judgments and 
broader changes in EU law.39 However this analysis tends not to examine the political 
genesis of the 2014 directives - from Green Paper consultation through a two-year trilogue 
between the Commission, Council and Parliament, and the (delayed) implementation by 
member states. Each stage of this process engaged broader questions regarding the 
balancing of interests: between the state as protector and the state as consumer, and between 
local or national objectives and the internal market. While on their face the 2014 directives 
allow more scope for the inclusion of social and environmental aspects in public contracts, in 
specifying rules and principles they also consolidate the ability of the Court of Justice to 
mediate between these interests. I argue that the decision to further regulate these highly 
contested matters at EU level can be seen as a significant transfer of power from member 
states to the Union.  
 To explain this transfer of power, two main theoretical perspectives on EU 
integration offer themselves. Supranationalism focuses on the role of EU institutions, 
including the Court, in promoting integration. It builds upon the insights of 
neofunctionalism, first developed in the late 1950s, to explain how these institutions have 
consolidated their competences over time. In contrast, intergovernmentalism places the 
interests of member states at the centre of understanding whether, when and to what extent 
EU integration happens in a particular area. While national interests may be mediated or 
traded-off against others, they are unlikely to be completely subsumed by supranational 
projects. Both perspectives have been applied to regulatory areas such as competition law,40 
and some research has also sought to apply them to public procurement regulation.41 To test 
the applicability of these theories, I analyse both the specific changes brought about in the 
2014 reform and the role of the EU institutions, member states and civil society groups in 
bringing this about.  
 This chapter addresses the dependent variable implicated in my research question, 
namely the degree of integration between EU member states in public procurement rules, 
                                                          
 
39 Amongst others, see Sjåfjell and Wiesbrock (2015); Lichère, Treumer, and Caranta (2014); Caranta (2015). 
40 For example see McGowan (2007) and Maher (2009) (applying a broadly intergovernmental approach and 
evaluating the relevance of principal-agent theory). 
41 Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) included a chapter on public procurement regulation in their book The 
Governance of the Single European Market, applying a historical institutionalist perspective. This preceded the 
major consolidation of procurement law which took place with the 2004 procurement directives. More recently, 
an edited volume has made inroads into examining the 2014 public procurement reform from a political science 
perspective, see Ølykke and Sanchez-Graells (2016). 
14 
 
and specifically the subset of those rules which relate to social and environmental 
considerations. This is a necessary first step to situate this study within the broader field of 
EU integration studies, and to develop an approach to measuring integration in the field of 
public procurement. I review the definitions of integration applied in supranational and 
intergovernmental theory, as well as some parallel concepts deployed in the governance 
literature. The robustness of these definitions and concepts for the purpose of developing 
and testing hypotheses is examined, including their suitability for understanding cases of 
non-integration.  I then turn to the question of how integration may be defined and 
measured in the specific context of public procurement, taking account of methods and 
metrics deployed more generally. This builds upon the account of public procurement 
regulation sketched briefly in the introduction, and sets the scene for the more detailed 
account of the reform process in the empirical chapters which follow. The chapter concludes 
with a preliminary assessment of the changes introduced in the 2014 directives and their 
impact on integration, and by introducing four hypotheses which test the competing 
explanations offered by supranational and intergovernmental theory for EU integration. 
What is integration? 
 Despite its centrality within EU studies, the concept of integration often goes 
undefined. Of the definitions of integration which have been put forward, most seem to 
presuppose something about causality. For example, Ernst Haas' (1958) frequently cited 
definition is: 
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
centre, whose  institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the 
existing ones.42 
 
The idea of a 'new centre' sits well within a neofunctionalist concept of integration but less 
well within an intergovernmental one. Neofunctional accounts of integration postulate a 
centre which becomes more than the sum of its parts, whose institutions exercise power of 
their own, and where the interests of states are subordinated to the self-perpetuating logic of 
integration. Supranational bodies and private actors play key roles in this process by acting 
in their own self-interest. Economic and political spillover effects further fuel the engine by 
encouraging the spread of integration from one substantive domain to another, either to 
avoid negative externalities or to capture positive ones, for example from the creation of a 
single market to the creation of a single currency.  
                                                          
 
42Haas (1958), p 16. 
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 Haas later put forward an alternative description of regional integration (while 
noting that fifteen years of research on the topic had not generated consensus on a 
definition): 
The study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states 
cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix 
with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring 
new techniques for resolving conflicts among themselves.43 
The shift from a 'new centre' to ' new techniques' suggests a more modest process than 
wholesale transfer of loyalty; this reflected the reality of slower European integration which 
took hold in the mid-1960s. Haas however was clear on the need to focus on the outcomes of 
activities, whether in institutional or attitudinal terms, rather than the activities themselves 
in identifying integration. This followed from the need for theory to be more than 
descriptive, by pointing towards hypotheses regarding an end-state; although Haas noted 
that both the explanatory and predictive powers of neofunctional theory had thus far proven 
limited.  
Meanwhile, in the wake of the Luxembourg Compromise Stanley Hoffmann had 
written an obituary for European integration in which he described it variously as a broken 
blender and the eating of an artichoke's leaves (symbolising state sovereignty), which 
nonetheless had left the heart intact (Hoffmann 1966). Rejecting the neofunctional view, he 
asserted the ongoing primacy of the nation state - not least the Gaullist version. Hoffmann 
placed geopolitical factors at the centre of his account both of why European integration had 
happened and why it had apparently stopped. This lead him to believe that only an external 
threat or shift in the international order could revive European integration. While later 
generations of intergovernmental theorists have focused on economic rather than 
geopolitical factors, the rejection of an endogenous logic for integration continues to 
separate them from those pursuing neofunctional or institutionalist explanations. The logic 
for integration in intergovernmental theory is supplied by the rational choice of states to pool 
sovereignty in areas where this generates better outcomes than those which are available to 
them unilaterally.44   
 Variations in integration over time and across functional areas are explained by the 
preferences of member states and the bargaining which takes place between them.  
Supranational actors - in particular the Commission and Court of Justice - are seen as agents 
                                                          
 
43 Haas (1971). Haas was also at pains in this essay to emphasise that the study of regional integration was 
conceptually limited to noncoercive efforts. 
44 This is the view put forward by Andrew Moravcsik (1998). Moravcsik's critics disagree on the role of rational 
choice in determining state actions and outcomes, however his account remains central to intergovernmental 
theory. 
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of the member states. This is not to underestimate their potential power; principal-agent 
theory expects agents to misbehave periodically and to pursue interests which conflict with 
their principals' (Pollack 2007). However, it is always possible to trace their power back to an 
original motive of the principals - albeit that it might not be exercised in exact accord with 
any one of their preferences. Seen this way, integration between states is not strictly the sum 
of its parts but is a non-exponential function of them - meaning supranational bodies cannot 
be the ultimate cause or beneficiaries of integration. New intergovernmental theory seeks to 
explain state preferences not only in terms of substantive outcomes but in terms of process 
and democratic imperatives, an approach which  has been applied to EU financial and 
economic regulation as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy and Justice and 
Home Affairs.45 It points to a greater instability in EU competences than was postulated by 
liberal intergovernmentalism, due to growing tension between governments and their 
societies and the politicisation of EU  integration within these cleavages.46  
 Given these fundamentally different accounts of the nature and causes of integration, 
it is unsurprising that a single definition of the concept has not gained acceptance.47 
However the lack of a definition can also be seen as limiting the relevance of the theoretical 
debate to the 'normal science' of empirical observation of policy-making in the EU. Without a 
common definition of integration, it is difficult to agree upon common measures for it, which 
in turn limits the scope for organising observations into meaningful patterns and testing 
hypotheses about cause and effect. For example, the extensive literature on governance in 
the EU encompasses a range of observations about the role of transnational actors in 
determining policy outcomes. While description and understanding of these roles may be 
interesting in and of itself, it is difficult to link them to each other without a theory which 
separates independent and dependent variables. Integration defined in a certain way may or 
may not be the best-fitting concept, but it does point towards falsifiable hypotheses. These 
can then be tested against individual observations and rejected or confirmed as appropriate. 
A string of rejected hypotheses (for example, about the impact of transnational policy 
networks on integration) should point to the need for a new independent variable, not a new 
dependent one. At the same time, as the EU evolves it is natural for the focus to shift to novel 
outcomes, whether they are labelled 'integration', 'disintegration' or something in between.  
 As the EU has become more complex and variegated, those who study it have chosen 
                                                          
 
45 See Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015) pp 33-36 and chapters by Smith, Wolff and Howarth & Quaglia in 
that volume.  See also Maricut (2016); Bressanelli & Chelotti (2016) and Fabbrini (2017).  
46 Ibid pp 36-38. See also Saurugger (2016).  
47 Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006) note a similar lack of a common definition for 'governance' in the EU 
context. Inasmuch as governance approaches reject the centrality of the state, they appear irreconcilable with 
intergovernmental theory; however, they also typically question the centrality of supranational institutions.  
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either to develop more nuanced understandings of integration or to abandon the concept 
altogether. The 'governance turn' described by Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006) began in 
the late 1990s with a focus on concepts such as the regulatory state (Majone 1996; 
Jachtenfuchs 2001) and new modes of governance (Wallace 2001 and 2005). These seek to 
explain the EU within the framework of globalised economic and social relationships 
between public and private actors.  Rather than treating EU integration as a dependent 
variable, the governance approach takes integration as a given and looks at how it influences 
policies and the exercise of power at national, subnational and supranational levels. It largely 
eschews grand scale theory to focus on more narrowly-defined research problems (Bulmer 
1997). Kohler-Koch and Rittberger trace the evolution of EU governance studies from early 
work on the role of policy networks through to a more recent focus on regions and civil 
society, noting an increase in the governance literature associated with the 2004 
enlargement. They also note a tendency to focus on first pillar issues as opposed to more 
intergovernmental areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy or Justice and 
Home Affairs.  
 From the governance literature emerged the idea of 'Europeanisation', whereby 
norms first defined and consolidated in the process of EU decision-making are incorporated 
into domestic policies and practices (Radaelli 2000).  Radaelli distinguishes Europeanisation 
from convergence (convergence or divergence may be a consequence of Europeanisation), 
harmonisation (Europeanisation may lead instead to regulatory competition), and from 
integration itself, which he sees as being concerned with a prior ontological stage. If 
Europeanisation is an outcome of integration as Radaelli suggests, can it also be used as an 
indicator of integration? Perhaps, but it has proven difficult to observe and its effects 
indeterminate. For example, Andersen and Burns (1996) identified a slightly decreased role 
for national and regional parliaments and Dyson and Featherstone (1999) identified a 
slightly increased role for executives linked to Europeanisation. The observed effects on 
national administrative structures and practices are similarly modest (Page and Wouters 
1995). By the early 2000s, questions were being raised about the explanatory power of the 
EU as an independent variable in studies of national administrative systems (Goetz 2000).  
 Hooghe and Marks (2001) developed the idea of multi-level governance (MLG), 
distinguishing it from intergovernmentalism (or the 'state-centric model' as they call it) in 
part by arguing that supranational institutions had independent influence over EU policy-
making which could not be derived from their role as agents of national executives. This 
perhaps ignores the variation in models of delegation - some of which specifically predict 
that agents will eventually act independently of their principals (Pollack 2003).  The other 
fundamental insight of multi-level governance - that subnational interests are not always 
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neatly nested within national interests, is compatible with both intergovernmental and 
supranational accounts of EU integration. It is an important prophylactic against the more 
reductive tendencies of both schools: caricaturisation of states as unitary actors in 
intergovernmentalism and projection of supranational institutions as the exclusive 
beneficiaries of powers transferred by states in neofunctionalism. Newer versions of both 
theories appear to take on this insight by placing more weight respectively on domestic 
political structures48 and transnational actors.49 In some respects this harks back to the early 
work of Bulmer (1983,1985) which focused on the role of domestic politics in European 
integration.         
Latterly Hooghe and Marks have espoused a 'postfunctionalist' approach which 
encompasses multi-level governance but which points to identity as a key causal factor 
determining integration outcomes in the EU context (Hooghe & Marks 2008). They 
distinguish this from neofunctionalist and intergovernmental approaches by arguing that 
efficient outcomes will not necessarily flow from integration driven by identity. They see 
political conflict as determinative of integration outcomes; however this seems not to raise a 
challenge to either the neofunctional or intergovernmental models of causality so much as to 
restate the questions they address.  Given that identity and political conflict have always 
existed and have always been different at national and European levels, why should 
integration occur in some areas or at certain times and not at others? Hooghe and Marks 
observe that as European integration became more prominent in public opinion and 
electoral politics in the 1990s, it also became more divisive both within and between political 
parties. The resulting politicisation has caused left/right divisions to become more salient in 
EU politics - but these do not map precisely onto national political cleavages. While a 
left/right spectrum certainly exists in EU politics, it is less directly concerned with 
redistribution of wealth than those which exist at national level. 50 
 Amongst scholars who have pursued the idea of integration, Diez and Wiener (2009) 
opt for a loose definition which only requires the 'creation of political institutions to which 
member states subscribe.' It is not clear how this definition of integration captures 
developments within those institutions, after their initial creation.  They proceed to define 
European integration theory as 'the field of systematic reflection on the process of 
intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political 
                                                          
 
48 Bickerton (2012), Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015). 
49 Sandholtz, Stone Sweet and Fligstein (2001); Schmitter and Niemann (2009). 
50 See also Hix (1994 and 1998) on left-right and pro/anti-integration dimensions. Micklin (2014) looks at the 
effect of the euro crisis on these dimensions in national party politics but still finds limited evidence of their 
alignment.  
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institutions, as well as on its outcome.' This definition is telling in that it only appears to be 
concerned with integration in one direction - towards more intense political cooperation. 
Arguably the opposite phenomenon, whereby states which once were prepared to pool 
sovereignty in particular areas choose instead to 'repatriate' certain competences or policies, 
is equally interesting (and perhaps more challenging) from a theoretical perspective.  It is 
true that examples of disintegration are thinner on the ground than examples of integration 
within the EU, but close examination of many policy areas may reveal a mix of both 
tendencies. Properly explored, examples of disintegration may even constitute a type of 
control group, enhancing the falsifiability of integration theories.   
 Both neofunctional and intergovernmental theorists have developed accounts of 
disintegration. Schmitter (1970) and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) developed the idea of 
'spillback' as a counterpart to the spillover effect which plays a central role in neofunctional 
theory. Spillback can be observed in situations where the functional benefits of cooperation 
no longer outweigh the costs, and may result either in repatriation of competences to states 
or in devolvement to subnational or transnational actors (Vollaard 2008). Disintegration 
may be explained in intergovernmental theory by either a failure of bargaining, or a shift in 
national preferences. Disintegration need not be a dramatic process any more than 
integration is - however it is indispensable to allow us to define and measure integration, if 
we consider that not everything the EU does constitutes integration. Due to the EU's unique 
depth and longevity, it is generally treated as a special case of political integration - but that 
does not mean it is synonymous with integration. Vollaard points out that while examples of 
large scale political integration are rare globally (thus the n=1 problem in EU studies), 
examples of disintegration are much more common.   
He develops Bartolini's framework on polity formation (Bartolini 2005) which 
highlights the mutual dependence between the external consolidation and internal 
structuring of political formations. External consolidation refers to both the permeability of a 
polity's boundaries (for example the possibility to exit or partially exit and the costs of doing 
so) and the congruence between its different types of boundaries (coercive, administrative, 
legal, cultural, social, economic). Internal organisation is needed to maintain these 
boundaries and where external consolidation is strongest, more permanent and stable 
alignments develop. Vollaard applies this logic to various scenarios for EU disintegration, 
asking if they could be explained by weak external consolidation, uneven distribution of exit 
and entry options, or weak internal structuring (for example, an insufficiently developed 
party system).What I wish to draw out from this analysis is the idea that disintegration can 
be theorised as something other than the reverse of integration - however given that the 
scenarios examined by Vollaard have until recently been purely hypothetical, it has been 
difficult to test the theory. 
20 
 
 Earlier generations of scholars had to grapple with 'Eurosclerosis' (1970s) and the 
'integration paradox' (1990s and 2000s) - developing approaches which helped to explain 
why integration might take place more slowly, incompletely or in different institutional 
forms. More recently, the measures adopted in response to the financial crisis have led some 
to identify an 'authoritarian tendency' in the exercise of power within the EU. Measures such 
as the fiscal compact adopted under the 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance have the effect of increasing fiscal capacity and fiscal surveillance at EU level. 
While neofunctional accounts have characterised this as spillover from the monetary to fiscal 
realms (Vilpisauskis 2013; Niemann and Ioannau 2015), it can also be seen as the product of 
asymmetrical interdependence between member states, with an emphasis on Germany's 
preferences (Schimmelfennig 2015) or as the path-dependent result of the initial decisions 
made to deal with the crisis (Gocaj and Meunier 2013). Kreuder-Sonnen (2016) argues that 
none of these approaches fully explain the specific political, legal and discursive processes 
adopted in the face of the crisis and that, by characterising them as 'business as usual' they 
also reinforce the normative bias of existing theory towards further integration. He points to 
the more critical account given by legal scholars of the crisis. The specific role of law in 
furthering European integration has received considerable attention from the 1990s 
onwards. The next section surveys this literature with a view to further refining the definition 
of integration.   
Legal views of integration 
 While law has always played a central role the European project, early attempts to 
theorise integration focused more on institutions and political bargains than on legal 
foundations. However, from the mid-1960s the role of the European Court of Justice in 
furthering integration became too prominent to ignore, with cases such as Van Gend en 
Loos, Costa v ENEL and Cassis de Dijon establishing its power to extend the scope and 
nature of integration. Joseph Weiler (1981) was one of the first to theorise these 
developments, applying a broadly neofunctional approach and drawing parallels between the 
Court and the Commission. The Court had established the ability of private litigants to 
enforce both Treaty provisions and secondary legislation such as directives.51 This generated 
spillover effects as the Court's recognition of individual rights to enforce EU law ensured 
ongoing demand for integration from various interest groups. Dehousse and Weiler (1990) 
characterised law as both the object and the agent of integration, identifying its important 
functional and symbolic roles in developing the internal market. For example, the Cassis de 
Dijon ruling lead to the development of the mutual recognition principle which underlay 
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much of the 1992 programme culminating in the Maastricht Treaty, but also responded to 
the political reality of stalled harmonisation. While the dual nature of law as active creator 
and passive reflector of integration continues to ring true, this dualism makes it more 
difficult to treat law as either a dependent or independent variable in the study of EU 
integration. Dehousse and Weiler described its semi-independent influence over integration: 
The legal system is sometimes animated by a dynamic of its own...even if law is not 
the main catalyst of change in the integration process, many changes are greatly 
conditioned by legal and institutional elements. 
They also drew attention to the lack of correlation between institutional and substantive 
integration: stronger supranational institutions do not always produce more integrated laws. 
This suggests that attempts to measure integration based on either institutional or legal 
analysis alone will give an incomplete picture. Dehousse and Weiler developed a scale to 
measure legal integration based on competence, decision-making bodies, the effect on 
national legal orders and use of legal techniques such as harmonisation.52 On one end of the 
scale are areas of exclusive supranational competence where decisions are made by 
procedures which do not require unanimity between member states, which have direct effect 
in national law and which aim to harmonise practices. On the other end sit areas of mixed 
competence where the jurisdiction of supranational bodies is limited, decisions require 
unanimity and must be implemented in national law, and they do not entail harmonisation.  
 They found that these indicators of integration did not always covary; for example, 
the Benelux and Western European Union groupings (highly integrated by other measures) 
used decision-making techniques which required unanimity and so were effectively 
intergovernmental. They also noted that stronger supranational structures did not 
necessarily produce more integrated norms; comparing the less harmonised outcomes of the 
American federal system with those of the EC. In terms of EC legal integration, the 
development of the concepts of direct effect and supremacy coincided with the erosion of 
supranational decision-making through reduced powers of initiative for the Commission and 
creation of new intergovernmental organs such as Coreper and the European Council. The 
question of whether the Court actively attempted to 'save' integration during times of 
political deadlock is hinted at but not actively explored by Dehousse and Weiler. To some 
extent this question looms in the background of most legal studies of EU integration, with 
Hjalte Rasmussen's 1986 work setting out a critique of what he saw as the Court's 
unaccountable judicial activism.53 While disagreement amongst political scientists on the 
causes of EU integration have inhibited adoption of a common definition in that field, 
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different views amongst legal theorists about the role of the Court of Justice in integration 
tend to focus more on normative questions (is judge-made law a good thing?) - rather than 
the causes of legal integration.  
 Burley and Mattli (1993) defined legal integration as the 'gradual penetration of EC 
law into the domestic law of its member states' - encompassing both formal penetration 
through direct effect and supremacy, and substantive penetration of different regulatory 
areas. They see this process as fitting well within original neofunctionalist theory, in 
particular the spilling over of regulation from economic to related domains such as 
occupational health and safety, social welfare or education. Both the formal and substantive 
penetration of EU law, and in particular the ECJ's cross-cutting principles of interpretation 
can be seen as conforming to the neofunctionalist model. Burley and Mattli characterise the 
drivers of legal integration as subnational and supranational actors behaving in their own 
self-interest within a politically insulated sphere. Citizens, businesses and interest groups 
drive legal integration through litigation, while the Court itself protects its decision-making 
power through politically-conscious interpretations of law. They describe law as a 'mask for 
politics' - although this tends to imply that the two domains are separated at birth and can 
only covertly converge - a premise which would be questioned by legal realists amongst 
others. Burley and Mattli also ignore the restrictions placed by the Court on private applicant 
standing in cases such as Plaumann54 and Calpak55 which lead many legal scholars to argue 
that the Court had not in fact protected individual rights effectively.56    
 In contrast to the neofunctional view, Garrett and Weingast (1993) and Garrett, 
Kelemen and Schulz (1998) argue that ECJ judgments can be understood through analysis of 
national interests. They draw both on Moravscik's (1993) idea of credible commitments - 
whereby states agree to bind themselves in the interest of also securing assurances over the 
future behaviour of others - and on principal-agent theory to understand the Court's role 
within integration. Armstrong (1998) criticises both neofunctional and intergovernmental 
accounts of legal integration for focusing on process to the neglect of outcomes, specifically 
the legitimacy of the Court's attempt to build a European constitution out of relatively thin 
textual foundations in the Treaties. Armstrong applies an institutionalist analysis to the role 
of law in EU integration, arguing that the Court's response to its (political) environment has 
created a path-dependent evolution. While both private litigants and the Court of Justice 
                                                          
 
54 Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co. v Commission [1963] ECR 95 
55 Joined Cases 789 and 790/79 Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v Commission [1980] 
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56 See e.g. Rasmussen, H.  “Remedying the crumbling EC judicial system” 37 C M L Rev 1071 (2000); Albors-
Llorens, A. “The standing of private parties to challenge Community measures: Has the European Court missed 
the boat?” 62 Cambridge L J 72 (2003); Schwarze, J. “The legal protection of the individual against regulations in 
European Union law” 10 Eur Pub L 285 (2004).   
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possess agency, these are mediated through precedent, legal doctrine, and eventually 
constitutionalism. Armstrong's analysis suggests a bi-directionality in law's effect on 
integration (meaning it can limit as well as strengthen it); this raises questions of how EU 
law can be linked back to independent political variables and how its effect on integration 
can be measured.   
 Whereas Burley and Mattli describe law as a one-way ratchet towards greater 
integration, Alter (2001) identifies the potential for 'negative feedback loops' to develop 
where an adverse ruling from the Court of Justice inhibits future private litigants from 
relying on EU law, in turn reducing the demand for integration. Court judgments may also 
create a backlash which leads member states to carve out areas as being beyond the Court's 
purview - Alter cites the Barber protocol to the Maastricht Treaty (limiting the retrospective 
effect of the Court's ruling on gender parity in pensions), as well as the Irish and Danish 
protocols to the same Treaty, as examples of this. More broadly, exclusion of the Court's 
jurisdiction over the common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs, and 
limitation of the right of lower national courts to request preliminary rulings under the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, point to the possibility of legal disintegration. However, there is a risk 
in treating these examples as all symptomatic of a reduction in integration; in the case of the 
second and third pillars under Maastricht it is rather a case of not transferring new powers 
to the Court. Similarly, while Alter cites the subsidiarity principle included in the Maastricht 
Treaty as part of the attempt to repatriate legal powers, later studies suggest that the 
practical effect of subsidiarity has been limited.57  
 While there is no lack of empirical literature on EU law written by lawyers, including 
the public procurement rules, much of this focuses on the meaning and effect of EU law 
rather than asking why it exists, or why it has changed over time. This is not mere incuriosity 
on the part of lawyers; a commitment to the rule of law means that law's legitimacy should 
be separated from the political projects which generate it.58 While it may then be natural for 
political scientists to be more interested than lawyers in what causes EU integration, the 
novelty of EU law, and in particular the Court's purposive or teleological approach to its 
interpretation, calls for some understanding of its political genesis. For example, directives 
are typically prefaced with a number of recitals setting out the objectives and intentions of 
the legislative text. Political scientists often stop reading after this part; lawyers are more 
likely to skip the recitals and focus on the binding provisions which follow. However, some 
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58 Whereas political legitimacy, following Locke, is usually understood to arise from the consent of the majority, 
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is clear even from this very basic account that either conception of legitimacy may, on its own, lead to tyranny.  
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representatives from either domain have been conscious of the benefits of a more catholic 
approach. 
  In updating the neofunctional account of EU law, De Búrca (2005) called for a more 
nuanced mutual understanding between political science and legal scholars. She highlights 
the need to look beyond the role of courts in seeking to explain the relationship between law 
and integration - in particular by understanding the use of law to create competences and 
constrain their exercise, to structure interpretation by the people and bodies subject to it, to 
confer symbolic legitimacy, and to provide reasons and incentives for action.59 In this last 
role, law also shapes the preferences of political actors. Judgments of the Court of Justice 
form a relatively small part of the overall corpus of EU law, but play a disproportionately 
large role in political theories of EU integration. De Búrca's work develops the idea of law as 
the independent variable and political integration as the dependent variable. She notes the 
lack of explanatory theories within legal scholarship both generally and in respect of EU 
integration; likewise neofunctional theory had largely failed to account for the specific role of 
law in furthering or hindering integration. A more nuanced understanding of law’s role 
beyond court rulings would help to develop causal theories regarding its contribution to EU 
integration.     
 The institutionalist theory of integration put forward by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
(1998) and Sandholtz, Stone Sweet and Fligstein (2001) does develop a more detailed 
account of law's causal role, in part by differentiating between legislation, judgments and 
general legal principles. This builds upon the earlier work of Sandholtz and Zysman (1989). 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet define integration as: 
the process by which the horizontal and vertical linkages between social, economic, 
and political actors emerge and evolve. Vertical linkages are the stable relationships, 
or patterned interactions, between actors organized at the EC level and actors 
organized at or below the member‐state level. Horizontal linkages are the stable 
relationships, or patterned interaction, between actors organized in one member 
state with actors organized in another. We understand these linkages to be 
“institutionalized” to the extent that they are constructed and sustained by EC rules.60 
Historical institutionalism draws upon the idea of path-dependence: once particular 
decisions or structures are put in place, subsequent developments are shaped in a way which 
reinforces the original event and makes its reversal less likely. Institutionalism in the context 
of EU integration allows both for the exogenous influence of geopolitical or economic factors 
and endogenous effects such as spillover. The application of institutionalism to international 
relations also points towards a broader appreciation of the dual role of law as agent and 
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subject of change.61 Applying these insights to the study of integration allows both 
comparative statics (between the EU and other polities) and historical dynamics (changes 
within the EU over time) to be analysed.  
Others have applied an institutionalist perspective on integration to specific areas of 
EU policy. Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) analysed a number of aspects of single market 
regulation adopted under the 1986 Single European Act, including mergers and acquisitions, 
the removal of technical barriers to trade, air transport liberalisation and public 
procurement. Their research also included two areas of social and environmental regulation 
(the rights of pregnant women in the workplace and transport of toxic waste). Armstrong 
and Bulmer sought to demonstrate that neither member state interests nor Commission 
entrepreneurship or ECJ rulings could fully account for these reforms. They emphasise the 
role of 'contingencies' such as European Council procedural rules as well as the extension of 
qualified majority voting in enabling the reforms, while also acknowledging the role of global 
political economy developments in normalising market liberalisation. While offering a 
relatively convincing account of how and why integration occurred in these areas, Bulmer 
and Armstrong admit that the institutionalist approach does not get at the 'very mainsprings' 
of integration, instead offering a middle-range theory which helps to explain how it is 
mediated within the EU.  It thus stops short of answering the 'why?' (or 'why not?') question.   
 Further research in the institutionalist vein includes Thatcher (2001 and 2006), who 
analysed the changes to telecommunications regulation from the late 1980s onwards, 
rejecting the view that the Commission acted unilaterally as a supranational entrepreneur in 
this area.62 Domestic institutions based on monopoly supply, public ownership and national 
regulation were replaced by open markets subject to detailed EU rules. Importantly, the 
institutionalist view of integration here does not pre-judge questions about the causes of 
integration, but brings them into sharper focus. Thatcher attributes the changes primarily to 
transnational technological and economic developments such as digitalisation, which eroded 
many of the natural monopoly characteristics of the sector. He identifies cases both of 
conflict and co-operation between the Commission and Member States in the evolution of 
the EU telecommunications regulation. Thatcher explores the idea of the Commission acting 
as the agent of the Member States in telecommunications reform, but ultimately 
characterises the process as a partnership rather than an example of supranational or 
intergovernmental policy-making.  Intuitively, if both theories offer plausible explanations 
for integration and are not mutually exclusive then there will be cases where both forces can 
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be observed within the same regulatory area. In areas where the interests of member states 
and the Commission conflict, we would expect to see evidence of trade-offs or compromises; 
Thatcher points to re-regulation to protect 'essential requirements' such as employee safety 
or network security as one such compromise. The hypotheses I develop below are based on 
what I argue are incompatible explanations for regulatory change offered by supranational 
and intergovernmental theory, based on the ideas of policy entrepreneurship and agency 
respectively.  
Adopting a Working Definition 
 Based on the above critical review of approaches to understanding European 
integration, it is possible to identify some criteria for a robust definition to be applied in this 
study. First, the definition of integration should not presuppose causality or privilege certain 
independent variables over others. Second, it should make it possible to test hypotheses 
about causality, by identifying a distinct and measurable phenomenon which can be 
observed over time and across more than one arena in which the same independent variables 
operate. Third, it should be measurable in both directions - integration and non-integration. 
Non-integration refers to cases where powers are not transferred to the EU, which should be 
distinguished from cases where powers previously exercised as EU level are repatriated 
(disintegration) and from cases where areas potentially subject to EU competence are legally 
insulated (anti-integration), seen most clearly in the protocols to the Maastricht Treaty 
mentioned above. It makes sense to focus on non-integration in testing hypotheses about the 
causes of integration, as absence of the identified causal factors would be expected to result 
in non-integration - whereas disintegration and anti-integration are more likely to 
demonstrate a resistance to attempted integration by other actors. Fourth, a working 
definition of integration must be plausible and neither over- nor under-inclusive. 
Characterising everything the EU does as integration, for example, is an over-inclusive 
definition which elides the distinction between cooperation and transfers of sovereign power.  
Of the definitions reviewed above, that put forward by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
(1998) seems to best satisfy these criteria: 
[EU integration is] the process by which the horizontal and vertical linkages between 
social, economic, and political actors emerge and evolve. Vertical linkages are the 
stable relationships, or patterned interactions, between actors organized at the E[U] 
level and actors organized at or below the member‐state level. Horizontal linkages are 
the stable relationships, or patterned interaction, between actors organized in one 
member state with actors organized in another.   
By invoking the somewhat anodyne class of 'social, economic and political actors' 
their definition avoids conferring primacy on either supranational or national actors at the 
outset. Elsewhere Sandholtz and Stone Sweet ascribe a central role to 'transnational actors' - 
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a term generally understood to exclude states. However, it is not necessary to adopt this 
causal hypothesis in order to make use of the above definition. Other causal hypotheses can 
easily be imagined, for example that member states would forge horizontal linkages in order 
to lower transaction costs amongst themselves. Does it describe a distinct and measurable 
phenomenon? The definition refers to a process rather than an end-state, which makes it 
easier to observe in the context of an ever-changing polity. Vertical and horizontal linkages 
or interactions are certainly susceptible to measurement. Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and 
Fligstein (2001) focus on institutionalisation as measured by precision, formality and 
authority. Precision refers to detailed guidelines on behaviour whereas formality is present 
where there are established procedures or bodies with rule-making powers. Authority exists 
where there are sanctions for breaking rules and enforcement procedures. The next section 
looks at how these measures can be applied to the changes to EU public procurement law 
adopted in 2014.  
 While the definition focuses on the emergence and evolution of linkages, it seems 
both theoretically and empirically possible for the absence or dissolution of such linkages to 
be studied. For example, in the course of this study I will identify some areas where the 
precision of the EU procurement rules have decreased in comparison with the previous 
generation of directives - as well as many where it has increased. This bidirectionality raises 
questions of quantification - how can we say whether a given area is more or less integrated 
when indicators point in different directions? Institutionalisation proposes that the creation 
of EU rules in a given area indicates integration. However the above definition also requires 
linkages to be stable in order for them to form the basis of integration. In the course of this 
study I will evaluate both the direction and the stability of the various rule changes studied. 
Stability is understood not as permanence (all EU rules are capable of being changed) but as 
relative 'stickiness' - measured according to the political cost associated with change.  A rule 
which the Court identifies as emanating directly from the Treaty is highly sticky/stable 
because of the political cost of Treaty changes. Conversely a rule which is set out in a 
Commission communication is generally much less stable - unless there are high political 
costs associated with changing it. Another way of expressing this idea is as the revocability or 
reversibility of EU measures, which informs my development of testable hypotheses below.  
 In terms of plausibility, tentatively applying the measures proposed by 
institutionalisation to the reform of EU public procurement rules indicates that these allow 
for a reasonably comprehensive assessment both of the detail and the overall direction of the 
reform. The definition would be over-inclusive if it characterised observations as integration 
which more plausibly relate to another phenomenon. For example, stable horizontal 
relationships and patterned interaction between bidding companies and contracting 
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authorities in different states might be seen as part of the more general phenomenon of 
globalisation, rather than EU integration specifically. This can pose problems in terms of 
developing and testing causal theories, if the dependent variable is in fact part of a bigger 
phenomenon which the specific causal factors proposed are not capable of affecting. This 
however is primarily a problem for studies which address meta-problems such as why 
integration has occurred. In the context of this study, which contrasts two sets of rules 
adopted within a period of ten years, macro-effects such as globalisation may be deemed to 
be relatively stable – and in any case they would not explain the higher degree of EU public 
procurement integration than applies under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 
for example.63 Under-inclusivity does not appear to be a serious risk within the 
institutionalist definition of integration, as it encompasses a large set of relationships which 
cover the known terrain of integration.  
 Finally, while the definition refers to a process, the concept of institutionalisation 
also potentially reaches towards a Haasian end-state. If stable vertical and horizontal 
relationships are observed, it should be possible to predict the effect of different independent 
variables on levels of integration. One critique of historical institutionalism (although it is a 
critique shared by almost all theories in the social sciences) is that it tends to operate 
retrospectively rather than prospectively. The difficulty lies partly in the proliferation of 
causal hypotheses which institutionalism invites - however careful testing of these can help 
to develop an understanding of integration which allows specific future scenarios to be 
rejected or even predicted. This is particularly the case where the rules and relationships 
observed are highly stable - for example where they form part of a constitutional settlement 
or treaty. It is not the project of this thesis to predict future developments in the EU public 
procurement rules but to compare the explanatory power of supranational and 
intergovernmental theory when applied to the most recent changes.  
Applying the Working Definition to the Case  
 Applying the institutionalist definition and measures of integration may help to link 
this study to broader theoretical debates about the nature and causes of EU integration. The 
2014 procurement directives set out detailed rules for how contracting authorities can 
include social and environmental factors in procurement decisions. These rules operate in 
different ways, which in turn entail different degrees of institutionalisation when compared 
to the previous procurement directives adopted in 2004. However even in areas where the 
new directives create additional flexibility or allow derogation from internal market 
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principles, they often appear to introduce or increase precision, formality and authority. The 
picture is made somewhat more complex by the existence of a four-way balance of power 
under the directives, between EU insititutions, member states, individual contracting 
authorities and economic operators. This contrasts with the two-way power balance between 
the EU and member states which is typically envisioned by integration theories emerging 
from classic international relations scholarship. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet's definition 
explicitly contemplates roles for multiple actors at the EU, national and subnational levels - 
meaning we should not be confined to a two-dimensional analysis. 
 As outlined in the introduction, the reform of the procurement directives was driven 
by a set of policy objectives which were variously espoused by the member states, 
Commission, Parliament and Court. Subnational and transnational actors (in this case, 
primarily regional and local government authorities, business associations, unions and 
NGOs) also played a clear role both during the initial Green Paper consultation and the 
negotiations over the new directives. While on their face the 2014 directives include a wider 
range of social and environmental provisions than their 2004 predecessors, a number of 
questions remain regarding the interpretation of these provisions. In particular, the 
requirement for a ‘link to the subject-matter of the contract’ (discussed in Chapter 4) may be 
interpreted more or less strictly by the Court, and there is ongoing debate over the ability to 
include non-statutory minimum wages in public contracts. These questions touch upon 
deeper debates as to the idea of a social market economy and the legitimacy of social 
protection measures being applied by Member States both domestically (including to posted 
workers) and to workers abroad who produce goods and services consumed by the public 
sector. EU law in this area aims to strike a balance between internal market interests and 
diverse local and national interests. The process of compromise between these interests can 
be clearly seen in the history of the reform which is examined in the empirical part of this 
thesis. 
On first glance, the increased volume of procurement rules (three directives 
amounting to some 450 pages, replacing two directives which covered 250 pages) might 
seem to answer the question of whether integration has increased. However, many of these 
rules give contracting authorities more flexibility in running tender procedures, while some 
of them give states more choice over which rules to apply. So mere volume of rules cannot be 
used as a proxy for integration. Likewise, in the specific area of focus for this study - the rules 
on social and environmental aspects of procurement - some of the rules serve to reinforce the 
autonomy of contracting authorities or member states whereas some clearly hold them to 
common EU standards. The picture is complex, however it is possible to break the changes 
down based on the levels of precision, formality and authority compared to the status quo 
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ante (i.e. the 2004 directives). The rule types found in the 2014 are summarised in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1 Social and environmental rules under 2014 EU Procurement Directives  
Comparing the rules under each of these types to their predecessors (if any) under the 2004 
procurement directives, it is possible to make a preliminary evaluation of their impact on the 
three indicators of integration proposed by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, as shown in Table 
1.2.  
Table 1.2 Preliminary analysis of rule types against institutionalisation indicators 
A more detailed analysis of the changes under each of these headings is given in the 
empirical chapters. It is worth noting that there are certain areas where the flexibility or 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by either individual contracting authorities (buyers) or 
Rule Type Characteristics Examples 
1. Buyer decides if and 
how to apply 
environmental/social 
factors 
Increased discretion of 
individual contracting 
authorities to derogate 
from internal market 
principles. 
Ability to reserve contracts for 
sheltered workshops/ 
employment programmes; light 
touch regime (discretion shared 
with MS); rules on subcontractors 
(shared with MS) 
2. Buyer decides if 
(but not how) to apply 
environmental/social 
factors 
Increased ability for 
contracting authorities 
to apply SPP measures, 
but reduced discretion 
over how to apply 
them. 
Rules on environmental and 
social award criteria, life-cycle 
costing and labels; rules on 
references to production 
processes and methods in 
technical specifications. 
3. Member state 
decides if and how to 
apply 
environmental/social 
factors 
Policy decisions to be 
taken at national (or 
regional) level within 
the limits defined in the 
directives 
Ability to restrict lowest price 
award; light touch regime (shared 
with buyers); possibility to make 
discretionary exclusion grounds 
mandatory; rules on 
subcontractors (shared with 
buyers) 
4. Buyer must apply 
environmental/social 
factors 
Mandatory rules which 
must be applied by all 
contracting authorities 
Exclusion of companies convicted 
of child labour and people 
trafficking; mandatory social 
clause (Art. 18.2); requirement to 
reject abnormally low tenders 
which do not comply with 
environmental and social laws or 
collective agreements.  
Rule Type 
  
Indicator of 
Integration 
(∆+ compared 
to 2004 
directives) 
1 Buyer 
decides if 
and how to 
apply 
2 Buyer 
decides if 
(but not 
how) to 
apply 
3 Member 
States decide 
if and how to 
apply 
4 Buyer 
must apply 
Precision No Yes No Yes 
Formality Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authority Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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member states has increased. This is most clearly seen in the rules relating to reservation of 
contracts for sheltered workshops or employment programmes. However even in areas 
where the directives expressly grant contracting authorities or member states discretion over 
social and environmental aspects of procurement, they regulate the scope of that discretion 
and establish principles or limits enforceable by the Court of Justice, as well as by domestic 
courts. For this reason, while they cannot always be seen as increasing precision in 
comparison with the 2004 directives, they do increase the levels of formality and authority.  
 Each of the above rules builds vertical linkages between EU institutions and national 
or sub-national actors, and horizontal linkages between procurement markets in different 
member states – although the strength of these linkages varies depending on the rule type. 
At the strongest end of the spectrum are mandatory rules which must be applied by all 
contracting authorities (Type 4) – such as the exclusion of bidders convicted of child labour 
or people trafficking. These create vertical linkages by enabling the Commission and Court to 
enforce their application, and horizontal linkages because the same approach must be 
applied in each member state and by each contracting authority. At the weaker end of the 
spectrum are rules which are merely permissive and do not specify how environmental or 
social factors are to be applied (Type 1). For example, the light touch regime allows member 
states and/or individual contracting authorities to decide on the procedures to be followed in 
awarding social or healthcare service contracts. However even these minimally prescriptive 
rules create vertical linkages due to their susceptibility to interpretation and enforcement by 
the Court and Commission. Likewise, while they fall well short of harmonising practices 
between member states, they do establish the ‘outer limits’ of acceptable practices by 
reference to general Treaty principles such as transparency and equal treatment, and define 
the list of services which fall within and without this lighter set of rules. 
 
Precision 
Precision in the context of the above rule types can be understood as the level of 
detail with which the directives regulate actions taken by member states, contracting 
authorities or economic operators. Caporaso and Stone Sweet (2001) point out that while 
precision is often key to the operational effect of EU law, it is not always so; many of the rules 
set out in the Treaty on free movement are vague, but due to their formality and authority 
have had far-reaching integration effects. Indeed it is those rules which are most vague 
which have often been the source of judicial integration. While precision may therefore be an 
indicator of integration in some cases, it should not be seen as a necessary condition for 
integration. In Table 1.2, it can be seen that those rules which allow either individual buyers 
or member states to decide if and how to apply them do not demonstrate an increase in 
precision over the 2004 directives. However, because these rules are encapsulated within the 
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directives and subject to interpretation and enforcement by the Court, they do imply 
integration at least in terms of the boundaries of what contracting authorities may do. For 
example, Article 20 of the Public Sector Directive provides in relation to reserved contracts 
that: 
1. Member States may reserve the right to participate in public procurement 
procedures to sheltered workshops and economic operators whose main aim is the 
social and professional integration of disabled or disadvantaged persons or may 
provide for such contracts to be performed in the context of sheltered employment 
programmes, provided that at least 30% of the employees of those workshops, 
economic operators or programmes are disabled or disadvantaged workers.  
 
 2. The call for competition shall make reference to this Article.  
 
The discretion to reserve contracts is clearly limited by the specific requirements for 
organisations benefitting from the reservation to have a particular aim, and to employ a 
minimum percentage of disabled or disadvantaged workers. Compared to the previous rules 
on reservation of contracts under the 2004 directives, the inclusion of 'disadvantaged' 
workers is new - and this term is not defined within the directives. While this might be seen 
as a decrease in precision, the provision in the second clause effectively allows for 
supervision both by the Commission and economic operators of the use of the reservation. 
Ultimately the CJEU would decide on the meaning of 'disadvantaged workers' if a member 
state or contracting authority were challenged on its use of this provision. As noted in the 
introduction, challenges to application of the procurement rules are not a mere theoretical 
possibility but occur frequently both at the domestic and EU levels, and thus have a 
considerable impact on practice.  Lack of precision in legislation may in some cases lead to 
more, rather than less integration - inasmuch as it renders it more vulnerable to challenge 
and, ultimately, to CJEU interpretation of the rules. 
 In other areas, there has been a clear increase in the detail associated with SPP rules 
in the directives. This is most clearly seen in relation to the rules on award criteria and use of 
third-party certifications (labels). The 2014 directives set out which labels can be requested 
in tenders and the circumstances in which an operator can submit alternative evidence. 
Previously, the directives simply stated that it was possible to use such labels, without setting 
any constraints on the type of label used. Legal commentators have highlighted the relatively 
restrictive nature of these new rules in an area which many see as fundamental to SPP.64 This 
was driven in part by concerns about 'green-washing' and the difficulty of determining 
compliance with basic environmental and labour conditions across global supply chains in 
the absence of third-party certification linked, for example, to audits and factory inspections. 
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It can be seen as an attempt to bolster the credibility of certification schemes by 
distinguishing those which are based on transparent criteria and accessible to all operators, 
from those which are effectively industry fig-leaves. As discussed in Chapter 4, a Commission 
challenge to the use of labels by a Dutch authority in the Max Havelaar case led the Court to 
develop rules on labels which are reflected in the text of the directives.  
 In relation to award criteria, the article setting out rules for this fundamental part of 
all procurement procedures has been considerably expanded to include both new examples 
of the type of criteria which can be applied and to provide a (partial) definition of the link to 
the subject-matter requirement. This accretion of rules in an area where the Court had 
previously accorded a relatively high degree of discretion to contracting authorities has been 
criticised by Arrowsmith (2015) amongst others. While many of the rules on award criteria 
are permissive rather than prescriptive, the scope for member states or contracting 
authorities to derogate from these rules is limited by the principles of equal treatment and 
transparency, as developed by the Court in its procurement jurisprudence. The light touch 
regime applies a much-reduced set of rules to contracts for social and other specific services 
which are deemed to be of lesser cross-border interest. However member states are not given 
free rein over award criteria, as can be seen in Article 76 of the Public Sector Directive: 
1. Member States shall put in place national rules for the award of contracts subject to 
this Chapter in order to ensure contracting authorities comply with the principles of 
transparency and equal treatment of economic operators. Member States are free to 
determine the procedural rules applicable as long as such rules allow contracting 
authorities to take into account the specificities of the services in question.  
2. Member States shall ensure that contracting authorities may take into account the 
need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and 
comprehensiveness of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, 
including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, the involvement and empowerment 
of users and innovation. Member States may also provide that the choice of the 
service provider shall be made on the basis of the tender presenting the best price-
quality ratio, taking into account quality and sustainability criteria for social services. 
While the first paragraph expresses the intention to limit the scope of EU regulation in 
relation to these contracts, the second paragraph introduces requirements for award criteria 
which go beyond those which apply to fully covered contracts. For example, there is no 
requirement on member states or contracting authorities to ensure that the specific needs of 
disadvantaged or vulnerable users are taken into account in award criteria for fully-covered 
contracts. As with the new reservation clause cited above, the new provisions on award 
criteria in the 2014 directives appear to give member states flexibility with one hand, but 
effectively take it away with the other, through an increase in the precision of the relevant 
measures. 
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Formality 
The rules set out in the directives are inherently formal; they have been adopted by 
the Parliament and Council and must be implemented in national law. The question for the 
purpose of this study is whether the various rules examined display an increase in formality, 
i.e. they relate to matters which were not previously regulated by the procurement directives 
or by another equally formal instrument. While informal sources such as Commission 
guidance on procurement65 still play a role in this area, environmental and social matters are 
dealt with more exhaustively in the 2014 directives than in the 2004 regime. Many of the 
rules relating to environmental and social considerations are new - this is the case for the 
mandatory social clause, light touch regime, life-cycle costing, trading conditions in award 
criteria, rules on abnormally low tenders and selection and exclusion grounds relating to 
child labour and human trafficking. It is also worth noting that the 2014 reform includes an 
entirely new directive relating to concession contracts,66 which were previously unregulated 
at EU level, although the Court had established their susceptibility to the general Treaty 
principles in a number of cases from the late 1990s onwards.67 While detailed consideration 
of the new rules on concessions falls outside of the scope of this study, their inclusion in the 
2014 procurement reform means that the overall formality of the EU rules has expanded 
considerably.  
 In the environmental and social provisions, increased formality is perhaps most 
obvious in the new rules on life-cycle costing (LCC). LCC is a technique for evaluation of the 
total cost of ownership of an asset68 which enables a more sustainable approach by including 
the costs of energy or water use, replacement, disposal and associated emissions, amongst 
other factors. LCC was not prevented under the 2004 directives but was not mentioned 
explicitly, leading many contracting authorities to develop their own methodologies for 
calculating LCC, which varied widely. This was a source of concern to some bidding 
companies who feared inconsistent or discriminatory use of LCC, a concern which appears to 
have been adopted by the Commission as it included new rules on LCC in its proposal for the 
directives. Article 68 of the Public Sector Directive now prescribes detailed rules for the use 
of LCC, including transparency requirements and the need to apply common EU 
methodologies where these have been developed for a particular sector.69 While these rules 
may assist contracting authorities by providing firm legal footing for LCC, they also create 
the possibility of challenges by bidders who consider that the methodology chosen does not 
                                                          
 
65 In particular the Buying Green Handbook (3rd edition, 2016) published by the European Commission.  
66 Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts. 
67 Over 25 cases relating to concession contracts were decided by the Court between 2000 and 2013.  
68 Also sometimes referred to as Whole-life Costing (WLC). 
69 Currently only the case in respect of vehicles under Directive 2009/81/EU (Clean Vehicles Directive) 
35 
 
conform to the detailed rules set out in the directive. As such, the rules have been greeted as 
a mixed blessing by advocates of sustainable public procurement.70 
 In addition to the formal and binding rules set out in articles, the directives contain a 
lengthy list of recitals which set out the intentions of the legislators. While these are not in 
themselves binding, they are often referred to by courts in interpreting substantive 
provisions. The volume of recitals has increased significantly over the 2004 directives - from 
51 in the old public sector directive to 138 in the new one - and they provide insight into the 
sometimes agonised compromises between the Council, Parliament and Commission over 
environmental and social matters. In areas where the Parliament, for example, was not 
happy with the text proposed by the Commission but failed to gain support in the Council for 
changes, the recitals aim to provide a gloss which accommodates its position to the extent 
possible without changing the text. The recitals therefore may not be an indicator of 
integration in the same way as formal legislative text, but they can be seen as the threads 
hanging out of a woven tapestry which provide clues as to its crafting.  
Authority 
 To some extent, even the permissive rules or exemptions which are included in the 
procurement directives have the effect of increasing judicialisation (and therefore the 
formality and authority) in this area - as it is not uncommon for a bidding company or the 
Commission to challenge the way in which such flexibilities are used. The European 
Commission initiates enforcement actions against member states for violations of the rules, 
often acting on complaints from companies. Separate directives regulate the availability of 
remedies in the member states themselves.71 These do not provide for full harmonisation of 
remedies - divergences in judicial systems across member states make that an impossibility. 
Instead they set out certain principles and minimum requirements regarding the procedures 
by which operators may seek to challenge contract award decisions. These include 
requirements to notify bidders of the outcome of procedures, to allow a minimum 'standstill 
period' between notification and award of the contract, and to suspend the contract award 
process where a challenge has been brought. In practice, the frequency of challenges depends 
on factors such as the costs associated with accessing the relevant court or tribunal in each 
country.72 Points of EU law which are not adequately clear must be referred to the Court of 
Justice, and these preliminary references account for more than half of its procurement case 
                                                          
 
70 See for example, Dragos and Neamtu (2013)  
71 Directives 89/665/EC, 92/13/EC and 2007/66/EU 
72 Sweden for example, where complaints can be brought through the Competition Authority, has a far higher rate 
of challenge than the UK or Ireland where proceedings must be brought through the higher courts.  
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law. All provisions of the directives may be subject to CJEU interpretation, and so the 
increase in formality for each of the rule types corresponds to an increase in authority. This 
is reinforced where provisions are unclear or lack precision, as they are more likely to form 
the subject of references to the Court.  
 While challenges to sustainability measures in public procurement appear to be 
relatively infrequent in practice, there is a small body of CJEU case law in this area, 
discussed in Chapter 4. The question of whether the volume of case law has or will increase 
under the 2014 directives is rather more difficult to assess, due to the length of time needed 
to progress claims through most domestic law systems. In jurisdictions which allow 
procurement challenges to be brought through administrative tribunals rather than through 
the courts, such as Denmark and Sweden, a number of claims regarding the environmental 
and social provisions set out in the 2014 directives have already been advanced and 
determined.73 As several of these concern provisions which did not form part of the previous 
generation of directives, at least a modest increase in judicialisation and authority in this 
area can be seen. While these domestic claims do not form part of the empirical focus of this 
study, I examine national sustainable procurement practices and policies in Chapter 5, 
including debates regarding the enforcement of these rules.  
Developing hypotheses 
Having specified the dependent variable of integration and identified preliminary 
evidence that the environmental and social aspects of the 2014 public procurement reform 
marked an increase in EU integration, we can turn to the question of which independent 
variables might have caused this change. While many of the claims of intergovernmental and 
supranational theory are not in fact mutually exclusive, I argue that two sets of claims 
advanced under these theories are incompatible: that EU institutions act either as 
supranational policy entrepreneurs or as agents of the member states, and that their actions 
are either irreversible or subject to recall by member states. Supranational entrepreneurship 
and principal-agent theory offer fundamentally different accounts of the causes of 
integration. While no actions of the EU institutions are irreversible in the absolute sense, the 
barriers to member states overturning certain actions and decisions are so high as to make 
reversal unrealistic. This has clear implications for the principal-agent model upon which 
intergovernmental theory depends, because to qualify as a principal, an actor must be able to 
both grant authority and to rescind it (Hawkins et al. 2006). If member states cannot in 
practice recall powers exercised by EU institutions, then the agency model comes into 
                                                          
 
73 See for example Andrecka (2017) on the Danish cases and Sundstrand (2018) on the Swedish experience.  
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question and alternative explanations of EU integration must be considered.  
The concept of agency is widely deployed in international relations theory to explain 
the relationship between states and the international organisations they have established.74 
It seeks to explain the dynamics under which delegated power is exercised, and to a lesser 
extent the situations in which it may be recalled by the principals. Importantly, agents are 
rarely seen as being completely obedient in P-A theory, with the concept of ‘agency slack’ 
being applied to explain situations where agents deviate from the preferences of their 
principals (Pollack 2003; Hawkins et al 2006; Heldt 2017). This slack arises where 
discretion is written into the delegation contract and can lead to agents behaving in a way 
which is both unintended by principals and which cannot be effectively controlled by them, 
at least in the short term. This behaviour is described as ‘shirking’ (where agents fail to 
deliver fully against their principals’ preferences) or ‘slippage’ (where agents pursue their 
own policy preferences). P-A theory generally predicts that where such slack occurs, 
principals will expend additional resources in an attempt to control their agents (Hawkins et 
al 2006; Heldt 2017). It is assumed that the costs of such control measures are still 
outweighed by the benefits of delegation, otherwise the contract will be withdrawn or 
redrawn. P-A theory seeks explanations for the behaviour of agents in either the preferences 
of the principals, the design of the delegation contract, or the credibility of threats to 
recontract; the actions of the agent are thus treated as a dependent rather than independent 
variable in analysing international decision-making.  
The term ‘supranational policy entrepreneur’ refers to a capacity to promote new 
policies which have not yet been accepted at EU level, and to assume the risks associated 
with this. Entrepreneurship implies potential rewards associated with being the ‘owner’ of a 
policy, as well as risks associated with getting the policy adopted within the EU’s multipolar 
power structure, and taking the blame if it fails. Supranational accounts of EU integration 
ascribe a key role to the policy entrepreneurship of the Commission and Court based on their 
marshalling of interest groups (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Sandholtz 1992; Stone Sweet 
2012). Intergovernmental theorists have been more sceptical of this role; Moravscik 
(1998,1999) has challenged the idea that the Commission plays the part of supranational 
entrepreneur in Treaty negotiations and more recent intergovernmental analyses also 
question the Commission’s pre-eminence in areas such as eurozone governance (Hodson 
2011, 2013) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Puetter 2014). The supranational 
entrepreneur idea persists, with analyses of the Commission’s role in internal security 
                                                          
 
74 Principal-Agent (P-A) theory was first developed in the field of organisational economics in the 1970s; since 
that time it has been applied extensively in economic theory as well as in law and political science.  
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(Kaunert 2011), higher education (Batory and Lindstrom 2011), energy policy (Maltby 2013) 
and mobile roaming charges (Cini and Šuplata 2017) all finding evidence of policy 
entrepreneurship. However, both the precise conditions under which supranational 
entrepreneurship takes place, and the extent to which other EU institutions – in particular 
the Parliament – take on this role remains underdeveloped in the theoretical literature.  
Kingdon (1984) developed the idea that policy entrepreneurship occurs when a 
window opens due to the alignment of problem, policy and politics. For example, the 
Commission had long supported the idea of a common EU energy policy – however it was 
only when the increasing prices and volumes of energy imports, together with disruptions in 
the supply of gas from Russia, put this issue firmly on the political agenda that the 
Commission was (partially) successful in having its policy adopted (Maltby 2013). The role of 
a policy entrepreneur is distinct from that of an agent because its ability to exercise power is 
not dependent on the extent to which it serves the interests of the principal(s). An 
entrepreneur is generally seen to act primarily out of self-interest, although it may also 
resolve collective action problems in doing so. While principal-agent theory can account for 
many actions on the part of the agent which appear to be self-motivated or which contradict 
the immediate interests of the principal, if an EU institution is the first to recognise and 
exploit a policy window, it is difficult to characterise it as acting as an agent of the member 
states. Essentially the principal-agent relationship loses its power as an interpretative device 
if it is stretched to cover situations in which an EU institution is acting on its own initiative, 
for its own benefit and without or prior to the support of the member states. For this reason, 
where convincing evidence of supranational entrepreneurship is found this calls 
intergovernmental theories of EU integration into question.  
Likewise, where EU institutions act only within the realms of expressed member state 
preferences then this calls supranationalism into question. These preferences must be 
understood with reference to the particular bargaining structures and decision rules which 
apply to collective decision-making within the EU. In the context of Treaty negotiations, for 
example, many unrelated issues are considered at the same time and require unanimity in 
order to be adopted. In the context of a directive, the scope is narrower (although there is 
still typically room for trade-offs between various member state interests) and only a 
qualified majority of member states is needed in most cases. This means that the same policy 
promoted by an EU institution might constitute supranational entrepreneurship in the 
context of treaty negotiations and agency in the context of negotiations over a directive – 
even assuming constant member state preferences. This is so because in treaty negotiations 
every state has a veto, meaning the risks attaching to promotion by an EU institution of a 
policy which even one objects to are higher than those which apply in the context of qualified 
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majority decision making. Member state preferences may be expressed in a variety of ways 
and are of course subject to change over the course of negotiations, making it important to 
trace EU decision-making processes in their entirety rather than relying upon individual 
provisions. This raises the question of the legitimacy of a study such as this one focusing on a 
particular aspect of a directive which includes many other elements. The justification which I 
offer for this is two-fold: first, as will be seen in the empirical chapters, the environmental 
and social aspects of the procurement directives were especially controversial and there were 
clear differences in the views put forward by the various protagonists during the reform. 
Second, even if member state interests were traded-off against those relating to other aspects 
of the reform, this would not fundamentally undermine a finding of entrepreneurship or 
agency in this specific policy domain, provided the requisite characteristics for either exist.  
Narrowing down the enquiry in this way allows the following specific hypotheses to 
be formulated: 
(H1) EU institutions acted as supranational policy entrepreneurs in the reform of 
environmental and social aspects of public procurement law;  
OR  
(H2) EU institutions acted as agents of the member states in the reform of environmental 
and social aspects of public procurement law;  
AND 
(H3) EU institutions acted in a way which was irreversible by member states in the reform of 
environmental and social aspects of public procurement law; 
OR 
 (H4) EU institutions acted in a way which was subject to recall by member states in the 
reform of environmental and social aspects of public procurement law.  
  (H1) and (H2) are mutually incompatible, as are (H3) and (H4). Note however that 
(H1) is not incompatible with (H4) – it is possible for the actions of supranational policy 
entrepreneurs to be recalled by member states. Likewise, it is possible for EU institutions 
which act as agents of member states to nevertheless act in a way which is irreversible by 
their principals, meaning the (H2) and (H3) are also not incompatible.  
Merely characterising EU institutions as supranational or intergovernmental, or 
analysing their interests regarding integration, does not help to falsify the main claims of 
intergovernmental and supranational theory. Neither does finding that supranational 
institutions were empowered at the expense of intergovernmental ones, or vice-versa. In 
order to falsify the supranational entrepreneur hypothesis (H1) I look for evidence that EU 
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institutions acted only within the bounds of expressed preferences of member states. In 
order to falsify the agency hypothesis (H2), I look for evidence that EU institutions acted 
outside of the bounds of member state preferences, understood collectively according to the 
requirements of a qualified majority or unanimity depending on the decision rule in the 
specific area. The irreversibility hypothesis (H3) can be falsified by showing either that 
actions were actually reversed or that there was a realistic chance of this based on precedents 
in similar areas and/or the applicable decision rule and revealed preferences of member 
states. The recall thesis (H4) can be falsified by showing that there was no realistic prospect 
of member states reversing decisions or revoking powers gained by EU institutions in the 
reform process based on the same considerations as H3. In chapter 7 I consider the balance 
of evidence in respect of these four hypotheses and draw conclusions about the explanatory 
power of the theories behind them, proposing refinements based upon the role which the EU 
institutions played in the public procurement reform.   
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Chapter 2 - Theorising the Role of EU Institutions in Policy-making 
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on each of the institutions involved in the 
reform process, making links to the supranational and intergovernmental theories of EU 
integration introduced in Chapter one. The aim is to provide a basis for understanding the 
powers and constraints of each of the institutions, the ways in which they might act as policy 
entrepreneurs or as agents of the member states, and the extent to which their actions are 
either subject to recall by member states or are irreversible. In sketching the architecture and 
decision-making processes of the EU institutions here, the objective is not to characterise 
them as either purely supranational or intergovernmental. As will be seen, all of the 
institutions have both elements woven into their design and operating procedures. For 
example, the Commission has broad powers under the Treaty to propose, embed and enforce 
internal market rules. However, it is dependent on the member states and Council both for 
the initial approval of its legislative programme and to progress individual directives. In 
practice it is relatively easy to amend or withdraw Commission initiatives in some areas – for 
example rules on product labelling or standardisation – and devilishly difficult to amend or 
withdraw them in others – for example rules on agricultural subsidies.  
Analysing the way in which each of the institutions makes, amends and withdraws 
rules (or has them amended or withdrawn by others) provides clues as to whether they are 
behaving in a way which is autonomous, or which depends on the preferences of the member 
states. One of the central claims of supranational theory is that the Commission and Court 
do behave autonomously75 – despite their mandates being initially granted by the member 
states and in theory subject to removal via Treaty amendments. If rules are irreversible or 
subject to unfeasibly high costs of recall then the fact that the member states originally 
delegated power to EU institutions to make those rules is largely irrelevant, as for most 
intents and purposes the EU institutions are able to act independently in exercising that 
power. It is not entirely irrelevant, as even where institutions are able to exercise their 
powers autonomously they must be conscious of the constitutional order which bestowed 
those powers upon them, and the need to respect its boundaries. The extent to which each of 
the EU institutions can be seen to act as a supranational entrepreneur or as an agent of the 
member states in the 2011-14 reform of public procurement law, and the susceptibility of the 
actions taken by each institution to reversal by member states, will be assessed in Chapter 7. 
  
                                                          
 
75 Stone Sweet (2012) identifies “supranational organizations with autonomous capacity to resolve disputes and to 
make law” as one of the key tenets of the supranational theory of integration. 
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The Commission 
The European Commission sits at the fulcrum of the EU institutions, carrying out 
executive, legislative and civil service functions. Its 31 directorates-general answer to the 
College of Commissioners and the President of the European Commission, a post held by 
José Manuel Barroso during the period covered by this study. Barroso’s second presidency 
(2009-2014) was characterised primarily by its response to the financial crisis, as well as by 
the implementation of the institutional changes adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon. Barroso’s 
effectiveness in achieving other policies championed during his leadership of the 
Commission was limited (Müller 2017). However the second Barroso Commission did 
succeed in furthering two of its major policy initiatives: the Europe 2020 strategy and the 
‘relaunch of the Single Market’ via the Single Market Act, following the recommendations of 
the 2010 Monti Report. These two policies form the framework within which public 
procurement reform took place, and their impact upon the content of the Commission’s 
proposals will be examined in Chapter three.  
The Commission plays a key role in both supranational and intergovernmental theories 
of EU integration.  From its origins in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the Commission has been understood as a supranational body, albeit one with 
an institutional design which reflects the desire of member states to exert control over it. The 
presence of one Commissioner from each member state, despite repeated attempts to reduce 
the size of the Commission, acts as a reminder of this control.  The independence of 
Commissioners and the collegial basis of their appointment and decision-making has 
occasionally been called into question, but both by design and in practice the Commission 
cannot be seen to directly represent the Member States or national interests. The extent to 
which it indirectly represents these interests, as an agent of the member states, is a point on 
which intergovernmental and supranational theory diverge. Supranational theory 
emphasises the entrepreneurial role of the Commission, predicting that this will routinely 
produce outcomes that the Member States would not have produced on their own and which 
conflict with the revealed preferences of the most powerful states (Stone Sweet 2012). In 
contrast, liberal intergovernmentalism portrays the Commission as an agent, largely unable 
to pursue an agenda of its own (Moravscik 1998), while new intergovernmentalism has 
highlighted the tendency of member states to create new agencies rather than further 
empowering the Commission (Bickerton et al 2015).76  
Amongst the various functions which the Commission carries out, five are of particular 
                                                          
 
76 Although others have pointed to the Commission’s ongoing ability to expand its mandate in areas such as 
economic governance (Bauer and Becker 2014) and foreign economic policy (Peterson 2015) and questioned the 
idea of a Commission in decline (Nugent and Rhinard 2016). 
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relevance for the purposes of this study. They are i) the right/duty to initiate legislation; ii) 
the development and implementation of EU policy, including by assembling interest groups 
and funding projects; iii) acting as mediator between the Council and Parliament in 
codecision procedures; iv) the enforcement of EU legislation against member states; and v) 
the coordination of external action on behalf of the EU. The extent to which the Commission 
carries out these activities by itself or shares power with other EU institutions varies between 
policy areas. For example, the Commission is only partly responsible for coordinating foreign 
and security policy, as the High Representative reports equally to the Council. In the trade 
arena, the Commission takes the lead on the negotiation of trade deals with third countries, 
but the Council, European Parliament and (increasingly) national and subnational 
parliaments must approve either the negotiating mandate, the final deal or both.  
i) Initiating legislation 
The Commission enjoys a near-monopoly over the right to initiate EU legislation under 
Article 17(2) TEU, but in a number of areas this amounts to a duty exercised at the behest of 
others. From a theoretical perspective, initiating legislation is often equated with agenda-
setting, although it is important to distinguish between formal and informal aspects of 
agenda setting (Pollack 2002).77 While the Commission proposing legislation may be seen as 
an act of formal agenda setting, it is almost always preceded by a political mandate from the 
Council or Parliament. Such mandates may be embedded in multi-annual work plans or 
emerge in response to political developments. Majone (2002) concluded that only about 10 
percent of legislation proposed by the Commission was the result of an autonomous use of its 
own initiative.78 Under Articles 225 and 241 TFEU the Parliament and Council both have the 
right to request legislative proposals from the Commission, which has a duty to provide 
reasons where it does not do so. The European Citizens’ Initiative introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon also requires the Commission to respond to invitations to legislate where signatures 
are gathered from at least one million citizens from seven or more member states; this power 
was used during the public procurement reform in order to amend the scope of the 
Concessions Directive to exclude water services.79  
The emergence in 2014 of the Spitzenkandidat process for appointment of the 
Commission President may be seen to increase the European Parliament’s power over the 
                                                          
 
77 Moravscik (1999) describes informal agenda-setting as a process in which “the entrepreneur launches a 
discussion by highlighting problems, advancing workable proposals, underscoring potential material benefits, or 
linking the outcome to symbolic values” (p 272) 
78 The remainder arise from international agreements; amendments to existing legislation; responses to specific 
requests from other Community institutions, member states or private actors; or from areas in which the 
Commission enjoys no discretion in exercising its right of initiative.  
79 The Right2Water initiative, discussed in Chapter 5, was the first ECI to meet the Lisbon Treaty requirements. 
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political direction taken by the Commission, including its priorities for the proposal of 
legislation. Majone (2002) considered that the (then much lesser) powers of the Parliament 
over the appointment and political direction of the Commission amounted to 
‘parliamentarization’ of the Commission – risking increased politicisation and reduced 
credibility for EU policies. Observing that new EU competences did not necessarily imply 
increased powers for the Commission (an idea further developed by new 
intergovernmentalism), Majone cited the dilution of the Commission’s monopoly on 
legislative initiative in common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs, and 
more generally due to increased use of codecision. While the Commission continues to 
exercise powers in codecision procedures as discussed below, the Parliament has 
undoubtedly taken a stronger role with consequences for the Commission’s room for 
manoeuvre in framing legislative proposals. 
Commission legislative proposals may also respond to case law of the Court of Justice - 
this can be seen clearly in several provisions included in the 2014 procurement directives 
which will be examined in Chapter 4. Analysing competition law proposals, Schmidt (2000) 
sees the Commission using actual or potential CJEU judgments as a lever to alter member 
state positions towards legislation, divide opposition and increase costs of failure to agree. 
Precedent for this may be seen in the Commission’s invocation of the Cassis de Dijon case 
law to support its proposals for the Single European Act (Dehousse and Magnette 2017). In 
responding to CJEU case law, legislative proposals put forward by the Commission may 
codify the Court’s position or conversely aim to overrule or modify it. Where Court 
judgments are based on Treaty provisions, the Commission does not have the power to 
overrule or modify the Court’s interpretation – this may only be done by the member states 
through Treaty amendments. In some cases, the CJEU specifically calls upon the 
Commission to bring forward legislative proposals in an area, for example in response to 
‘actions for failure to act’ brought by member states, other EU institutions or private litigants 
under Article 265 TFEU.  
Regardless of the various prompts to which it responds, the Commission’s control over 
the timing and content of legislative proposals undoubtedly allows it to shape outcomes, if 
not to fully determine them. The use of consultations and impact assessments prior to the 
publication of draft legislation can strengthen the credibility of Commission’s proposals, 
while at times constraining their scope or altering their emphasis. The increasing push for 
transparency amongst all EU institutions may be seen to disproportionately affect the 
Council and Parliament in the context of codecision procedures; the Commission is not 
generally required to provide a line-by-line justification of its legislative proposals or to 
publish all preparatory documents, although in some cases it does so voluntarily. In contrast, 
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the Commission has been the focal point for pressure to reduce the overall volume of EU 
legislation, seen most clearly in its withdrawal of 73 pending legislative proposals in 2015 as 
part of an effort to ‘cut red tape’.80 This was presented under the rubric of the Juncker 
Commission’s attempt to apply a ‘new and more focused approach’ to regulation, in part as a 
reaction to the results of the 2014 European elections, which saw the election of an 
unprecedented number of eurosceptic MEPs. The novelty of this approach may be 
questioned given the similar initiatives undertaken by the Barroso and Santer 
commissions.81  
 The withdrawal and amendment of Commission proposals suggests that its exercise of 
its right of legislative initiative is subject to recall, and that this happens on a reasonably 
regular basis. Even in areas where the Commission is empowered to adopt regulations 
directly without the approval of the Council and Parliament, and therefore might be 
considered to act as an entrepreneur rather than an agent, pressure from member states to 
reduce the overall volume of regulation, or to amend or withdraw specific regulations, has 
been effective. Are any of the Commission’s legislative proposals irreversible? Arguably those 
which confer direct rights on third parties, such as private companies or individuals, are 
most difficult to reverse. This can be seen in the slow and uncertain reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy – partly due of course to lack of agreement amongst member states but 
also due to the reliance of farmers upon specific regulations propagated by the Commission, 
the withdrawal or adjustment of which implies financial loss. Nevertheless in areas where 
member state consensus has been achieved – such as ending sugar production quotas and 
the reduction and regionalisation of payments under the Single Payment Scheme –EU rules 
were reversed despite losses to large agricultural companies with extensive lobbying power 
both at EU and national level.82 This indicates that even in areas where transnational 
interests might be expected (under supranational theory) to entrench the Commission’s 
control over legislative proposals, integration is not irreversible.  
The Commission’s interests in furthering EU integration, especially in terms of the 
                                                          
 
80 European Commission – press release “Commission confirms withdrawal of 73 pending proposals announced 
in 2015 work programme” Brussels, 7 March 2015 
81 The Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) programme launched by the second Barroso commission in 
2012 identified laws and legislative proposals for repeal, withdrawal, amendment and impact assessment – with 
just under 200 such initiatives underway by 2014. The Juncker Commission has continued REFIT, and 
introduced a considerably smaller number of proposals than the Barroso Commission. The Santer Commission 
launched its ‘SLIM’ initiative in 1996 with the stated goal ‘to do less in order to do it better’ (European 
Commission, Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market (SLIM) COM (1996) 204 final). As Stephen Weatherill 
(2007) put it: “EC red tape is a tempting target for EC and particularly national politicians anxious to find a 
scapegoat for economic underperformance…at least since the Delors’ Commission’s relaunch of the Single 
Market, policy-makers have coupled their regulatory initiatives with ceremonial self-flagellation concerning the 
inflexibility of EC regulation and the need to ‘simplify’ and ‘improve’ it.”  
82 This occurred following the 2013 reform of the CAP. See Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnan (2014) for analysis of the 
negative impact of the 2013 reform on land values.  
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internal market, are balanced against its desire to maintain its own credibility by avoiding 
institutional overreach and the need to steer proposals towards adoption by the Council and 
Parliament. Nevertheless, in this core agenda-setting function it is clear that the Commission 
sometimes acts against the revealed preferences of powerful member states. For example, in 
2013 parliamentary bodies in 11 member states – including the French and Dutch senates 
and UK House of Commons and House of Lords – objected to the Commission’s proposals 
on the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The German Bundestag also passed 
a resolution which was critical of the proposals.83 The Commission proceeded with the 
proposal despite this opposition, but on the basis of ‘enhanced cooperation’ between certain 
member states, rather than unanimity. This perhaps encapsulates the role of the 
Commission in proposing legislation: not always a hostage to member state preferences, but 
also not at liberty to disregard them. Wider empirical analysis of the Commission’s use of its 
right of initiative between 1991 and 2007 found that  
…the codecision procedure and the political influence of the European Council, have 
undoubtedly pushed the Commission’s main role more and more from that of a powerful 
initiator to that of an “honest broker”, on the one hand, and from that of an autonomous 
initiator to that of a reactive initiator, on the other.84  
The manner in which the Commission carries out its role as ‘honest broker’ or mediator, as 
opposed to representing its own interests, is considered further below.  
ii) Developing and implementing EU policy 
The formal legislative process is often preceded by activities undertaken by the 
Commission to test and build support for proposals. These activities may continue during 
and after the legislative process, for example via work undertaken by expert groups and the 
funding of projects linked to implementation of EU law and policy. In characterising the 
Commission as a policy entrepreneur, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (2012) draw attention to 
the Commission’s convening and support of private and third-sector groups at the pre-
legislative stage. Pollack (1997) also identified the Commission’s support of significant non-
governmental actors as one of the conditions enabling it to act as a policy entrepreneur. 
Hodson (2013) points to the failure of the Barroso Commission to act as an entrepreneur 
during the financial crisis, attributing this to a mix of structural and partisan factors. The 
                                                          
 
83 For discussion of the subsidiarity process, see Fromage (2017) 
84 Corona, Hermanin, and Ponzano (2012) This study evaluates 53 innovative directives proposed by the second 
Delors, Santer, Prodi and first Barroso Commissions, comparing the initial proposals with the text ultimately 
adopted by the Council. Where proposals were adopted quickly with minimal amendments this was taken to 
amount to a weak exercise of the Commission’s right of initiative, whereas proposals which encountered more 
resistance from the Council and Parliament were taken as a strong exercise of initiative. Comparing the results 
from the third year of each of the colleges showed a progressive weakening of the Commission’s use of its right of 
initiative. The study also took account of the Commission’s use of its power to amend or withdraw proposals.  
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Commission’s uneven record of entrepreneurship has led some scholars to describe its role 
as ‘purposeful opportunism’ (Cram 1993, 1999; Nugent and Rhinard 2016; Camisão and 
Guimarães 2017) – suggesting that the Commission has clear objectives but is flexible on 
when and how to achieve them. 
The support provided by the European Commission to green public procurement (GPP) 
from 2008 onwards illustrates the role of its policy-development activities. In addition to 
issuing various guidance documents and common criteria to address environmental impacts 
in procurement procedures, the Directorate-General for the Environment commissioned 
research on the impact of GPP, provided a helpdesk service, published regular newsletters, 
and provided financial support to dozens of international projects, conferences and training 
initiatives.85 It also convened a GPP Advisory Group, comprising public sector, business and 
NGO representatives. From these activities there emerged a community of practitioners 
involved in implementing GPP, many of whom took part in the legislative reform process by 
lobbying for stronger provisions on environmental aspects of procurement. This community 
included local, regional and national public bodies, environmental NGOs, product labelling 
organisations, academics and consultants, as well as businesses wishing to establish the 
environmental credentials of their products and sell them to the public sector. While hardly 
unique as an interest group wishing to influence EU policy, the extent to which this group 
was fostered by the Commission’s own actions and expenditure is notable. In contrast, the 
Commission gave very little support, either directly or indirectly, to the inclusion of social 
aspects in public procurement.86 
The non-legislative and discretionary nature of most of the Commission’s policy support 
initiatives suggests that they should be relatively easy to reverse. However, the ability of 
member states to recall policy support powers exercised by the Commission is ambiguous, 
mainly because these have often not been clearly granted by the member states in the first 
place. Other than a few lines buried in a multiannual budget, there may be little formal basis 
for policy development activities carried out by the Commission. In relation to GPP, the 
Council did endorse the Commission’s 2008 Communication and the specific support 
activities proposed. If member states strongly objected to these activities, financial and 
political support could in theory be withdrawn - but the disinvestment of an established 
policy community would likely prove even more difficult than the reversal of legislative 
proposals. The Commission’s policy support actions, whether undertaken as an agent or 
entrepreneur, may be less susceptible to recall by member states than legislation due to their 
                                                          
 
85 The outputs of these initiatives are available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp 
86 See discussion in Chapter 3 
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informality and broad involvement of civil society actors. However, the Commission itself 
may not be able to control the policy communities it creates or supports.  
iii) Participating in the legislative process 
The Commission has always played a role in ‘mediating’ between the Parliament and 
Council during the legislative process. With the expansion of codecision to over ninety areas 
under the Treaty of Lisbon, the use of trilogues to secure interinstitutional agreement on first 
reading for EU legislation has become the default practice.87 Trilogues involve 
representatives of the Parliament, Council and Commission meeting to discuss legislative 
proposals and to formulate compromise texts acceptable to all three institutions. Although 
not mentioned in the Treaties, the use of trilogues was endorsed by the three institutions in a 
Joint Declaration adopted in 2007.88 The Declaration notes the informal framework in which 
trilogues take place, flexibility regarding the timing and levels of representation involved, 
and the right of each institution to define its negotiating mandate and choose its 
representatives. Despite this flexibility, certain conventions have emerged regarding the 
conduct of trilogues which are seldom departed from – in particular regarding the location of 
meetings and the preparation of the four-column documents which track progress during 
negotiations (Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood 2015).  
The role of the Commission in trilogues was subject to relatively little scrutiny prior to 
the launch of the European Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry into the process in 2015. 
This involved a public consultation, inspection of files and requests for specific information 
from the Commission, Council and Parliament. In its response to the inquiry, the 
Commission expressed reservations about whether such an inquiry fell within the 
Ombudsman’s remit, given that no specific allegations of maladministration had been raised. 
The inquiry proceeded, with the Ombudsman’s 2016 report making a number of 
recommendations to enhance the transparency of the trilogue process.89 In its response to 
the Ombudsman’s report, the Commission indicated its broad acceptance of the 
recommendations, while emphasising that their implementation rested primarily with the 
                                                          
 
87 In the 2009-14 legislative session, 85% of all codecision procedures were adopted on first reading (European 
Parliament (2014) Activity Report on Codecision and Conciliation 14 July 2009 – 30 June 2014 (7th 
Parliamentary Term) at p 8.) 
88 European Parliament, Council and Commission (2007) Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the 
Codecision Procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty) 2007/C 145/02. 
89 The Ombudsman recommended (inter alia) the establishment by the three institutions of a joint database to 
publish: trilogue dates and agendas (in advance of meetings); the initial positions adopted by the Parliament and 
Council; four-column documents (as soon as possible after negotiations have concluded); lists of other documents 
tabled at trilogues (to facilitate public access requests); and the names of representatives responsible for political 
decisions taken in trilogues, including where this power is delegated to a civil servant. In relation to the last point, 
the Commission noted in its response that ‘decisions’ were never formally taken during trilogues.  
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Parliament and Council. However, it also observed that: 
…the Institutions need a space for exchange and explanation in a spirit of trust and 
confidence. Over-formalising them could become counterproductive in terms of 
transparency as it could push the “real” negotiation into other forums. Much of the value 
of the trilogue process lies in its informality and flexibility. Greater transparency should 
not come at the price of making the process excessively rigid and formal.90 
The flexibility and informality of trilogues may suit the Commission as much as the co-
legislators. One reason for this is that the Commission does not always act as a neutral 
arbiter within trilogues, but rather as champion of its own position as put forward in the 
legislative proposals or as adapted in response to the Parliament and Council. In this way, 
the Commission may be able to secure a ‘second bite at the cherry’ rather than being hostage 
to the outcome of political negotiations between the co-legislators. It can threaten to 
withdraw legislation (which it has a unilateral right to do) or seek a unanimous vote of the 
Council if negotiations do not go its way. There is nothing in the Treaties to prevent the 
Commission taking such an active role in the legislative process beyond its initial proposals; 
to do so however implies an element of risk and fits within the idea of the Commission acting 
as entrepreneur, rather than agent of the member states or neutral consensus-finder.91 
Liberal intergovernmental theory posits that the Commission is primarily empowered in 
order to enforce credible commitments on the part of member states (Moravscik 1998) – 
however in trilogues it sometimes pursues an agenda which goes beyond any existing 
commitments of the member states, and which is actively opposed by them. The fact that it 
often does not succeed in having its positions adopted reinforces the perception that they are 
not pre-approved by the member states.  
Given that the Council and Parliament are responsible for adopting legislation via 
codecision, in principle any powers exercised by the Commission may be recalled, by 
refusing to accept the Commission’s position. It is important to distinguish here between 
reversing a particular manifestation of the powers exercised by the Commission, and 
recalling the power itself. The Council and Parliament could in fact move to exclude the 
Commission from the trilogue process if both institutions agreed on this, by revoking the 
Joint Declaration. In contrast, the Commission could not exclude either of the other two 
institutions from the process, as their role in codecision is established under the Treaties. 
Formally then, the Commission’s powers as mediator or participant in the legislative process 
                                                          
 
90 European Commission, 16 December 2016, Reply to the request for information in relation to the 
Ombudsman's owninitiative inquiry OI/8/2015/JAS concerning transparency of trilogues 
91 This idea is perhaps further supported by the fact that Commission delegations in trilogues tend to be at high 
level (Heads of Unit, Deputy Director-General or even Director General – Michel Barnier attended a trilogue 
meeting on the public procurement directives). If the Commission were merely helping the co-legislators to draft 
appropriate compromise wording, such high-level representation might be deemed overkill.  
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can be recalled, although in practice the barriers to doing so would be high. This stems in 
part from the technical resources and legal expertise which the Commission holds in many 
areas, which is still often unrivalled by that within the Council or Parliament (Hooghe and 
Rauh 2017). It also stems from the Commission’s deep involvement in the stages which 
precede and follow legislative negotiations – namely the development of legislative proposals 
and the enforcement of EU law. As the Commission does exercise formal powers granted by 
the Treaties in these areas, excluding it entirely from the deliberations over legislation would 
be likely to undermine the authority of EU law. In particular, while the Parliament and/or 
Council sometimes favour ‘constructive ambiguity’ in legislative texts, the Commission is less 
likely to do so where it is directly responsible for enforcement, as such ambiguities present a 
considerable challenge for effective and resource-efficient enforcement.  
iv) Enforcing EU law 
The enforcement of EU law once it has been adopted forms a key part of the 
Commission’s workload, and this role is particularly pronounced in the fields of competition 
and public procurement. In the first instance, the Commission supervises the 
implementation of directives by member states. If national implementation is not 
undertaken within the designated period, or if the Commission considers the national 
implementing measures to fall short, it will issue a notification and then a reasoned opinion 
to the member states concerned. If implementation is not achieved within a further specified 
period, the Commission may refer the member state to the CJEU, with financial penalties 
being levied in cases of continued non-compliance.  As Nic Shuibhne (2017) notes, in theory 
it is possible for member states to initiate actions against each other to enforce EU law, but 
in practice this role is carried out by the Commission. The Commission enjoys complete 
discretion over whether and when to launch an infringement procedure, 92 although it does 
provide grounds for decisions not to pursue an infringement to the complainant(s). It is also 
able to launch infringement actions based on its own initiative. The Commission undertakes 
enforcement activities very frequently - in 2016, it launched 986 new procedures by sending 
a letter of formal notice (including 847 late transposition cases) and issued 292 reasoned 
opinions.93 This included reasoned opinions issued to 21 member states regarding failure to 
fully transpose the 2014 procurement directives.  
The overall number of open Commission infringement actions has increased steadily 
over time, placing a considerable demand on its resources. In December 2016 it published a 
communication announcing a ‘more strategic approach to enforcement’, including less 
                                                          
 
92 This was confirmed by the Court in Case T-571/93 Lefebre and others v Commission 
93 European Commission (2017) 34th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law COM(2017) 370  
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reliance on the EU Pilot problem-solving mechanism (which had come to be seen as a 
lengthy prelude to infringement actions rather than a way to avoid them); stepping up 
cooperation with networks and independent regulators at national level in areas such as 
electronic communications, financial services, competition and environmental law; 
supporting improvements to national justice systems through reforms and training; giving 
priority to infringement actions that reveal systemic weaknesses in member state legal 
systems; and systematically requesting the CJEU to impose lump sum fines as well as 
penalties for non-transposition of directives.94 The Communication also notes that 
infringement actions taken by the Commission are not intended to provide individual 
redress for breaches of EU law, and emphasises the role of national courts in this regard. 
While it is too early to judge the impact of the 2016 Communication on the actual volume of 
enforcement activity undertaken by the Commission, the intention to distance itself from its 
image as ‘the policeman of Europe’ is clear.  
Where does the motivation for this less centralised approach to enforcement of EU law 
come from? Is it an expression of a preference on the part of member states for ‘less Europe’ 
or does it reflect the Commission’s own desire to safeguard its resources and credibility? If 
the Commission is an agent of the member states whose powers are subject to recall, the 
former explanation makes more sense. If it acts as an entrepreneur empowered primarily by 
the Treaties, the latter explanation has more currency. The truth is probably that both factors 
are influential. At other times or in other domains the Commission may be seen to increase 
its enforcement activities, for example in relation to competition law or environmental 
regulation. It is relatively easy to find examples which support either a supranational or 
intergovernmental analysis of the Commission’s enforcement activities, and to find an equal 
number of counterexamples. However, it is clear that decisions on the part of the 
Commission to exercise its enforcement powers to a greater or lesser extent are reversible 
without Treaty change or other major barriers.  
v) Representing EU interests externally 
The above sections have considered the Commission’s role vis-à-vis the member states 
and other EU institutions, that is other internal stakeholders within the Union. It also plays a 
unique, if not exclusive, role in representing the Union’s interests vis-à-vis external third 
parties. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is jointly 
responsible to the Commission and Council, is a prominent example of power in this area 
being shared amongst the institutions. Likewise, the controversies over TTIP and CETA 
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brought to public attention the role which both the European Parliament and national 
parliaments can play as ‘deal breakers’ when it comes to external trade agreements. However 
much of the day-to-day responsibility for external action remains firmly vested in the 
Commission, including under the European Neighbourhood Policy, trade negotiations, and 
other aspects of international affairs such as the Paris Agreement on climate change. These 
activities are important not only in themselves as examples of the type of ‘high politics’ 
traditionally reserved for nation states, but also for the leverage which they afford to the 
Commission over other, more internal, aspects of EU law and policy. For example, during 
the public procurement reform process the Commission repeatedly invoked the EU’s 
commitments under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement as precluding certain 
reforms favoured by the Council and Parliament.  
The extension of EU competence over international trade and, more recently, investment 
agreements, may be seen as a classic case of spillover – as the single market and customs 
union harmonised the key tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, it became increasingly 
logical for external trade policy to also be coordinated at EU level. This did not however 
determine which of the EU institutions should exercise this power, and to what extent they 
should act as policy entrepreneurs or agents of the member states. Supranational theory 
would point to the well-defined interests which transnational actors such as multinational 
companies, industry associations and NGOs have in trade policy, and the extent to which 
these actors have focused their lobbying efforts on Brussels. An intergovernmental 
perspective would conversely emphasise the power which member states and the Council 
retain in terms of granting a negotiating mandate to the Commission and ratifying trade 
agreements. Woolcock (2016) draws attention to the increased influence of the European 
Parliament over trade policy, limiting the extent to which the European Commission is able 
to act as an entrepreneur in this area, although formally the Parliament has only the power 
to veto trade agreements. The Council on the other hand holds extensive formal powers in 
this area, exercised via the Trade Policy Committee which works closely with the 
Commission in negotiations.  
Beyond trade, the Commission leads on implementation of association agreements with 
potential accession states. This is a highly politically sensitive area, and one in which the 
member states exercise extensive control via the Council. Association agreements generally 
provide for the approximation of law with the EU acquis, without making specific 
commitments regarding accession. Commission delegations are set up in the partner 
countries, and funding made available for implementation of reforms. The delicate balancing 
of domestic politics with EU commitments in this area is illustrated by the rejection of the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement by Dutch voters in a referendum held in 2016. Following 
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the Euromaidan revolution of 2014, Ukraine’s new leadership had moved quickly to ratify 
the Agreement and began implementing reforms with EU support. But a campaign in the 
Netherlands which exaggerated the prospects for Ukraine joining the EU and its entitlement 
to military assistance lead to Dutch voters rejecting the accession agreement, and the Dutch 
government was faced with a dilemma.95 Support for Ukraine amongst most member states 
remained high, and eventually the Council produced a declaration regarding interpretation 
of the agreement which the Dutch parliament accepted as meeting the dictates of the 
referendum. The Commission was largely a helpless hostage during this détente, its 
delegation in Kyiv keeping a low profile while the diplomatic machinery churned in Berlin 
and the Hague. Ultimately, the text of the association agreement itself was not changed and 
EU ratification took place in July 2017. 
Of the five areas of the Commission’s power examined here, the outcomes of the exercise 
of its mandate in the field of external affairs are perhaps least susceptible to reversal by 
member states. The mandate itself may be withdrawn, amended, or subjected to additional 
controls; but once the Commission has exercised its powers, and the member states have 
ratified the outcomes (where necessary), the barriers to reversal are extremely high, because 
the outcomes are embedded in international agreements. To illustrate, following the UK’s 
notification in March 2017 of its intention to withdraw from the Union under Article 50 of 
the Treaty, it was clear that the country wished to begin negotiations with third countries in 
order to secure its trading relationships following its departure. The existence of trade 
agreements between the EU and most of these third countries prevents the UK from 
engaging in such negotiations until its withdrawal is complete. Even following withdrawal, 
the scope for the UK to negotiate deals may be limited by its ongoing relationship with the 
single market and customs union. The ability for a member state to recall powers which the 
EU has exercised externally is thus constrained even where it ceases to be a member – and in 
the case of member states, may be considered as close to irreversible as any power exercised 
by the EU. International agreements are of course subject to renegotiation from time to time, 
but this requires agreement of the other side, and can be a painstaking process.  
The Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives  
The Council is invariably identified as the most intergovernmental of EU institutions, 
although it is worthwhile distinguishing between its constituent parts and formations to 
evaluate this claim. The European Council, comprising heads of state and government plus 
                                                          
 
95 The referendum held in April 2016 attracted a turnout of 32.2% of voters, of whom 61.1% voted against the 
agreement. The referendum was held under a Dutch law requiring a referendum to be held where at least 
300,000 signatures are gathered, and the result was advisory rather than binding on the Dutch parliament. 
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the president of the Commission, met 42 times during the 2009-2014 period, excluding Euro 
summits.96 The unprecedented frequency of these meetings, which took place only three 
times per year between 1975 and 1996, is generally attributed to extraordinary events: the 
financial, Greek and migration crises. An alternative view is that the frequent Council 
meetings speak more to the increasing breadth and politicisation of the EU’s activities and 
corresponding need for political engagement at the highest level; it is difficult to argue that 
the events of 2009-14 in themselves were more extraordinary than those that took place for 
example during the 1979 Iranian revolution and oil crisis, during the collapse of the Soviet 
Union a decade later, or the reunification of Germany shortly thereafter. The difference is in 
the level of EU involvement and authority in such areas and the corresponding need for 
leaders to coordinate responses via the Council. 
Alongside this increase in highly politicised activity, the creation of a more 
independent role for the Council President under the Lisbon Treaty has altered the 
intergovernmental mechanics of the Council. The President’s role is now entirely separate 
from the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU held by member states for six-month 
terms. Elected by a qualified majority of member states, the President sits for a two-and-a-
half-year term (renewable once) and has his or her own cabinet, as well as being able to draw 
upon the services of the General Secretariat of the Council. The two occupants of this office 
to date, Herman van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, were both re-elected for second terms, in 
Tusk’s case despite the opposition of his home country Poland. Van Rompuy was widely 
perceived to be a non-threatening occupant of the newly created post, and empirical 
evaluation of his presidency suggests that he did not exercise much in the way of 
independent power but was effective as a mediator during the eurozone crisis in particular 
(Dinan 2017). There are some signs that Tusk’s presidency may set a precedent for both a 
higher profile and lower level of deference to member states. This can be seen most clearly in 
his outspoken support for sanctions against Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 – an issue on which consensus on the Council was by no means well established at 
that point.97  
The importance of the Council Presidency is also apparent in the frequency with 
which member states direct lobbying efforts at this office. Panke (2012) identified the 
Presidency as being the body most frequently lobbied by member states on economic, 
                                                          
 
96 Attended only by the heads of state/government of the Eurozone countries. 
97 In particular, Germany and Italy, both of which are dependent on Russian gas and oil imports, and France, 
which had a contract to supply two warships to Russia, were less immediately supportive of far-reaching 
sanctions than the Eastern European and Scandinavian countries. In remarks made to the media in March 2015, 
Tusk accused certain national leaders of ‘appeasement’ and ‘naiveté or hypocrisy’ in their reluctance to extend 
sanctions (“Donald Tusk: Putin’s policy is to have enemies and to be in conflict” The Guardian, 15 March 2015) 
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agricultural and environmental matters, exceeding both the Commission and Parliament. 
Despite the increased independence and importance of the Council President, both the 
European Council and Council of Ministers remain under the control of national politicians. 
While qualified majority voting (QMV) formally applies to the majority of decisions taken by 
the Council, in practice seeking consensus is the norm. References to ‘consensus’ within the 
Council need to be unpacked. Novak (2013) questions whether the apparent existence of 
consensus within the Council actually means that agreement has been reached between all 
member states. Based on empirical evidence including interviews with a cross-section of 
Council participants, Novak found that the role of the rotating presidency (chair) in many 
cases consists not in seeking unanimity but in avoiding a blocking minority. The chair may 
intervene to prevent adoption of a measure by QMV where a large member state objects or 
any member state argues that it threatens their vital interests - however Novak also notes 
counterexamples where measures have been adopted despite such opposition.98 Novak 
identifies blame avoidance as a driving factor behind apparent consensus on the Council, 
because voting against a measure which is subsequently adopted is likely to attract negative 
attention in the domestic arena.  
Contested votes within Council meetings are rare – normally the president of the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) only sends a legislative text to the 
Council President when it is clear that majority backing has been secured. Sometimes voting 
occurs by e-mail only after adoption in a meeting at which national views are aired. Voting 
records can thus not be taken as an indication of national interests without detailed analysis 
of preceding meetings. As Hayes-Renshaw (2017) puts it: 
while roll-call votes represent a precise public choice on the part of national 
representatives in the Council, they constitute only one part of a member state’s 
preferences and bargaining behaviour at EU level.99 
 
Puetter (2014) emphasises the role of deliberative intergovernmentalism in the work of both 
the European Council and the Council of Ministers, although his analysis focuses on areas 
which are primarily non-legislative, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and governance of the eurozone. Puetter’s main argument is that integration via the type of 
deliberative intergovernmentalism seen in the Council is as important as legislative 
integration via the classic Community method. He draws conclusions from this for the role of 
supranational institutions, identifying in particular a reduced role for the Commission. 
Puetter’s choice of traditionally intergovernmental policy areas upon which to rest this 
                                                          
 
98 The example of the End of Life Vehicles Directive being adopted in 1999 over strong opposition from German 
delegation (and auto industry) is cited by Kleine (2013) at p 139-140 
99 At p 98 
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argument weakens its persuasiveness as a general analysis of EU policy-making. He presents 
no evidence of a reduced role for the Commission in traditional ‘first pillar’ areas linked to 
the single market, Common Agricultural Policy, competition or consumer protection, for 
example. Even in areas where the Commission’s ability to act autonomously has been 
reduced (Puetter argues this is the case for the CFSP), he acknowledges that the capacity of 
others to act without the Commission has also been reduced.100  The Commission holds at 
least one seat within each Council formation and in addition to this formal representation a 
rich network of bilateral contacts are maintained between the Council and Commission 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006).  
A large part of the work involved in preparing for Council meetings and legislating is 
carried out by the country holding the rotating presidency, and by Coreper. Coreper meets in 
two different formations (Coreper I and II) comprising national permanent representatives 
from each member state and their deputies. Research indicates that members often depart 
from instructions from their principals in national governments or make recommendations 
for instructions to be changed (Lewis 2014; 2017) – meaning they have a fairly wide margin 
of manoeuvre. As in other parts of the Council, formal voting is rare. Coreper has its own 
well-developed institutional culture and norms and it is common for permanent 
representatives to outlast national administrations, in some cases by decades. While its 
proceedings are characterised by a lack of transparency, this can be seen as instrumental in 
preventing posturing by member states and allowing compromise and consensus. Kleine 
(2013) characterises this type of informal governance as a means of accommodating political 
uncertainty and thus giving member states more flexibility (in particular, to respond to 
domestic pressure groups). In contrast, Lewis (2017) places more emphasis on the 
autonomous nature of the norms developed within Coreper and the dual identities of the 
permanent representatives as national agents and members of a supranational body. Despite 
this degree of institutional autonomy, it is difficult to see permanent representatives acting 
as policy entrepreneurs, as any risks or rewards associated with their work ultimately vest in 
the member states. Rather they can be seen as agents who exercise a significant degree of 
discretion on some matters, and occasionally go rogue.  
In what way might the Council be seen as exercising supranational entrepreneurship? 
Undoubtedly it has an institutional identity beyond the representatives of the member states, 
with its General Secretariat and various formations which include the President as well as 
representatives of the Commission. While member states still hold the majority of seats and 
votes, the use of QMV (even if often hypothetical) calls into question the directness of the 
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relationship between the national policy preferences of any given member and the decisions 
and actions taken by the Council. Permanent representatives may also not be perfectly 
faithful agents of the interests of national administrations, although they probably represent 
national interests in the long-term sense. Likewise, the country holding the rotating 
presidency, which chairs trilogues, may act as a supranational entrepreneur rather than as 
an agent of collective national interests. What is clear however is that member states are able 
to recall powers delegated to agents within the Council, and do so on a regular basis. The 
President of the Council is subject to a relatively short term which must be renewed by 
member states – although it has been seen that this does not require unanimity. While the 
increased frequency of Council meetings and higher profile of the President may imply a 
more politicised Council, it also indicates the unwillingness of member states to delegate 
powers to this institution which are not subject to regular review by national leaders. 
The European Parliament 
The European Parliament does not fit easily into either intergovernmental or 
supranational theories of the EU. Pollack (2003) characterised the EP as an outlier in his 
application of principal-agent theory to EU institutions. He suggested that there had been a 
lack of delegation of powers to the Parliament by member states in areas where they 
perceived that the Parliament would move political outcomes away from their collective 
preferences. The increase of the EP’s powers under the Lisbon Treaty challenges this 
assessment – especially as its political composition has been volatile over the same period, 
meaning it was not consistently aligned with national governments. While its powers have 
increased in recent years, the EP has not always used these powers to further EU integration 
– indeed there has been a notable eurosceptic element in successive parliaments since 2009. 
However, this must be balanced against the emergence of relatively stable pan-European 
party groupings on the left, right and centre of the political spectrum (Raunio 2017). Writing 
in 2007, Hix, Noury and Roland observed high levels of cohesion within these groupings, 
with membership thereof outweighing nationality in determining MEP’s voting patterns. 
These contradictory and shifting attributes of the Parliament have led to its relative neglect 
by integration theorists, apart from occasional flurries of interest such as during the 
Spitzenkandidat standoff.101 
Rittberger (2005) analysed the Parliament’s powers in terms of its ability to place 
                                                          
 
101 The Treaty of Lisbon requires the Council to propose a candidate for Commission president ‘taking account of 
the European elections.’ In 2014 this provision was used by the party groupings within the EP to put forward 
their preferred candidates prior to the elections. When the EPP grouping emerged with the most votes, it made it 
clear that it expected its candidate Jean-Claude Juncker to be put forward by the Council and would not support 
another candidate, despite strong opposition on the Council to Juncker’s candidacy. Juncker was duly proposed 
by the Council (with the UK and Hungary voting against him) and elected as President of the Commission. 
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constraints on the executive, an established approach in the comparative analysis of national 
parliaments. Tracing the development of the EP’s powers to modify and veto EU legislation 
and budgets, he argued that national governments had chosen to empower the Parliament in 
order to resolve legitimacy problems associated with the pooling of sovereignty.  By creating 
a body capable of exercising some control over the Commission and Council, member states 
compensated for the declining legislative role of national parliaments as powers were 
transferred to the EU. Rittberger applies the delegation model and treats the Parliament as 
an agent of the member states, but one created for the specific purpose of enhancing 
democratic legitimacy. While his historical analysis is persuasive, Rittberger concedes that 
national concerns for procedural legitimacy do not translate automatically into institutional 
design and the EP was only one of many potential solutions – increasing scrutiny of EU 
legislation by national parliaments would have been an alternative. Haroche (2018) develops 
the idea that the EP was in fact empowered by an interparliamentary alliance in key 
budgetary and legislative domains.  The Parliament’s assertion of powers even prior to the 
first direct elections in 1979, particularly in the environmental and social policy fields, has 
been noted by others (Meyer 2014; Roos 2017). The conventional logic of delegation by 
member states provides very little to explain why the EP has been so much more influential 
in some areas than others, or at certain times, even in the absence of formal powers.102   
Once powers have been delegated to the EP in the Treaties, it is difficult for member 
states to recall these powers, due in part to the Parliament’s status as the only EU institution 
directly elected by citizens. Paradoxically, Germany has been the most consistent advocate of 
increased powers for the Parliament, despite its citizens being most underrepresented in 
terms of the number of MEPs. Hix and Høyland (2013) raised the question of how effectively 
the European Parliament exercises its powers given its tendency to adopt legislation on first 
reading – however more recent quantitative research indicates that first reading agreements 
can actually empower the EP over the Council (Laloux 2017; Laloux and Delreux 2018). As 
will be seen in the analysis in Chapter 6, adoption at first reading by no means implies that 
the Parliament has not made vigorous use of its role as co-legislator. The work which takes 
place in committees prior to, during and after trilogues (leading to a plenary vote) is often 
politically fraught and attracts the lobbying efforts of businesses, NGOs and even national 
governments (Panke 2012). Unlike the deliberations of the Council or Commission, most EP 
committee meetings are held in public and they often attract large attendance. Of the 11,500 
lobbying organisations on the common register held by the Commission and Parliament, 
                                                          
 
102 See Roos (2017) for discussion of the powers exercised by the Parliament over social policy from the 1950s to 
the 1970s, in the absence of any formal Treaty basis for this.  
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over 7,000 hold EP accreditation.103 
 Given its fulsome exercise of the powers granted to it under the Treaties – including 
some which the member states did not intend to grant – the Parliament cannot easily be 
seen as an agent of the member states. More plausibly, it is an agent of EU citizens 
themselves. However most of the outcomes of the Parliament’s exercise of its powers, as 
opposed to the powers themselves, can be reversed or modified by member states through 
the Council. While the Parliament was able to propose a candidate for the Commission 
presidency, it was open to member states to reject this candidate – a power which they may 
be more prepared to exercise in the future. While the Parliament takes its own views on 
legislation informed by the political balance on its committees, the Council must agree to 
these views in order for them to be adopted as EU law. It is therefore possible to exaggerate 
the extent to which the Parliament truly wields independent power within the Union. 
Regardless of the powers which it exercises in the legislative process and in other areas such 
as approving agreements with third parties, the Parliament lacks agenda-setting powers in 
comparison with the Commission and Council. Beyond approving the Commission’s work 
programme, the EP exercises little control over the timing or content of legislative proposals, 
or the decision to withdraw them.  
Nevertheless, in certain areas the Parliament can be seen to act as a policy entrepreneur, 
taking on risks and seeking to consolidate its own interests. The extent to which it played this 
role in championing social considerations in the public procurement reform will be assessed 
in Chapter seven. The ability of the EP to effectively act as a policy entrepreneur may depend 
on its political orientation differing from that of the Commission or Council, rather than 
being aligned with them. Where the political make up of EP committees is notably to the left 
or right of the Commission – or where it differs on other major issues such as the 
environment or civil liberties – this may enable it to gain the ‘first mover’ advantage and 
exploit windows of opportunity as a policy entrepreneur. This can occur where interest 
groups find the relevant EP committee to be a more receptive target than Commission or 
member state representatives, and therefore focus their efforts upon its rapporteurs or other 
MEPs. This points to a paradox in the EP’s ability to consolidate its powers: it may have an 
advantage as a policy entrepreneur where its political alignment is distinct to that of other 
EU institutions, but it is also more likely to encounter resistance to its attempts to exercise 
power in such situations. This suggests that the Parliament’s ability to act as an entrepreneur 
is likely to be cyclical, waxing as a distinct political orientation emerges amongst its members 
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and waning as resistance builds up within the Council and Commission. 
The Court of Justice 
From the time of its seminal 1960s judgments in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v 
ENEL, the ability of the Court to shape EU integration has been widely recognised. More 
than any other EU institution, it has left its mark on the single market through its 
interpretation of the fundamental freedoms set out in the Treaties. As noted in Chapter one, 
classic debates about the political power of the Court of Justice were framed not in terms of 
supranational or intergovernmental theory but around questions of the separation of powers, 
judicial activism, and the nature of the EU constitution. From the late 1980s however, the 
Court began to play a more central role in political theories of EU integration. Burley and 
Mattli (1993) applied a neofunctional analysis to the growth of the Court’s powers over time, 
identifying the spillover of EU law from economic to related domains such as occupational 
health and safety, social welfare, and education. Moravscik (1993, 1997, 1998) sees member 
states as choosing to empower the CJEU to secure credible commitments from their 
counterparts. This leaves open the question of why member states have chosen to exercise 
less rather than more control over this power by including general principles in the Treaties 
which are open to wide interpretation by the CJEU. Intergovernmental theory generally 
interprets such ‘incomplete contracts’ as one of the rational outcomes of bargaining (better 
to have a vague provision which may accommodate your preferred position than a precise 
one which does not); neofunctional and supranational theory sees it as an unintended 
consequence of the desire to empower the Court to act in specific areas.  
Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz (1998) developed the idea of member states delegating 
the role of filling in the details of incomplete contracts to the CJEU. They see the Court as 
being careful not to overstep the mark in exercising this power, as it needs member states to 
acquiesce to its judgments to preserve its authority. This perhaps underplays the importance 
of the preliminary reference procedure in creating a direct link between the CJEU and 
national courts, meaning it is not dependent on national governments to enforce its 
interpretations of EU law. Pollack (2003) sees the Court as an agent of the member states, 
responsible for monitoring compliance and filling in the details of incomplete contracts. 
However, this is difficult to reconcile with the transformative character of many of the 
Court’s judgments, as well as the ongoing contention of its powers by member states - both 
through litigation and other means, for example Theresa May’s ‘red line’ regarding CJEU 
jurisdiction after Brexit.104 In Chapter four, I review several large scale studies which purport 
                                                          
 
104 As set out in May’s 2017 speech at Lancaster House in the following terms: “…we will take back control of our 
laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain. Leaving the European Union 
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to show a link between the preferences of a qualified majority of member states and the 
Court’s decisions, finding that these are unpersuasive in establishing a causal relationship.  
In contrast to the intergovernmental view, Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (1997) 
presented the Court as advancing its own agenda against member state interests. Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet (1997, 1998, 2012) developed the idea that transnational actors have driven 
EU integration through law, by pursuing private interests which have been effectively 
vindicated in Luxembourg. The latter account, in which the Court’s powers are not advanced 
through its own will but through the instrumental use of its jurisdiction by others, sits more 
comfortably with traditional legal conceptions of the role of courts. Carrubba and Murrah’s 
(2005) quantitative research supports the idea of transnational actors using preliminary 
references to expand economic activity within the EU. While the principle of horizontal 
direct effect requires enforcement of EU law by national courts, the Article 267 procedure 
enhances the ability of the CJEU to promote its consistent application. Preliminary rulings 
complement the decentralised nature of EU law enforcement; these cannot readily be 
‘gamed’ by either EU institutions or member states as they rely upon the initiation of an 
action in national courts and the decision by a national court to refer questions to the CJEU. 
While courts of final appeal are obliged to refer questions regarding the interpretation of EU 
law to the CJEU, they retain some room for manoeuvre in determining whether or not the 
point is acte clair (obviating the need for a reference). In practice the number of preliminary 
references made to the CJEU varies widely between member states, with Germany and Italy 
topping the table and the Scandinavian countries at the bottom.105 In a number of areas 
including public procurement, enforcement of EU law at national level is further buttressed 
by common rules on the domestic remedies which must be available for infringements of EU 
law.  
At times, the CJEU can be clearly seen as acting to consolidate its own powers - for 
example in Opinion 2/13 regarding the EU’s accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The Commission and a number of member states had long favoured 
the EU acceding to the ECHR in its own right, to copper-fasten the protection of 
fundamental rights within the Union.106 The Council requested an opinion from the Court on 
ECHR accession in 1994, at which time the Court held that there was no legal basis in the 
Treaties for the EU to accede. This was addressed in Article 6(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
                                                          
 
will mean that our laws will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws will be 
interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg but in courts across this country.” 
105 Source: European Court of Justice, Annual Report 2016 – Judicial Activity, p 107-111 
106 As all EU member states are required themselves to accede to the ECHR, and the EU Convention on 
Fundamental Rights replicates most of its provisions, the additional protection associated with the EU’s accession 
is arguably marginal.  
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leading the Council to give the Commission a mandate to begin negotiations on accession. 
With the negotiations complete, the Commission requested the Court’s opinion on the draft 
instrument of accession, which it duly delivered in December 2014. The Court rejected the 
proposed terms of accession on the basis that they undermined the autonomy of EU law in 
various ways, notably by allowing the European Court of Human Rights (in Strasbourg) to 
interpret it. While this decision was widely criticised due to the perception that the Court had 
put protection of its own jurisdiction before protection of fundamental rights, it is also 
possible to see the Court as protecting the integrity of EU law against the more political 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court.107 Regardless, the CJEU’s willingness to protect its 
own bailiwick may be seen as the act of a policy entrepreneur – and was not without risks 
that the Commission and Council would proceed with accession despite its negative 
opinion.108 
The idea of the CJEU as a purposeful  or entrepreneurial actor may overstate its 
powers however as i) it does not control which cases come before it and ii) it does apply at 
least a loose precedent doctrine, limiting its ability to respond to political imperatives.109 
Standing requirements for judicial review cases brought by member states or EU institutions 
before the CJEU are less strict than those which apply to similar actions in many national 
legal systems, as there is no need for such applicants to show that the law complained of has 
a particular legal effect on them. However standing requirements for private applicants (i.e. 
individuals, companies or third sector bodies) have traditionally been strictly construed by 
the Court, raising a debate about access to justice amongst EU law scholars. The test of 
‘direct and individual concern’ which applies to private applicants acts as a relatively high 
bar to initiating actions, and has effectively limited the Court’s role as an enforcer of 
individual rights, especially where these are affected by directives.110 While Kelemen (2011) 
sees the beginnings of US-style adversarial legalism in the EU, other scholars have argued 
that Europe’s litigation culture is more conservative (Kagan 2008).  
At other times the Court has acted to uphold the rights of member states vis-à-vis EU 
institutions. In the Tobacco Advertising case,111 the Court annulled a directive which banned 
                                                          
 
107 For discussion of the ECHR court’s sometimes controversial approach see Christoffersen and Madsen (2013). 
108 In the event, this has not (yet) come to pass. 
109 For discussion of the Court’s approach to precedent see Tridimas (2012) and Jacob (2014).  
110 Because directives are addressed to member states, who must implement them in national law, private 
applicants cannot argue that they are of direct concern to them. While private applicants may in theory challenge 
regulations before the CJEU, the requirement to demonstrate individual concern limits the scope for this. The 
CJEU has interpreted ‘individual concern’ as requiring membership of a closed class of persons affected by a 
regulation or other legal act (see Case C-25/62 Plaumann v Commission) While Art. 263(4) of the Lisbon Treaty 
removed the ‘individual’ requirement for challenges to regulatory acts, the Court has continued to apply a high 
bar for challenges brought by private applicants in cases such as T-18/10 R Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v European 
Parliament and Council and C-546/13 Sugars Ltd and Sidul Acuzares, Unipessoal Lda v European Commission 
111 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising I) 
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all consumer advertising of tobacco products. Germany had argued that the directive 
overstepped the legal basis in the Treaties on which it had been adopted, by aiming to 
harmonise public health measures rather than simply to ensure free movement of goods. The 
Court accepted this argument, however it subsequently upheld the very similar replacement 
directive proposed by the Council and Parliament in Tobacco Advertising II,112 on the 
grounds that this respected the legal basis in the Treaties. The different outcomes in these 
cases should serve as a cautionary tale against simplistic attributions of political motives – 
whether pro-integration, pro-member-state, or pro-business – to the Court. In both cases 
identical interests were assembled on either side, however the Court relied upon the precise 
wording and legal basis of the directives to reach two different conclusions. While the Court’s 
undoubted role in furthering EU integration is often cited by political scientists, its role in 
limiting integration, or restricting the powers exercised by the political institutions of the EU 
is less widely referred to. The two Tobacco Advertising cases aptly illustrate this dual role. 
Overall, intergovernmental or principal-agent interpretations of the Court appear to 
underestimate its role not just in enforcing EU law, but in creating it. As the discussion of the 
case law on environmental and social aspects of public contracts in Chapter four will explore, 
the legislative response to CJEU case law by other EU institutions and member states ranges 
from codification through to non-adoption or override. Where the Court bases its decisions 
on interpretation of the Treaties their options are restricted – until and unless the member 
states agree to Treaty change or the Court itself changes its interpretation. There are 
relatively few instances in which member states have adopted Treaty changes in order to 
counteract Court of Justice rulings, one prominent example being the Barber protocol to the 
Maastricht Treaty which aimed to limit the effect of the Court’s jurisprudence on equal 
treatment of men and women in pension entitlements.113 The Court might plausibly be seen 
as a policy entrepreneur, albeit one which operates in a relatively obscure legal penumbra 
and is thus often able to ‘test’ ideas in an environment insulated from the full repercussions 
of policy experimentation – a task which is harder for the Parliament and Council. The way 
in which the Court at times appears to defer to political imperatives, and at times appears to 
ignore or actively seek to transform them, will be traced in its evolving jurisprudence on 
social and environmental aspects of public contracts in Chapter four.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored theoretical conceptions of the EU institutions involved in 
the public procurement reform of 2011-14. Building upon the intergovernmental and 
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supranational theory introduced in Chapter 1, it is possible to identify ways in which each of 
the institutions may act as an agent of the member states or conversely as a policy 
entrepreneur pursuing its own interests. The objective here is not to neatly label each of the 
institutions as agent or entrepreneur, but to understand both the theoretical basis and 
empirical evidence associated with these characterisations. Later chapters will examine the 
broader implications for EU integration and democratic accountability of the way in which 
the institutions and member states exercised power during the reform process. The 
Commission, despite its energetic and wide-ranging policy initiatives, can be seen primarily 
as an agent of the member states. Its much-vaunted power of initiative is most often used at 
the behest of others. With the exception of the international agreements it negotiates 
(subject to extensive ex ante and ex post controls by member states and other EU 
institutions), very few of the outcomes of the Commission’s exercise of its powers cannot be 
recalled by the principals – and in fact this happens frequently with the amendment, repeal 
and withdrawal of directives and regulations. While some of the policy support activities 
undertaken by the Commission are less readily reversed due to its cultivation of interest 
groups, it does not have a monopoly on such activities.  
The Council has traditionally been seen as a proxy for the member states, and 
remains both formally and informally an intergovernmental institution. However, it has also 
developed an institutional culture which is more than the sum of its parts. This can be seen 
in the prevalence of pseudo-consensus rather than unanimity in most of its decision-making 
processes, as well as the more active role of the Council President in recent years. It can also 
be seen in functional autonomy of permanent representatives who often both shape the 
positions of their national administrations and outlive them. Nevertheless, the occasions on 
which the Council can be seen to act as a policy entrepreneur pursuing its own interests and 
taking risks not sanctioned by the member states are few and far between. The increase in 
Council meetings in recent years may be a sign of the institution’s centrality in responding to 
crises, but it also speaks to the indispensability of heads of state and ministers in resolving 
these crises.  
The European Parliament’s role as co-legislator places it on formally equal terms to 
the Council in many areas, and it has actively sought to maximise its power including 
through the cultivation of interest groups. As a directly elected chamber, and one which is 
organised according to ideological rather than national affiliations, it perhaps has more 
claim than any other EU institution to democratic legitimacy. The effectiveness of this can be 
seen both in innovations such as the Spitzenkandidat process and in the prevalence of 
adoption of legislation on first reading following trilogues, suggesting that Parliament’s 
committees are largely successful in gaining support for their positions. Arguably the 
65 
 
Parliament is most successful where its political orientation differs to that prevailing within 
the Commission and/or Council – because in these situations it is more likely to attract 
lobbying and support for its positions from businesses, civil society groups and even national 
politicians. However, the Parliament’s powers should not be exaggerated: outside of the 
areas where it acts as co-legislator it is still often treated as an apprentice rather than a 
respected colleague, and it enjoys little to no powers of initiative or agenda-setting. 
The Court of Justice holds a unique power of interpretation over EU law – and has 
only rarely been subject to the recall or limitation of this power through Treaty amendments. 
More frequently, EU legislation is amended or repealed where a qualified majority of 
member states find the Court’s interpretations unpalatable, but even this is undertaken with 
caution giving the importance of the rule of law within the EU’s constitutional order and the 
difficulty in finding consensus on alternatives. The Court acts to preserve its own authority in 
a number of ways, both through the incremental development of legal doctrine to avoid 
political confrontations, and through direct defence of its jurisdiction - as seen in Opinion 
2/13 on the European Court of Human Rights. The extent to which it is able to act as a policy 
entrepreneur is constrained by its inability to control which cases are brought before it, by its 
sensitivity to the separation of powers within the EU, and by the application of precedent. 
However, in a number of areas, notably gender equality and equal pay, free movement of 
goods and services and more recently environmental protection and the posting of workers, 
the Court has pursued what many see as a radical or interventionist approach. Despite strong 
objections by powerful domestic interests to the Court’s jurisprudence in such areas, the 
Court has not faced sanctions from member states in the form of curtailment of its powers or 
resources.  
These paradoxical features of the Parliament and the Court present challenges for the 
two main theories of EU integration. Unlike the Commission and Council, it is difficult to 
depict them as either agents of the member states or supranational entrepreneurs without 
some contortions of these concepts. It is clear that they were created by the member states 
and that it is possible for the impact of their decisions to be limited by states acting 
collectively. It is also clear that they frequently exercise independent influence over highly 
contested questions of law and politics, and do so in a way which is contrary to the 
preferences of a majority of member states. The extent to which these elements featured in 
the reform of the procurement directives will be explored in the chapters which follow. This 
will allow evaluation of the four specific hypotheses derived from intergovernmental and 
supranational theory, and refinement of the descriptive account of the role of EU institutions 
in integration.  
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Chapter 3 – The European Commission and Origins of the Reform 
This chapter begins to test the applicability of four specific hypotheses derived from 
supranational and intergovernmental theory to the reform of EU public procurement law. It 
focuses on the origins of the reform in the period after the financial crisis took hold in 
Europe, in 2008-9. The reform happened in the context of severe constraints on public 
spending in many EU member states, as well as declining trust in EU and national 
authorities.114 Reform of public procurement was seen as a policy lever at both national and 
EU level to stimulate growth and to achieve a number of other objectives such as support for 
particular industries/sectors, addressing unemployment, stimulating innovation, and 
increasing trade both within and outside the EU’s borders. This chapter is primarily 
concerned with the actions of the European Commission in 2010-11, when it initiated the 
reform. Subsequent chapters trace the legislative process and the specific contributions of 
the Court of Justice, European Parliament and Council to the environmental and social 
provisions of the directives – as well as the positions adopted by Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom and prominent interest groups.  
The two pairs of specific hypotheses tested in each of the empirical chapters are: (H1) 
EU institutions acted as supranational policy entrepreneurs in the reform of environmental 
and social aspects of public procurement law or (H2) EU institutions acted as agents of the 
member states in this reform; and (H3) EU institutions acted in a way which was irreversible 
by member states and (H4) EU institutions acted in a way which was subject to recall by 
member states. As set out in Chapter one, these claims derive from supranational and 
intergovernmental theory respectively, and unlike many of the other claims of these theories, 
(H1) and (H2) are mutually incompatible, as are (H3) and (H4). In order to falsify the 
supranational entrepreneur hypothesis (H1), in this and subsequent chapters I look for 
evidence that EU institutions acted only within the bounds of expressed preferences of 
member states. To falsify the agency hypothesis (H2), I look for evidence that EU institutions 
acted outside of the bounds of member state preferences, understood collectively according 
to the requirements of a qualified majority. The irreversibility hypothesis (H3) can be 
falsified by showing either that actions were actually reversed, or that there was a realistic 
chance of this based on precedents in similar areas and/or the applicable decision rule and 
preferences of member states. The recall thesis (H4) can be falsified by showing that there 
was no realistic prospect of member states reversing decisions or revoking powers exercised 
by EU institutions in the reform process. In chapter 7 I consider the balance of evidence in 
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respect of these four hypotheses and draw conclusions about the explanatory power of the 
theories behind them, as well as noting any adjustments which appear to be justified by the 
public procurement case. 
The first EU public procurement directive was adopted in 1970.115 Successive 
directives adopted in the 1980s and 1990s introduced minimum requirements for the 
remedies116 available to disappointed tenderers in domestic courts and extended the regime 
to cover services and works contracts117 as well as supplies, and to cover utilities118 as well as 
the public sector. In 1998, work began on what would become the 2004 procurement 
directives – consolidating supplies, services and works contracts and repealing the earlier 
directives (with the exception of the Remedies Directives, which remain in force to date as 
amended). The 2004 directives contained a number of innovations in terms of procedures, 
award criteria and use of electronic means of communication. From an environmental 
perspective, they incorporated the CJEU’s 2001 judgment in the Concordia case, which 
endorsed the use of environmental award criteria, subject to certain constraints. They also 
contained a brief reference to the possibility of including social considerations in contract 
performance clauses, or setting aside contracts for fulfilment by sheltered workshops 
employing disabled people.119 The adoption of the 2004 directives was accompanied by an 
increase in the prominence of public procurement as an area of EU activity, in part due to 
the Commission’s active programme of enforcement actions against member states. 
The motivation for the Commission’s heightened attention to public procurement 
from the late 1990s onwards appears to be rooted in concerns about the relatively low 
number of public contracts awarded on a cross-border basis, that is to companies based in 
other member states. As such, public procurement was seen as a ‘missing piece’ of the single 
market puzzle, and a sizeable one at that. The value of public procurement was estimated by 
the Commission at 17-18% of EU GDP in 2010, although a large part of that spending fell 
                                                          
 
115 Commission Directive 70/32/EEC of 17 December 1969 on provision of goods to the State, to local authorities 
and other official bodies. This was followed by Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts 
116 Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts and Directive 
92/13/EEC coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of 
Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
telecommunications sectors (the Remedies Directives). 
117 Directives 92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC on services, works and supply contracts respectively. 
118 Directive 93/38/EEC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and telecommunications sectors. The utilities rules apply both to state owned or controlled enterprises 
and to those which have been granted a special or exclusive right by the state, e.g. a local water monopoly.  
119 Articles 26 and 19 of Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts. 
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outside of the common rules.120 A measly 1.5% of covered procurement contracts were 
awarded directly cross-border, with a slightly higher percentage awarded indirectly through 
subsidiaries or subcontractors.121 Such low levels were interpreted by the Commission as 
evidence that substantial barriers to competition for public contracts still existed within the 
single market. EU countries showed a marked decline in penetration ratios for imports to 
meet public sector demand in the period 2009-10.122 This probably reflected the effect of 
stimulus packages which increased demand primarily for domestically produced goods and 
services, due either to explicitly protectionist objectives or to the particular sectors of the 
economy in which they applied. While in most countries the decline was short-lived, with 
penetration rates increasing again from 2010, European public procurement markets 
remained less open to international competition than most others worldwide.123   
The Monti Report, Green Paper consultation, and evaluation of the 2004 directives 
In October 2009 Commission President Barroso requested a report from Mario 
Monti, a widely respected former Commissioner and future prime minister of Italy, on the 
relaunch of the single market. In his letter to Monti, Barroso highlighted the renewed threat 
of economic nationalism arising from the financial crisis, as well as the mandate in the 
Lisbon Treaty to deliver a “highly competitive social market economy” within the EU. 
Monti’s report, delivered six months later, noted that “The single market today is less 
popular than ever, while Europe needs it more than ever.”124 He identified both integration-
fatigue and market-fatigue as amongst the factors impeding consensus on the direction and 
deepening of the single market. Monetary union, enlargement and institutional reform had 
taken up much of the EU policy agenda in the pre-Lisbon period. Based on consultation with 
representatives of national governments, EU institutions, business and civil society groups, 
Monti identified distinct attitudes towards and expectations of the single market in 
continental social-market economies, “Anglo-Saxon” countries,125 Central and Eastern 
European countries, and the Nordic countries. Compromises between the priorities of these 
groups would be required.  
                                                          
 
120 This is due both to the exclusion of some types of contracts from the procurement rules and also to the 
minimum thresholds which apply under the directives, meaning the majority of public contracts are not covered. 
121 European Commission (2010), at p 15 
122 Messerlin (2015) draws upon two sources of data, a study conducted on behalf of the European Commission in 
2012 by Ramboll Consulting Management and the World Input-Output Database. His findings contradict the 
argument put forward by the Commission in its trade policy, that EU public procurement markets are inherently 
open to outside competition.  
123 Ibid 
124 Monti (2010), at p. 6 
125 It is not clear from the report which countries other than the UK Monti placed in this group, in particular 
whether it includes Ireland, the Netherlands or Germany.  
69 
 
 Monti also identified three levels of support for the single market: radical critics, 
conditional supporters and unwavering supporters. Amongst the conditional supporters, his 
report highlights concern about how social and environmental objectives are reconciled with 
free movement of goods and services. In order to successfully relaunch the single market, 
these concerns would need to be addressed without undermining the competitive principles 
highly valued by the unwavering supporters. The report dismisses the idea that consensus 
amongst member states is not necessary to further develop the single market, or that this 
could be driven by the Commission and Court of Justice alone. Areas in which Monti 
suggests specific initiatives are needed to address the concerns of conditional supporters 
include the free movement of workers in light of the Viking and Laval judgments; the place 
of social services within the single market; and the integration of broader policy goals in 
public procurement. At the same time, the report notes concern from business groups 
regarding the fragmentation of markets across the EU, excessive regulation, and 
insufficiently robust external trade policy. Monti’s recommendations encompassed not only 
policies traditionally understood as part of the single market such as competition, but also 
industrial, consumer, energy, transport, digital, social, environment, climate change, trade, 
tax and regional policy – and even justice and citizenship.  
In its October 2010 Communication setting out its response to the Monti report, the 
Commission noted that: 
…the single market is not an end in itself. It is a tool for implementing other policies. 
All of the public and private measures, the responses to the challenges concerning 
growth, social cohesion and employment, security and climate change, will be more 
likely to succeed if the single market works as it should. 126 
This can be read as either a relatively anodyne statement of the single market’s potential 
utility or as a rather more radical argument for extending EU competences beyond the 
construction and maintenance of the single market, into more politically contested policy 
domains. By 2010 the EU’s presence and power within these domains was already well 
established, but the language in the Communication (which is by no means exceptional) 
casually fuses various objectives in justifying intervention, not all of which lie within the EU’s 
internal market competences under the Treaties. A more formalistic approach might justify 
further action based purely on the mandate given in the Treaties to create an internal 
market; notably absent is any reference to the desires or preferences of the member states in 
this regard. It is clear then that Communication (together with the Green Paper on public 
procurement considered below) seeks to convince member states and to consolidate the 
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Commission’s single market mandate, rather than simply to execute it.  
 The Commission sought to test this mandate by setting out 50 proposals to 
implement Monti’s recommendations in areas ranging from transport and energy policy, 
support for small and medium sized enterprises, intellectual property, electronic commerce 
and coordination of national tax policies.127 An extremely ambitious timetable to achieve 
these reforms by the end of 2012 was proposed – however in the event only one of the 50 
proposals was adopted in that period.128 Single market reform continued to lack the political 
prominence or urgency attached to the ongoing fallout of the financial crisis and eurozone 
governance issues. On public procurement, the Commission stated its intention to bring 
forward new legislation in 2011-12 with an emphasis on simplifying the rules, allowing more 
flexibility and including ‘other’ policies in procurement. At this stage it did not commit to 
any of the specific ideas put forward by Monti, such as allowing public sector contracting 
bodies to use the negotiated procedure or qualification systems (a streamlined method for 
bidder selection available to the utility sector under the 2004 directives). Nor did it 
specifically mention environmental or social aspects of procurement. Six studies had been 
commissioned into various aspects of the current procurement framework, including levels 
of cross-border competition, accessibility of public contracts to SMEs and use of 
environmental, social and innovation-related criteria in tenders. These studies were 
published in June 2011, at the same time as the synthesis of the consultation carried out by 
the Commission and were used to justify specific proposals in these areas.  
 The reform of the procurement directives fell primarily within the remit of the 
Directorate-General for the Internal Market, then headed by Michel Barnier. The 
consultation was launched by a Green Paper in January 2011, setting out the overall 
objectives of the reform and seeking responses to specific questions regarding the scope and 
content of the new legislation. The majority of this document focuses on how the rules might 
be amended to encourage greater competition for public contracts (in particular by SMEs) 
and to provide contracting authorities with greater flexibility/choice in procurement 
procedures. A number of questions relate to the implementation of Court of Justice rulings 
in the period since the previous reform, for example on post-award modifications and ‘in-
house’ contracts awarded by one public entity to another. A relatively brief section sets out 
                                                          
 
127 Coordination of national tax policies was highlighted by Monti as an important part of a new single market 
consensus, as the continental social market economies and Nordic countries would seek this from the Anglo-
Saxon and Central and Eastern European countries in return for allowing further competition in their markets. In 
the event, tax coordination has proven largely illusory in the period up to 2017, although 11 countries agreed in 
2013 to progress a common financial transactions tax. The UK challenged the use of enhanced cooperation to 
implement the tax; the challenge was dismissed by the CJEU but at time of writing progress appears to be stalled. 
128 On the establishment of a European network of employment services to promote mobility of workers, which 
was implemented by Commission decision 2012/733/EU.  
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the Commission’s views regarding environmental, social and innovation-related aspects of 
procurement, and solicits input on these topics. The Green Paper frames these questions in 
the context of the Europe 2020 objectives to improve energy-efficiency, increase the share of 
renewable energy and spending on research and development, as well as reducing 
unemployment, social exclusion and poverty.129 While reiterating the Treaty prohibition on 
discrimination against bidders from other member states, the questions posed by the 
Commission are relatively far-reaching, contemplating the potential to limit the use of lowest 
price awards, to allow derogation from the rules in certain circumstances, to loosen the ‘link 
to the subject-matter’ requirement, and to introduce common EU requirements regarding 
the use of life-cycle costing or the purchase of energy-efficient goods or services.130 
 A total of 623 responses were received to the consultation, of which the largest 
number came from businesses and business associations (40% of responses). The remainder 
came from public sector bodies (33% of responses), including 22 national governments; civil 
society organisations (17%); academics and legal experts (7%); and individual citizens 
(3%).131 Ninety-two of the responses were from multi-country associations and interest 
groups. The geographical spread of responses was roughly proportionate to population, with 
the UK being heavily overrepresented and France slightly underrepresented.132 Although the 
respondents for the most part welcomed the reform, sharp divergences existed in the 
approach to the questions posed by the Commission. For example, on the question of 
whether the ‘link to the subject-matter’ requirement ought to be abandoned, 80% of civil 
society organisations expressed support as opposed to less than 20% of member state 
governments and businesses. Significant divergences also applied between local/regional 
public authorities and national governments on the desirability of a separate regime for 
social services – with the former almost twice as supportive of this as the latter. Support for 
common EU ‘what to buy’ requirements was strong amongst civil society groups (62%) but 
attracted less than 25% support amongst the other respondent groups.133 The positions of the 
German, French and UK governments on these questions are analysed in Chapter five. 
 Of the six studies published by the Commission in June 2011 evaluating various 
aspects of public procurement, one looked in depth at the use of environmental and social 
criteria.134 It sought to identify the framework conditions in the member states for pursuit of 
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133 Ibid, pg. 7 
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such policies via procurement, the way in which these were implemented by individual 
contracting authorities, and the impact of such activities. The study found that 20 member 
states had adopted national action plans on green public procurement (GPP), of which 10 
included mandatory elements.135 The priority product groups and criteria adopted in many 
cases were based on the common EU GPP criteria. Construction, transport and IT equipment 
were the largest markets for green products based on national policies. A large gap existed 
between national policies and awareness/implementation by contracting authorities: on 
average only 56% were aware of their national policy – but 64% were found to be 
implementing some aspects of GPP in tenders.136 The study found no standalone policies on 
socially responsible public procurement in the member states; however social objectives in 
procurement were addressed in a range of other policies and legislation, such as that on 
labour and disability rights. Despite the absence of dedicated policies and criteria, the study 
identified widespread uptake of socially responsible procurement (49% of respondents), in 
particular amongst local and regional authorities.137 
 Alongside the six studies and synthesis of the consultation, the Commission 
published its evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of the 2004 directives in June 
2011.138 This drew upon data gathered from the procurement notices published in the Official 
Journal (OJEU) as well as analysis of legislation and practices at member state level. 
Amongst the key findings of the evaluation were that only about 20% of public expenditure 
on goods, services and works was covered by the EU rules, and that while there was an 
average of 5.4 bidders for each covered contract, this varied widely between member 
states.139 The cost of complying with the rules averaged at 1.3% of the value of contracts – 
although the Commission was keen to point out that some of these costs would also be 
incurred under purely national rules.140 According to the econometric analysis carried out, 
the average savings associated with increased competition through applying the EU rules 
ranged from 2.5%-3.8%, depending on the procedure used.141 The overall conclusion was 
that the EU procurement rules had resulted in measurable increases in transparency, 
competition and financial savings, despite the very modest level of cross-border tendering. 
The evaluation report also announced the Commission’s intended timetable for bringing 
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141 Ibid, p 20. The report also notes a high level of variance between member states in the amount of time and 
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forward the new procurement directives: draft proposals would be published by the end of 
2011, with the expectation that the legislation would be adopted by the Council and 
Parliament by the end of 2012. In the event, although the Commission published its 
proposals in December 2011, it was not until February 2014 that the new directives were 
adopted.  
Commission proposal for new directives 
The Commission’s initial proposal for a new public sector procurement directive ran 
to 246 pages, including an explanatory memorandum. The memorandum identified two 
overarching objectives for the reform: to increase efficiency/competition (including through 
increased participation of SMEs and cross-border tenders) and to: 
Allow procurers to make better use of public procurement in support of common 
societal goals such as protection of the environment, higher resource and energy 
efficiency, combating climate change, promoting innovation, employment and social 
inclusion and ensuring the best possible conditions for the provision of high quality 
social services.142 
The Commission noted the support for these objectives expressed during the Green Paper 
consultation, as well as their complementarity to the Europe 2020 targets. The impact 
assessment published alongside the legislative proposal sets out the various options for 
reform and the costs and benefits imputed to each. The impact assessment identified a lack 
of convergence in the use of environmental and social criteria amongst member states, 
meaning that bidders faced many different standards when responding to tenders.143 
Addressing this might help to avoid market fragmentation. Two options for increasing 
uptake of SPP were compared: a facilitation or enabling approach, and a mandatory 
approach based on quotas or the definition of common environmental and social 
requirements for all tenders. The latter option was rejected on the basis that it would place a 
disproportionate administrative burden on contracting authorities, increase costs and 
potentially reduce competition, including by SMEs.144  
 Both the definition of options and their evaluation in the impact assessment can be 
seen as biased against far-reaching reform to support SPP. The two options presented lie at 
the extremes of possible interventions – the first approach being largely passive and the 
second involving radical change. Intermediate options, such as the provision of incentives to 
engage in SPP, were not considered. The analysis of the ‘facilitation’ option fails to fully 
evaluate the costs of ongoing fragmentation in the market for environmentally and socially 
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sustainable goods and services; or the benefits in terms of cross-border trade which might 
arise from further harmonisation of SPP criteria. The evaluation of the mandatory option 
does not consider evidence based on the sector-specific environmental requirements which 
applied under existing EU legislation, such as the Energy Star Regulation and Clean Vehicles 
Directive. While the possibility to pursue further such sector-specific initiatives is mentioned 
in the impact assessment, the benefits of including such requirements directly in the 
procurement directives were not assessed – this might be expected both to increase uptake 
and to reduce the administrative burden on both contracting authorities and businesses of 
identifying and applying such obligations.145  
 Based on the impact assessment, the Commission proposed a number of measures 
related to SPP in the draft directive. These measures are listed in Figure 3.1. Only new 
elements which did not form part of the 2004 directives are listed; the proposal also 
maintains the environmental and social provisions which applied under the old directives. 
For example, the ability to address environmental characteristics in award criteria and the 
requirement to include accessibility for disabled persons in technical specifications were 
maintained. In several cases however, more detailed rules were proposed to regulate the 
application of environmental and social criteria. This is particularly the case in relation to 
third-party labels (such as organic certification) and life-cycle costing, which was tacitly but 
not explicitly permitted under the 2004 directives. The Commission’s proposal of more 
detailed and explicit rules in these areas can be seen as an increase in precision and formality 
as discussed in Chapter one; the extent to which these reforms support SPP or actually make 
it more difficult is analysed in the sections dealing with each proposed reform below.  
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Procurement stage Description of measure 
Contract definition – 
special regimes for 
certain contracts 
Reserved contracts – extension of ability to reserve contracts for 
performance by disabled or disadvantaged workers (17) 
Light touch regime for social services (74-76) 
Bidder 
selection/exclusion 
Mandatory exclusion for non-payment of tax or social security 
(55.2) 
Discretionary exclusion for violation of EU or international 
environmental, social and labour law (55.3) 
Technical 
specifications 
Ability to refer to specific processes of production or provision in 
technical specifications (40.1) 
Verification  Ability to require third-party labels attesting to social and 
environmental characteristics of goods/services (41) 
Ability to reject tenders for non-compliance with EU or 
international environmental, social and labour law (54.2) 
Environmental management systems may be requested for all 
contracts (61.2) 
Award of contract Award criteria may refer to specific production processes or 
processes for other life-cycle stages (66.2) 
Rules for life-cycle costing (67) 
Rejection of abnormally low tenders which do not comply with 
EU or international environmental, social or labour law (69.4); 
Rules on subcontracting (71) 
Table 3.1 Environmental and social measures in COM (2011) 896                                         
Note: Numbers in brackets refer to Article numbers in Commission proposal 
Reserved contracts 
Internationally it is relatively common for public procurement rules to allow certain 
contracts to be ‘set aside’ or reserved for a particular type of business – for example 
Canadian law allows contracts to be set aside for businesses run by First Nations people, and 
South Korean law allows reservations for businesses run by veterans. Such arrangements are 
permitted as exceptions to the general rule of open competition under the GPA and other 
international procurement agreements. Under the 2004 directives, it was possible for 
contracting authorities to reserve a contract for competition by ‘sheltered workshops’ which 
employed a minimum of 50% disabled staff. Such workshops exist in several member states, 
although their prevalence has declined over time as programmes which aim to integrate 
disabled workers into mainstream workplaces have become more popular. The reservation is 
not a derogation from competition – contracts must still be advertised in the OJEU and the 
procedural rules applied, however competition may be restricted to those organisations 
which meet the employment condition.  
The Commission’s proposal extended the scope of the reservation to include not only 
disabled but also disadvantaged workers, while also reducing the minimum number of such 
workers who must be employed by the businesses benefitting from the reservation to 30% 
from 50%. This represents a significant relaxation of the conditions for the reservation; the 
76 
 
rationale for this and its expected impact on competition or cross-border trade are nowhere 
mentioned in the proposal or impact assessment, nor were they mooted in the Green 
Paper.146 The idea to extend the reservation clause may have come from one or more of the 
member states, although analysis of the responses from Germany, France and the UK to the 
Green Paper shows that no reference was made to such a policy at that stage. In any event, 
the revised and more generous reservation clause survived the legislative process intact and 
was adopted in the 2014 directives. Unlike several of the other provisions discussed here, the 
reservation clause provides for a relatively straightforward increase in the ability of 
contracting authorities to pursue social aims via procurement. But its impact on competition 
is limited due to the low number of sheltered workshops/employment programmes in most 
member states. A more far-reaching reservation, in favour of public service mutuals, was 
proposed by the UK in the course of the trilogues, and ultimately adopted despite concerns 
from the Commission regarding its impact on competition, following extensive amendments 
by the European Parliament which enhanced its ‘social’ character.147 
Light touch regime for social and other specific services 
The 2004 directives distinguished between ‘priority’ and ‘non-priority services’, 
which were listed in two separate annexes to Directive 2004/18/EC. Priority services were 
those subject to the full rigours of the directives, whereas non-priority services were those 
considered to be of less cross-border interest, and thus only subject to minimal procedural 
rules. These included health and social, education and community, and hotel and restaurant 
services, and also a residual category of ‘other services’, meaning many contracts fell within 
this lighter regime.148 The Commission proposed three major changes to the treatment of 
such services: an increase in the threshold for application of the EU rules to €500,000;149 the 
removal of ‘other services’ from the scope of the lighter regime; and a requirement for 
member states to put in place specific procedures for such contracts. The last element 
included the following text: 
Member States shall ensure that contracting authorities may take into account the 
                                                          
 
146 The ‘non-paper’ sent by the Commission to the Council in January 2012 states that the previous reservation 
was considered too restrictive and out of step with practices and legislation in some member states (European 
Commission (2012), p 34-35) 
147 As originally envisioned by the UK, the reservation was primarily intended to facilitate privatisation of public 
services by making it easier for companies spun out of the public sector to win contracts. During the trilogues, the 
EP inserted requirements that such companies serve a public interest, reinvest their profits in the service and are 
governed by employees. The Commission’s hesitation is evident in the final text of Article 77 of the Directive, 
which makes the public service mutual reservation subject to review by the Commission over a five-year period, 
and also limits the duration and frequency of contracts awarded under it.  
148 These services were also excluded from the scope of the EU’s market access commitment under the GPA. 
149 This was increased to €750,000 in the final version of the Public Sector Directive, and €1 million in the 
Utilities Directive. 
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need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, availability and comprehensiveness 
of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, the involvement and 
empowerment of users and innovation. Member States may also provide that the 
choice of the service provider shall not be made solely on the basis of the price for the 
provision of the service.150 
 
On the one hand, the proposal increases the discretion available to contracting 
authorities in the award of such services by applying a higher threshold. However, it also 
restricts the scope of contracts subject to this lighter treatment,151 and requires member 
states to come up with national rules. The latter element is curious in light of the responses 
of the UK, Germany and France to the consultation – none of which expressed a desire for 
separate national rules on social service contracts. Germany and the UK both expressed 
satisfaction with the status quo, while France was in favour of a common EU approach to 
award of social service contracts.152 It is possible that the Commission was responding to the 
submissions of unions and other civil society groups in formulating the light touch regime, or 
that it was sensible of the preferences of the European Parliament in this regard, already 
expressed in its resolution of May 2010.153 Due to the exclusion of the relevant services from 
the GPA, the Commission may also have considered this an area where greater concessions 
to the social agenda could be made without threatening the EU’s trading relationships.  
Mandatory exclusion grounds 
 The procurement directives had long included both mandatory and discretionary 
grounds for the exclusion of bidders (debarment provisions). The mandatory grounds under 
the 2004 directives concerned convictions for fraud, corruption, money laundering or 
similar offences.154 The Court had held that such grounds must be strictly construed to 
ensure an even application of the basic conditions for participation in public tenders across 
the single market.155 Whereas exclusion for non-payment of tax or social security had been 
discretionary under the 2004 directives, the 2011 Commission proposal made this 
mandatory where a judgment had been entered against a company, but subject to new rules 
on the ability of companies to ‘self-clean’.156 Further mandatory exclusion grounds, relating 
to child labour and human trafficking, were added by the European Parliament during the 
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152 SGAE (2011), p 64-66  
153 European Parliament (2010a) 
154 Article 45.1 of Directive 2004/18/EC.  
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Others and Consorzio G. f. M. v Ministero della Difesa and La Cascina Soc. coop. arl  
156 As set out in Article 55.4 of the proposal 
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trilogue process.  
The self-cleaning provision was intended to balance the ability of contracting 
authorities to exclude disreputable bidders against the right of companies not to be unfairly 
blacklisted, for example where they have fully addressed the causes of previous misconduct. 
The Green Paper had raised the prospect of harmonising rules on self-cleaning, however it 
did not mention tightening the grounds relating to tax and social security. Germany had 
expressed its support for common EU rules on self-cleaning, while France and the UK were 
against this.157 Ultimately, while both the mandatory tax and social security exclusion and 
the self-cleaning rules were maintained in the final version of the directive, their effect was 
softened by providing for the tax and social security exclusion to be waived where it would be 
disproportionate, or where a period of five years had passed from the date of conviction.158 
Discretionary exclusion grounds 
A new discretionary ground of exclusion was proposed for bidders who did not 
comply with EU environmental, social or labour law or certain international instruments. 
The latter were limited to the core International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and 
several environmental conventions ratified by all member states. This formed the germ of 
what would later become the ‘mandatory social clause’, following heavy amendment and 
extension by the European Parliament – in particular to include national laws and collective 
agreements.159 The scope and the effect of this provision are subject to ongoing debate,160 
with some commentators taking the view that it is of little significance as it merely states the 
ability to enforce general legal obligations in the context of public contracts. This observation 
seems correct in respect of the Commission’s original proposal, which did not create any new 
obligations on contracting authorities. However, the wording in the adopted directives does 
create a general duty on member states to ensure that such laws are respected in the 
performance of public contracts – thereby increasing both the visibility and the 
enforceability of environmental, social and labour obligations in public contracts. More 
concretely, the obligation to comply with environmental, social and labour laws and 
collective agreements can form the basis for requiring the replacement of a subcontractor or 
for rejecting a tender, and such rejection is mandatory where a tender is found to be 
abnormally low due to non-compliance with environmental and social rules.  
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158 Unless the judgment itself provides for a longer period of exclusion, as set out in Art. 56.7 of Directive 
2014/24/EU.  
159 Article 18.2 of Directive 2014/24/EU 
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Production processes in technical specifications 
 A longstanding debate had taken place between the Commission, Court, member 
states and various academic commentators regarding the possibility to address production 
processes and methods in technical specifications.161 The Commission’s original position was 
that such methods could only be specified if they were somehow discernible in the end 
product, a concept which it described as ‘affecting the material substance’ of what was being 
purchased.162 Forgiving the arcane terminology momentarily, the Commission’s objective 
seemed to be preventing discrimination between identical products based on factors likely to 
be linked to their origin, which would have the potential to undermine the free movement of 
goods. However, this restriction also had the effect of casting doubt upon many 
environmental criteria, which by definition were concerned with production processes as 
much as the final product – renewable electricity and organic food being indistinguishable in 
most respects from their conventional counterparts, for example. The Court’s judgment in 
the EVN and Wienstrom case appeared to place a nail in the coffin of the Commission’s 
approach, as it endorsed the use of an award criterion based on renewable energy.163 
 The Commission’s proposed new provision on technical specifications not only 
endorsed references to production processes, but also to other stages of the life-cycle (for 
example the use period or end-of-life). The importance of these elements in delivering GPP 
had become increasingly important through the work done to develop common criteria. 
However, the loosening of the rules on specifications was accompanied by a new reference to 
the requirement for a link to the subject-matter, an idea which had previously only applied in 
relation to award criteria. This was explained by The Commission as precluding 
requirements for general corporate social or environmental responsibility commitments, for 
example – however it may in fact place more profound restrictions on environmental and 
social criteria as many production stage impacts cannot be meaningfully addressed at the 
level of individual products or services.164 The final text of the directives contains an explicit 
refutation of the requirement for specifications to have an effect on the ‘material substance’ 
of a product or service; this appears to have been inserted by the Council for good 
measure.165 
                                                          
 
161 For a summary of this debate see Kunzlik (2009) 
162 This distinction appears to have been inspired by the 1991 ruling of the GATT dispute resolution panel in 
United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Dolphin-Tuna I), which held that restrictions on 
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163 Case C-448/01 EVN and Wienstrom [2003] ECR I-14527 
164 For discussion of the potential limitations of the link to the subject-matter requirement, see Semple (2015a). 
165 Council of the European Union (2012q); Article 42.1 of Directive 2014/24/EU.  
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Labels 
The importance of third-party certification schemes in supporting GPP had become 
clearer in the period since the adoption of the 2004 directives. Significant resources had 
been invested in the development of such labels both at national and EU level (through the 
development of the EU Ecolabel). Given the inability of contracting authorities to verify all 
environmental claims made about products and services during tender procedures, the 
importance of objective and reliable labels was recognised by the Commission and member 
states. The labelling organisations themselves were also active lobbyists and took a keen 
interest in the consultation and reform process. The Commission’s proposal seeks to strike a 
balance between increasing the ability of contracting authorities to insist upon third-party 
labels, and avoiding foreclosure of markets by restricting references to labels which are 
proprietary or otherwise unavailable to the market as a whole. It does this by setting down a 
number of procedural and transparency requirements for the types of labels which may be 
referred to in tender documents. The German federal government in particular had 
expressed its support for such a position.166 Amendments during the trilogue resulted in a 
slightly stronger ability on the part of contracting authorities to insist on third-party 
certification.167 However both the original wording proposed by the Commission, and the 
final version adopted, add considerably to the complexity of using labels in procurement, 
thus potentially undermining the objectives of the provision.  
Possibility to reject tenders for non-compliance with environmental, social and labour law 
 The proposal contained an option for contracting authorities to reject tenders which 
did not comply with the same EU and international laws referred to in the discretionary 
ground of exclusion discussed above.168 Whereas the exclusion ground discussed above is 
retrospective (i.e. it relates to events prior to the tender competition), this provision appears 
to be based upon the evaluation of tenders, for example to determine whether they comply 
with EU directives on employment equality or working time. However the Commission’s 
draft of this provision only refers to EU law and certain international conventions, limiting 
its impact. This clause became more powerful in the course of the trilogues at the instigation 
of the European Parliament, as explained above and further explored in Chapter six.  
Environmental management systems 
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167 In particular, by limiting the situations in which bidders may rely on ‘technical dossiers’ (self-declarations) in 
lieu of a third-party label to situations in which they have no opportunity to obtain a label, for reasons which are 
not attributable to the bidder. Article 43 of Directive 2014/24/EU.  
168 European Commission (2011f), Article 54.2 
81 
 
The Commission’s proposal included the apparent widening of the ability to select 
tenderers based on their ability to apply environmental management measures, and to request 
third-party evidence of this. Under the 2004 Directives, this was possible only for service and 
works contracts, whereas the proposal extended this to all forms of contract including 
supplies.169 This relatively subtle change was not highlighted anywhere in the Green Paper or 
documents accompanying the proposal. Its origins may lie in the Commission’s desire to 
promote the application of the EU’s own environmental management scheme, EMAS.  
Award criteria 
The relaxation of the ‘material substance’ requirement in relation to technical 
specifications was also extended to award criteria. This effectively meant that factors relating 
to production or to any other life-cycle stage could be taken into account when distinguishing 
between bids and awarding marks. The Commission’s proposal maintained the link to the 
subject-matter requirement first articulated by the Court in the Concordia case, which 
prevents general corporate practices being taken into account.170 France had expressed its 
support for a relaxation of this requirement171, while Germany and the UK favoured retaining 
it.172 It was not until the Court issued its judgment in Max Havelaar, mid-way through the 
negotiation process for the new directives, that the Council and Parliament moved to include 
social characteristics, such as fair trade production, in the provisions on award criteria. The 
Commission’s proposal referred only to environmental and innovative characteristics.  
Life-cycle costing 
 The directives had never contained prescriptive rules regarding how costs are to be 
evaluated, however under the 2004 directives if the ‘lowest price’ basis was chosen for award 
then only price, and not any other costs, could be taken into account. Life-cycle costing 
involves assessment of all of the costs of ownership of a particular asset, for example the cost 
of electricity used by IT equipment or fuel used by cars, as well as maintenance and disposal 
costs. It is generally considered to favour environmentally sustainable goods and services, 
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170 For example, while an award criterion might evaluate the carbon emissions associated with production and 
use of the particular product being purchased, it could not evaluate the overall carbon footprint of the company. 
171 SGAE (2011), p 43-44  
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achieved at the same time, then that is a bonus. We do not think that procurement should 
be used as a main lever to achieve a particular policy line.” (Cabinet Office 2011, p 18) 
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which may have a higher up front purchase price (such as the higher cost of insulation in an 
energy-efficient building) but save costs in the longer term. As such the inclusion of explicit 
rules on life-cycle costing in the proposal was presented by the Commission as a major step 
in supporting GPP. The rules set out aimed to ensure that methods for life-cycle costing 
would be transparent and that bids would be compared on an equal basis. They also 
specifically allowed the inclusion of ‘external environmental costs’ – such as those attributed 
to greenhouse gas emissions. As with the provision on labels, the Commission’s draft article 
on life-cycle costing seeks to balance promotion of its use with avoidance of discrimination 
against bidders through the gerrymandering of methodology. The resulting provision was 
complex in its wording, and became more so in the course of the legislative process.  
Subcontracting 
The Commission acknowledged in the Green Paper that some stakeholders had called 
for stronger rules on subcontracting in public contracts. The ability under EU law for 
operators to subcontract some or even all of a contract had long been seen as a way of 
circumventing various rules, including environmental or social requirements such as wage 
agreements. This arose for example in the Rüffert case, discussed in Chapter four. However 
the Commission’s proposed new provision on subcontracting was relatively anaemic, stating 
only that contracting authorities could require bidders to indicate the share of the contract 
they proposed to subcontract and the names of subcontractors. There was also an 
acknowledgement that direct payments could be made to subcontractors – a measure 
intended to support SMEs. In the course of the negotiations, and largely at the instigation of 
the European Parliament, the provisions on subcontracting became more extensive and 
stronger, allowing the application of exclusion and selection criteria to subcontractors and 
explicitly requiring their compliance with environmental, social and labour law. This 
reflected concerns in the richer member states about subcontracting being used to 
circumvent labour law and collective agreements.   
Abnormally low tenders 
 A final feature of the Commission’s proposal which addresses environmental and 
social concerns is the inclusion of an explicit requirement to reject tenders which are 
‘abnormally low’ if this is due to non-compliance with the same EU and international 
obligations referred to in the discretionary exclusion grounds and compliance clause. An 
abnormally low tender was defined in the proposal by reference to the average value of the 
other tenders received – a definition which was removed during the trilogues, leaving it up to 
individual member states or contracting authorities to identify abnormally low bids. The 
objective of preventing social dumping can be discerned in the Commission’s original text, 
however this is very much weaker than the provision ultimately adopted, again due to the 
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inclusion of national law and collective agreements in the final text.  
Agency or entrepreneurship? 
Did the Commission play the part of a supranational policy entrepreneur in 
introducing new social and environmental aspects in the draft procurement directives? Or 
did it rather act as an agent of the member states, putting forward only those policies which 
either already had support at national level or were likely to garner such support in the 
legislative process? The Monti report and the Commission’s response in October 2010 
suggested that a window of opportunity had opened for advancing the single market, but that 
progress was dependent upon securing buy-in from more sceptical member states, in 
particular through the deeper integration of environmental and social policies within the 
fabric of the single market, including the public procurement rules. The Green Paper 
consultation tested the appetite for such measures amongst member states, businesses and 
civil society groups, establishing basic parameters for the legislative proposals which were to 
follow. The Commission also drew upon extensive research regarding the impact of 
horizontal policies on procurement outcomes such as cost and cross-border competition, 
which provided some reassurance that such policies were not inimical to the values of free 
movement and open markets.  
Taking a broad view of the mandate set out in the Lisbon Treaty to create a social 
market economy, the Commission’s proposals seems to sit well within the competences 
bestowed upon it by member states. It is also clear that France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom (as well as many other member states) were generally supportive of SPP, although 
their views differed on the specific mechanisms for pursuing this under the directives and 
the extent to which further EU harmonisation was desirable. The Commission could have 
pursued a much stronger approach to integrating horizontal policies in its proposal, for 
example by introducing mandatory common criteria, or by incorporating sector-specific 
requirements set out in other EU legislation in the text of the draft directive. On the other 
end of the spectrum, it could have avoided introducing any new SPP provisions. Instead it 
chose a relatively conservative, incremental approach – balancing modest increases in the 
ability of contracting authorities to pursue SPP with a number of new safeguards, including 
the self-cleaning rules and an expanded link to the subject-matter requirement. While the 
fact that it acted conservatively does not completely rule out the possibility that it acted as a 
policy entrepreneur, it suggests that the Commission did not take any significant risks. 
As noted in chapter 2, the Commission devoted considerable resources to promoting 
green procurement in the years leading up to the reform of the directives. Strong support for 
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this existed at national level in only a handful of member states prior to 2008.173 Support for, 
and implementation of SPP was higher amongst local and regional authorities.174 Efforts to 
bring national governments on board proceeded during the period 2008-2011, with the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for the Environment coaxing member states to adopt the 
national action plans on GPP envisioned in its 2008 communication. The Council had 
endorsed the Commission’s communication in 2008, adopting a ‘political indicative target’ 
for 50 percent of all procurement procedures to comply with green criteria.175 While an 
evaluation carried out in 2012 indicated that this target had not been met,176 the existence of 
a prior policy commitment was used by the Commission to support the inclusion of further-
reaching environmental provisions in its 2011 proposals for new directives. 
In contrast, the Commission was distinctly less supportive of the inclusion of social 
considerations in public procurement in the period preceding the reform. This reflected its 
concern that social criteria would be used by member states as an excuse not to open their 
procurement markets to cross-border bidders, and in particular to undermine competitive 
advantages held by the new accession states. This concern is perhaps most evident in the 
2011 Buying Social guide published by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities. While acknowledging the possibilities to address issues 
related to employment opportunities, labour rights and social inclusion in public contracts, 
the guide makes little mention of wage guarantees or fair trade procurement, although by 
2010 these were well established, in particular amongst local authorities (Barnard 2011). It 
also proffered a restrictive interpretation of the judgment in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais177 case, 
in which the CJEU had rejected a complaint brought by the Commission against the use of 
public contracts to combat local unemployment in the economically deprived French region. 
Support for projects, training, common criteria or targets for social procurement was not 
forthcoming from the Commission, despite the strong interest in this from local and regional 
governments, NGOs and trade unions.178  
Environmental and social aspects in public contracts engage different interests, with a 
clearer potential for intra-Union ‘losers’ where social criteria are applied. This can be seen 
most clearly in the tension between low and higher-wage member states in the Laval quartet 
                                                          
 
173 Notably in Austria, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands.   
174 For example the cities of London, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Barcelona and Vienna and the Lombardy, Piedmont, 
Catalan and Basque regional governments all had active policies in the period prior to 2011.  
175 Council of the European Union (2008) 
176 Centre for European Policy Studies/College of Europe (2012)  
177 Case C-225/98 Commission v France 
178 This can be seen in many of the submissions to the 2011 consultation on the draft directives, which note the 
lack of support at EU level for social procurement. The content of these submissions is discussed in chapter 5.  
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of cases, discussed in the next chapter. Linking the award of public contracts to support for 
local unemployment projects also has the potential to disadvantage not only cross-border 
bidders, but also those based in competing regions within the same country. In contrast, the 
use of environmental criteria does not tend to discriminate against bidders from elsewhere 
within the EU, especially as the market for sustainable goods and services has grown over 
time. Environmental protection became mainstreamed within EU policy during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, meaning there were clear links to be made between GPP and other 
areas of Commission activity. While the same might be said in relation to employment 
equality and combatting social exclusion, these issues tend to engage debates on the left-
right spectrum which are a primary focus of national politics in most member states. In the 
absence of consensus regarding the legitimacy of using public contracts to support social 
objectives, any policy adopted by the Commission in this domain would carry distinct risks. 
 The contrasting actions taken by the Commission in these two policy areas appear to 
reflect the collective preferences of the member states – with consensus on the validity of 
green procurement but divisions on the validity of social procurement. The also reflect the 
Commission’s primary concern with the internal market, and its gradual acceptance of other 
policy considerations where these do not impede free movement of goods and services. 
Plausibly, the member states may have empowered the Commission to act as guardian of 
single market principles, even where these conflict with their more immediate political 
interests, or those of regional and local authorities. The logic of delegation here calls for 
some scrutiny; should we expect member states to be more or less willing to delegate policy 
development to the Commission where this is likely to conflict with powerful domestic 
interests? While member states may have empowered the Commission to act as guardian of 
the single market, it is difficult to argue without some contortions that their interests are 
behind litigation taken by the Commission against them on allegedly protectionist 
procurement practices, or the choices made by the Commission regarding which interest 
groups to support. While member states delegated general powers to the Commission to 
build and enforce single market rules, they may not have fully appreciated how evolving 
horizontal policy demands on public procurement would challenge these rules. These actions 
appear to fall within the realm of ‘unintended consequences’ contemplated by neofunctional 
theory.  
However close comparison of 2011 proposal for new directives, and the text ultimately 
adopted by the Parliament and Council in 2014, also invites scepticism about the extent to 
which the Commission acted as a supranational entrepreneur. By definition, none of its 
proposals were irreversible, as all were subject to negotiation within the codecision process. 
The most significant GPP measures introduced by the Commission, relating to labels, life-
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cycle costing and the link to the subject-matter, are primarily concerned with limiting the 
discretion available to contracting authorities in order to ensure transparency and protect 
free movement within the single market. Despite its investment of resources to support GPP, 
the Commission did not take risks by proposing common mandatory criteria or by relaxing 
rules on competition in order to deliver environmental benefits in particular sectors. This 
applies a fortiori to the social measures included in the proposal; only the reservation for 
disabled and disadvantaged workers could be described as an innovation in this regard – and 
many of the Commission’s more modest proposals were expanded upon by the Parliament. 
While the 2011 text did mark an evolution compared to the Commission’s earlier stance on 
social procurement, it is difficult to see it as a first mover or entrepreneur in this regard, as 
social procurement was already well established (if legally fraught) in many member states.  
More plausibly, the Commission can be seen acting as an agent of multiple principals in 
its attempt to balance horizontal objectives with its core task of building the single market. 
Where agents are responsible to multiple principals, one of their core tasks become 
mediating between these interests to facilitate collective decision-making. As the Monti 
report was at pains to show, there was a lack of consensus amongst member states regarding 
the legitimacy of deeper single market integration if this did not take sufficient account of 
environmental and social policies – but also a lack of consensus about the content of such 
policies. As will be seen in Chapter four, the potential for conflict between public 
procurement rules, free movement of workers, and minimum social protections had been 
brought to the fore by the CJEU’s 2008 judgment in the Rüffert case. This judgment, 
together with those in Laval and Viking, opened a fault line between those member states 
sending workers abroad (primarily in the east and south) and those receiving them 
(primarily in the west and north). The Commission would have been highly conscious of 
treading along this fault line in proposing new rules on procurement, and avoiding any new 
cracks. While green procurement was not as divisive, mandatory measures which introduced 
new costs or administrative challenges would have faced opposition in member states 
undergoing financial austerity, as well as those still struggling to implement the basic 
requirements of the EU public procurement acquis.  
A rational agent in such a situation would attempt, as the Commission did, to introduce 
rules which accommodated SPP to the extent that these did not interfere with the basic free 
movement principles or impose unacceptable costs on member states. Did its proposals 
further EU integration? The rule types and increases in precision, authority and formality 
identified in Chapter 1 were all present in the Commission’s original draft of the directives. 
Despite the voluntary nature of the SPP measures included in the proposal, where member 
states or contracting authorities do opt to use these provisions, detailed rules which are 
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legally binding and subject to the CJEU’s supervision apply. In rejecting the idea of common 
mandatory measures, the Commission stopped short of promoting harmonisation in this 
politically and economically important policy domain. It also did not claim significant 
additional powers for itself, other than those which follow from its role in enforcing the 
procurement rules. This approach fits well with the idea of a conditionally empowered agent 
which seeks to manage policy externalities and facilitate collective decision-making 
(Hawkins et al 2006). While the Commission’s actions may correspond in a general sense 
with the idea of an agent mediating between member state interests regarding deepening of 
the single market and environmental and social policies, it remains to be seen if its actions 
specifically aligned with the preferences of the three largest member states – or perhaps with 
other actors interested in the reform. This question is the focus of Chapter 5.  
Conclusions 
 Returning to the four hypotheses outlined at the beginning of this chapter, analysis of 
the Commission’s actions in the period 2010-11 casts serious doubt upon hypothesis H1 in 
respect of the Commission (that it acted as a supranational policy entrepreneur in its 
proposed public procurement reforms.) Even without knowing the detailed preferences of 
the largest member states or other actors, it is clear that the Commission was neither the 
first mover on SPP, nor did it take any significant risks in the measures it proposed in the 
draft directives. If we stretch the idea of a policy entrepreneur to include cautious or risk-
adverse entrepreneurs, we would still expect to find evidence of the Commission advancing 
its own interests or increasing its own powers in some way. While the introduction of more 
precise and formal rules might be expected to increase the Commission’s workload in terms 
of providing guidance and enforcement, ultimately the power to interpret and apply such 
rules vests in the Court of Justice, not the Commission. Only if we accept the idea of a ‘joint 
venture’ between the Commission and Court can the 2011 proposals plausibly be seen as an 
act of supranational entrepreneurship. As Chapter four will show, in fact the Court 
repeatedly placed itself in opposition to the Commission on the role of environmental and 
social concerns in public procurement, including during the reform process itself.  
 Conversely, based on analysis of the Commission’s actions alone we cannot reject 
hypothesis H2 that it acted as an agent of the member states in proposing new SPP 
measures. While many of the proposed measures appear to be novel and cannot readily be 
linked to the responses of France, Germany or the United Kingdom to the Green Paper, this 
does not mean they were fully ‘made in Brussels’. An agent may sometimes anticipate the 
preferences of its principals, or may glean them based on past interactions. Any agent with 
multiple principals will have to depart from some of their preferences some of the time (but 
is unlikely to depart from all of their preferences any of the time). In this case the 
88 
 
Commission had insight into both the level of ambition regarding SPP amongst the member 
states, and the constraints or competing policy interests which they faced. The need to find 
compromises between those states with higher and lower levels of ambition and tolerance, 
particularly in the fraught area of social conditions and free movement of workers, would 
have pointed a diligent agent towards measures which allowed individual member states and 
contracting authorities to strengthen horizontal policies in procurement, without making 
this mandatory. Ultimately, many of the Commission’s carefully worded provisions were 
modified by a European Parliament which had stronger ambitions in the social field, and 
some of these changes were accepted by the Council. This does not in itself undermine the 
idea that the Commission acted as an agent of the member states in proposing less ambitious 
provisions; national preferences may have shifted during the negotiation process and trade-
offs been sanctioned to achieve bargaining priorities.  
The process leading up to the Commission’s proposal for new procurement directives 
in December 2011 was marked by its renewed ambitions for the single market. The extent to 
which the member states shared this enthusiasm was largely untested at the time of the 
proposal, and the Commission’s agenda certainly was not realised within its envisioned time 
frame. Member states had recently fought back against the perceived overreaching of the 
Commission in the public procurement field, with Germany challenging a Commission 
Interpretative Communication on the rules applicable to contracts outside of the 
directives.179 What emerges clearly from analysis of the public procurement proposal is that 
while the Commission took seriously Monti’s counsel that environmental and social concerns 
would need to be addressed to maintain support for the single market, it eschewed a 
mandatory approach and in many areas sought out compromises between these objectives 
and its more traditional preoccupation with competition, which ultimately led to a significant 
increase in the complexity of EU procurement law. To what extent did this approach reflect 
the policy preferences of the three largest member states? To what extent did it play into the 
hands of the Court of Justice and European Parliament, which stood ready to fill in any gaps 
in the emerging directives? These questions will be examined in the chapters which follow.  
 
  
                                                          
 
179 Case T-258/06 Germany v Commission. See discussion of the case in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 - The Court of Justice and Non-market Objectives in Public 
Procurement 
 
The questions to be addressed in this chapter are i) whether the Court of Justice can be seen 
to act as a supranational policy entrepreneur or as an agent of the member states in its 
procurement jurisprudence and ii) whether its judgments are irreversible or subject to recall 
by member states. I seek to test the same two sets of incompatible hypotheses applied in 
Chapter three. To do this, I analyse four key judgments issued by the Court in the period 
2001-2012, which dealt with environmental and social aspects of public procurement. The 
first two cases, Concordia Bus v City of Helsinki180 and EVN Wienstrom v Austria181, were 
decided prior to the adoption of the 2004 directives but continued to shape procurement law 
and practice on environmental aspects during the period of the 2011-14 reform. The two later 
cases, Rüffert v Lower Saxony182 and Commission v The Netherlands (Max Havelaar)183 
were decided in 2008 and 2012 respectively – the latter in the middle of the procurement 
reform process. In each of these cases, the Court had to decide if non-market objectives were 
compatible with the Treaty principles of free movement, non-discrimination, transparency 
and proportionality as these apply to the award of public contracts. In all but one (Rüffert) it 
based its judgments on detailed analysis of the text of the procurement directives as well as 
on these principles.  
The impact of these judgments was felt beyond the relatively narrow realms of EU 
procurement law, and they played a role in expanding the number of civil society groups 
active in this field. Many public bodies, from small local authorities through to national 
governments, followed the Court’s case law closely in this area, as did the other EU 
institutions.184 The four procurement cases discussed here should be seen in the context of 
the Court’s wider jurisprudence in this period which concerned the interaction between 
market and non-market objectives under the Treaties. This includes prominent judgments 
relating to renewable energy support schemes (PreussenElektra,185 Ålands Vindkraft186 and 
Essent Belgium187) and the Posted Workers Directive (Laval,188 Viking189 and Commission v 
                                                          
 
180 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne (Concordia) 
181 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Republic of Austria (EVN) 
182 Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen (Rüffert) 
183 Case C-368/10 European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands (Max Havelaar) 
184 This is evident from the responses by local and regional governments to the Green Paper consultation on 
public procurement (discussed in Chapter 5) and the European Parliament’s own initiative reports on public 
procurement in 2010 and 2011 (discussed in Chapter 6).  
185 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Land Schleswig-Holstein (PreussenElektra) 
186 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten (Ålands Vindkraft) 
187 Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt (Essent Belgium) 
188 Case C- 341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al (Laval) 
189 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP et 
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Luxembourg190), amongst others. In PreussenElektra, Vindkraft and Essent Belgium the 
Court had accepted that the restrictions placed on free movement by renewable energy 
support schemes which were available only to national suppliers were proportionate to the 
objective of environmental protection, in the absence of a fully harmonised EU energy 
market. Conversely, in the Laval quartet of cases, the Court found that measures aimed at 
protecting wages and working conditions which interfered with the free movement of 
workers under the Posted Workers Directive were not justified. While these cases varied in 
terms of the specific questions they addressed, they show a pattern of the Court being 
relatively more lenient in its review of environmental measures compared to labour 
protection measures. This pattern extended to its public procurement jurisprudence, and can 
be seen to influence the Commission’s differentiated approach to green and social 
procurement, noted in Chapter one.  
Market and Non-market Objectives 
The terms ‘non-market’ or ‘non-economic’ are used in the EU context to refer to 
objectives which fall outside of the Union’s basic competence to regulate the internal market. 
This includes everything from environmental protection and human rights through to health 
and safety, cultural diversity and animal welfare. The majority of these areas now have an 
explicit legislative basis in the Treaties, for example the requirement under Article 11 TFEU 
to integrate environmental protection requirements into the Union’s policies and activities, 
and the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights under the Treaty of Lisbon. Before 
these explicit Treaty bases existed, the Court had interpreted EU competences in a way 
which encompassed certain non-market objectives; environmental, social and regional 
policies were all first developed under the general competence clause (Article 100 EEC).191 In 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft the Court held that human rights formed ‘an integral 
part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice’ which were protected 
within the ‘structure and objectives of the Community.’192 In Tobacco Advertising I, the 
Court appeared to establish a limit to the use of the internal market competence, holding 
that this did not permit EU regulation based exclusively on health concerns.193 Nevertheless, 
many non-market objectives continue to be addressed in legislation which is formally 
                                                          
 
al (Viking) 
190 Case C-319/06 European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Commission v Luxembourg) 
191 The first EU Environmental Action Plan was adopted in 1973, although a formal Treaty basis did not exist until 
the Single European Act in 1986.  
192 Case 11/70 at para. The context for this case was provided by increasing unease within national constitutional 
courts (in particular in Germany and Italy) during the late 1960s that fundamental rights were not adequately 
protected within the EU legal order. The Court’s stance can therefore be seen as defensive or reactionary as much 
as activist in its assertion that such rights do form part of EU law.  
193 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising I). See discussion of this and the 
Tobacco Advertising II case in Chapter 2. 
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adopted under internal market powers, with the procurement directives providing a clear 
example of this.  
The dividing line between market and non-market objectives is often blurred. De 
Witte (2012) notes that while pursuing non-market objectives may have an economically 
beneficial effect in some cases, economic cost/benefit analysis is not their driving concern. In 
the procurement context, measures promoting employment on public contracts of 
disadvantaged workers pursue both social and economic objectives, and life-cycle costing is a 
measure which pursues both economic and environmental aims. For this reason, the term 
‘non-market’ is preferred here to ‘non-economic’ to designate objectives which fall outside of 
the EU’s internal market competence as defined by the Court. The conflict between the 
essentially deregulatory agenda associated with removing barriers to free movement on the 
one hand, and environmental and social protections on the other, has also come before other 
international courts and tribunals, such as the WTO dispute settlement body.194 Reid (2017) 
notes that while the CJEU has often given effect to non-market interests even where they 
conflict with internal market rules (usually by applying a proportionality test), it has not 
done so in a consistent way in reviewing acts of the EU institutions. She also finds an 
asymmetry in the way the Court has applied the proportionality test where market and non-
market objectives conflict: asking whether environmental or social protection measures can 
be justified despite interfering with market freedoms, rather than asking whether market 
freedoms can be justified despite interfering with other rights which the Treaties place on 
equal footing.195  
The potential for conflict between market and non-market aims might be expected to 
come into sharper relief during times of slower growth, such as that which took hold in 
Europe following the financial crisis and sovereign debt crises of 2008-2010. On the one 
hand, national governments experienced stronger demands in terms of social protection and 
welfare spending, while the EU was expected to take greater responsibility for supervising 
fiscal responsibility. Environmental programmes and commitments were not abandoned, 
but these were generally seen as less pressing than the restoration of growth and 
employment. The tensions between these agendas were clearly noted in the Monti report. At 
the same time, the effects of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the Union were only just 
becoming clear during the period 2008-2010, when the Laval quartet of cases interpreting 
                                                          
 
194 Kelemen (2001) compares GATT/WTO case law on trade-environment disputes with that of the ECJ, finding 
that the relative strength of political and legal pressures on both bodies may explain their rulings in this area. 
195 Reid (2017) at 80-85. In Case 271/08 Commission v Germany, which concerned the direct award of public 
contracts to pension providers, the Court applied a more balanced proportionality test based on an equal ranking 
for social rights and economic freedoms. 
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the Posted Workers Directive were decided. It is in this context that the Court’s role in 
adjudicating social and environmental claims under the procurement rules must be placed, 
in order to understand the political impact of its judgments. 
Evaluating the Court’s Role – Theoretical and empirical approaches 
Given the fraught task of reconciling market and non-market objectives, as well as 
the contested boundaries of EU integration, the Court’s legitimacy as a political, as well as 
judicial actor, in the areas of social and environmental policy has attracted considerable 
debate and scholarship. As discussed in Chapter two, early approaches to the Court, and 
those informed by comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, focused on the 
extent to which ECJ judges were ‘activist’ in their interpretations of EU law. More recently, 
theoretical and empirical work has focused on the question of whether the Court can be seen 
to act as an agent of the member states in furthering EU integration. Carrubba, Gabel and 
Hankla’s (2008; 2012) research tests the theory put forward by Garrett (1992) and Garrett 
and Weingast (1993) that the Court is constrained by the preferences of the most powerful 
member states. They do so by analysing a large data set of infringement, annulment and 
preliminary reference cases from 1987-1997 and the observations submitted by member 
states, which they code as either supporting or opposing the Court’s position. They argue 
that their findings provide systematic evidence that threats of legislative override and of non-
compliance by member states have a substantively large effect on the Court’s rulings.   
Stone Sweet and Brunell (2012) refute the claims made by Carrubba, Gabel and 
Hankla and question their research design. In particular, they argue that credible threats of 
legislative override are extremely rare in the EU context, and that even where such credible 
threats do exist, they are not necessarily the cause of Court decisions which favour positions 
supported by a qualified majority of member states. Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla assume 
that the threat of non-compliance constrains the Court’s decisions in all cases except where 
its position is supported by a qualified majority of other member states, as only in such cases 
would a non-compliant member state be ‘punished.’ Analysing the same data set, Stone 
Sweet and Brunell argue that a credible threat of override only existed in a tiny proportion of 
the cases. However, neither analysis takes into account the positions of member states which 
did not submit observations in a case196 – because reliable data on this is very difficult to 
come by. Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla and Stone Sweet and Brunell also disagree on the 
                                                          
 
196 Carruba, Gabel and Hankla assume that where one or more member states attach high significance to an issue 
they will be able to assemble a qualified majority or even unanimity through ‘logrolls’, where concessions in one 
area are traded for favours in another. Although examples of this do exist, it clearly does not apply in all cases 
where a member state has a strong preference. Cases in which more than a handful of member states submit 
formal observations are rare. 
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significance of the fact that so few real cases of legislative override occur in the EU context – 
for the former this suggests that the Court has systematically adjusted its rulings to avoid 
this outcome. This view is intriguing from a separation of powers perspective, as it means 
that the Court effectively pre-empts the political resolution of collective action problems. But 
it is also impossible to test, unless the Court itself states that its decision takes account of the 
risk of override.  
More recent empirical work carried out by Larsson and Naurin (2016) relies upon the 
reports for hearings which were prepared for most CJEU cases prior to 2012, and which 
include a summary of the positions taken by different member states. Analysing a large 
sample of these reports from 1997-2008, they look for evidence of a systematic impact of 
member state preferences on judgments. Their research design takes account of the fact that 
in most situations the Court does not have enough information about the political risks of 
either non-compliance or legislative override to engage in sophisticated strategic action vis-
à-vis member state preferences. Nevertheless, they find “a strong correlation between 
member states’ signalled preferences and the decisions of the CJEU, in a pattern that goes 
beyond legal merit, and that is difficult to explain without reference to the override 
mechanism.” They find evidence to support hypotheses that member states’ observations 
have more influence over CJEU decisions where override can be pursued by qualified 
majority (rather than requiring unanimity) and where it can be pursued by the Council 
without seeking approval from the Parliament. They also find that member state 
observations are more influential where they support, rather than oppose, further 
integration.197 But Larsson and Naurin’s summary of their own findings is relatively modest: 
‘State governments are crucial parts of the broader audience that defines the political 
boundaries of judicial discretion.’ It would be very surprising if this were not the case.  
What is more controversial, and which is implied by the theory that member state 
preferences constrain the Court’s jurisprudence, is the idea that the Court begins with an 
analysis of the likely political impact of a decision and reasons backwards to arrive at its 
judgments regarding the interpretation and application of law to individual cases. This is 
controversial because it is the exact opposite of the way the CJEU presents its own legal 
reasoning in judgments, suggesting that such reasoning is fundamentally disingenuous.198 
                                                          
 
197 Larsson and Naurin hypothesise that this will be the case because, assuming that the Court favours more 
integration in most cases, support for this position from only a small number of MS will be enough to block 
legislative override. Their data shows that the correlation between pro-integration observations and judgments is 
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Stating that the CJEU takes member state positions (as expressed in their observations) into 
account is not controversial – but it also does not suggest that political concerns trump legal 
doctrine. It is equivalent to stating that the political organs of the EU take the Court’s 
position into account when formulating or revising legislation. Neither observation provides 
much support for either supranational or intergovernmental accounts of EU integration, 
because they effectively cancel each other out. Crucially from the perspective of the 
hypotheses I test here, the fact that the Court takes account of Member State observations 
does not invalidate the idea that it acts as a policy entrepreneur. Taking account of the 
positions and interests of member states in itself does not imply a principal-agent 
relationship. In fact, it may be a sign that no such relationship exists, because if it did then 
the Court would be obliged to conceal it to maintain its credibility. The CJEU often adopts 
positions which do not have the support of a qualified majority of member states; a clear 
example in the procurement context is provided by Rüffert, discussed below.   
Blauberger and Schmidt (2017) argue that empirical studies showing a relationship 
between state preferences and Court judgments do not undermine the independence and 
power of the Court, due to the EU’s ‘over-constitutionalisation’ (Grimm 2016). This arises 
from the scope and detail of the Treaties and the relative difficulty in amending them, as well 
as the Court’s unique role in interpreting the Treaties. They also question the premise that 
national governments intervene rationally in all cases which affect them – they may not 
intervene due to lack of resources, domestic disagreements on desirable outcomes from 
CJEU cases, or a desire to shift blame for a particular policy change to the EU.199 Domestic 
‘non-decisions’ may also result from CJEU case law (particularly in areas of negative 
integration), but are very difficult to trace on a large scale. An example of this in the 
procurement context can be seen in the UK government’s issuing of guidance on steel 
procurement in 2015.200 The clear intention of this policy was to protect the UK steel sector 
from price competition from lower cost foreign producers, however discrimination based on 
nationality was ruled out by the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty requirements of free 
movement and non-discrimination in its procurement case law (as well as the directives). 
The policy therefore focuses on application of criteria linked to health and safety, 
environmental compliance and life-cycle costing as ways of counteracting the price 
advantages of foreign steel. In the absence of CJEU case law, a ‘Buy British’ approach might 
well have been adopted.201 
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Neither Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla nor Naurin and Larsson test a control 
hypothesis such as: where little or no risk of legislative override exists, the Court will issue 
pro-integration rulings despite revealed MS preferences against this. As well as offering 
insight into the relative strength of supranational and intergovernmental explanations of the 
Court’s actions, such a hypothesis would allow a larger n analysis due to the relative 
prevalence of scenarios where no real risk of override applies. Davies (2014) observes that 
the risk of legislative override is small in the EU context relative to other jurisdictions such 
as the United States, due to the frequency with which the Court links its judgments to Treaty 
interpretations. Despite this, he identifies three techniques adopted by the Court to avoid 
legislative constraints: annulment, emasculatory interpretation, and avoidance. Davies 
presents examples from the Court’s jurisprudence on EU criminal law (Pupino202), consumer 
rights (TestAchats203), work-related benefits (Vatsouras204), patient mobility (Decker and 
Kohll205) and citizens’ rights (Surinder Singh206 and Ruiz Zambrano207) in which the Court 
has employed one of the three techniques. Questioning the legitimacy of these techniques 
where they directly undermine the expressed policy choices of the EU legislature, Davies 
argues in favour of ‘co-interpretation’ of Treaty principles by the Court and legislative 
institutions. For example, in the internal market sphere, this might involve adopting 
interpretative legislation to define ‘measures of equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction’ 
or ‘the subjects of application of free movement law’. However, this misses the point that it is 
often precisely because of lack of political agreement that member states and other EU 
institutions delegate interpretative powers to the Court in such sensitive areas.  
Martinsen (2015) points to a lack of systematic studies of how CJEU case law affects 
EU policies. She identifies an excessive focus on legislative override, even though this is the 
least common reaction. Drawing on case studies on working time, patient mobility and 
posted workers, Martinsen distinguishes four political responses to the Court’s 
jurisprudence: codification, modification, non-adoption and override. She finds codification 
to be the most frequent response in technical areas, with modification prevalent in more 
contested areas. She identifies only two instances of override in the social policy field, both of 
which predate the increased role of European Parliament as co-legislator. Nevertheless, 
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Martinsen contests the idea (put forward by Davies amongst others) that EU legislative 
politics is too fragmented to respond to Court rulings. Although examples of deadlock are 
relatively common, there are also many areas in which it is overcome to enable substantial 
modification of Court judgments. In terms of the factors influencing which of the four 
approaches is most likely to prevail, Martinsen draws attention to the role 0f time – with 
legislators being less likely to codify CJEU judgments as time passes and the immediate 
context of the judgment fades. This is relevant to the discussion below of Max Havelaar, 
where judgment was delivered in the thick of political negotiations on the directives – and 
this judgment was partially codified in the directives. Other factors influencing the likelihood 
of codification are the decision-making rules which apply to legislation in the relevant area; 
the position taken by the Commission and the extent to which it actively ‘adopts’ the 
judgment; and the political positions taken in the Council and Parliament both before and 
after Court judgments. Martinsen concludes that the Court is not an independent source of 
political change due to the conditioning effect of these factors.  
Martinsen’s categorisation of legislative responses to judgments can be applied to the 
four judgments discussed here and their impact upon the 2004 and 2014 procurement 
directives. As will be seen, these provide examples of non-adoption, modification and partial 
codification – but not of legislative override. What do these responses say about the role of 
the Court vis-à-vis the political institutions? Codification of a Court judgment might be seen 
as the most supine legislative response – but this does not necessarily mean that the Court 
has acted as a supranational entrepreneur (H1) rather than as an agent of the member states 
(H2). On the contrary, codification may be the most likely response where the Court’s 
judgment reflects a pre-existing political consensus. Likewise, modification or non-adoption 
may demonstrate that the Court has pushed beyond the boundaries of politically acceptable 
solutions. Martinsen’s categories are perhaps more useful in evaluating the extent to which 
Court judgments are either irreversible or subject to recall (H3 and H4). Both codification 
and ‘light’ modification indicate that the Court’s interpretation is unlikely to be subject to 
recall by the member states, at least in the short term. Conversely non-adoption (as I argue 
took place with Rüffert), substantial modification and override indicate that the Court’s 
judgment is subject to, or has actually been reversed by the political institutions. Ultimately 
all Court judgments can be superseded by Treaty change, although the difficulty of achieving 
political consensus for this is indicated by the tendency for individual member states to 
adopt Treaty protocols in response to lines of CJEU jurisprudence which discomfit them. 
Cases concerning environmental criteria in public procurement 
Prior to 2004, the EU procurement directives contained no references to 
environmental matters. A number of public authorities began pursuing green public 
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procurement in the late 1990s and early 2000s, however the legal basis for this was unclear 
and there was a risk of challenge by bidders. Kingston (2016) points out that the increase 
during the early 2000s in market-based environmental instruments, such as emissions 
trading schemes and green certificates, naturally led to cases coming before the Court on the 
compatibility of such schemes with the internal market. In  PreussenElektra, which 
concerned state aid in the renewable electricity sector, Advocate General Jacobs considered 
the meaning of the Treaty commitment to sustainable development, finding that it imposed 
legal obligations and that therefore special account must be taken of environmental concerns 
in interpreting the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods.208 He considered that 
environmental measures may be justified even where they are discriminatory in nature, due 
for example to the requirement to rectify harm at its source. The case concerned a German 
law which obliged energy supply companies to purchase renewable electricity generated in 
their area of supply, at specified minimum rates. The Court held that the measure was 
compatible with the Treaty, given its aim which was to combat climate change and the lack of 
integration of markets for renewable electricity at that time.209 In doing so, it did not apply 
the normal proportionality test by asking first if the measure was appropriate to achieve its 
legitimate objective, and then whether it went beyond what was necessary to achieve it. It 
was unclear whether this indicated a special approach which the Court would apply to all 
such environmental measures, or was confined to the case at hand. 
The first challenge to environmental measures in procurement to come before the 
Court was the case of Concordia Bus Finland v City of Helsinki. In its procurement of bus 
services, Helsinki had sought to encourage suppliers to reduce emissions by applying 
contract award criteria which assigned more marks for buses with lower emissions. An 
unsuccessful tenderer challenged this on the basis that the award criteria did not help to 
establish ‘the most economically advantageous tender’ – the only acceptable basis for 
awarding contracts under the directives other than lowest price. Helsinki defended its 
approach by arguing that, as it was responsible for providing healthcare to local residents, 
lowering bus emissions would confer a direct economic benefit on it. Observations were 
submitted by the Finnish, Greek, Dutch, Austrian, UK and Swedish governments as well as 
by the Commission. While each of these interventions supported the principle that 
environmental criteria could be applied in tenders, a number proposed strict limitations on 
the scope of such criteria. In particular, the Commission, Dutch and Austrian governments 
considered that such criteria must always have an economic dimension or be economically 
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quantifiable.210 The Court however did not hold that an economic benefit was required. It did 
hold that the criteria must be linked to the subject-matter of the contract, not confer an 
unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority, be advertised in advance, and 
comply with the Treaty principles – in particular non-discrimination.211 
In comparison to the assessment of state aid measures in PreussenElektra, the Court 
took a more restrictive approach to environmental measures in procurement in Concordia. 
The emphasis placed on the link to the subject-matter and the principle of non-
discrimination suggested that it would not be possible to justify environmental award 
criteria if these had a discriminatory effect. Aside from the basic advertising requirement, the 
limitations applied by the Court all offered ample room for further judicial interpretation, 
particularly the link to the subject-matter requirement and the idea of criteria not conferring 
an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority. The following year in 2003, 
further light was cast on the link to the subject-matter requirement in EVN Wienstrom, 
concerning the purchase of renewable electricity by the Austrian government. The Court 
found that an award criterion which looked at suppliers’ overall capacity to deliver electricity 
from renewable sources, rather than the specific quantities required under the contract, 
lacked the necessary link. It also cited the authority’s inability to effectively verify 
performance under the criterion in determining that it was illegal.212 However it held that 
there was nothing to prevent a contracting authority from attaching a heavy weighting to an 
environmental criterion provided it was linked to the subject-matter of the contract and 
capable of verification, regardless of whether the criterion actually served to achieve the 
objective pursued.213 The EVN judgment was thus greeted with mixed sentiments by the 
burgeoning green procurement movement, with some concern that it created an especially 
high standard for environmental award criteria. 
At first glance the rules developed by the Court in Concordia and EVN for the 
application of environmental award criteria appear to have been directly codified in the 2004 
directives.214 However examination of the preparatory texts for the 2004 directives shows 
that references to environmental characteristics and the link to the subject-matter already 
appeared in the Commission’s 2000 proposal for the directives (i.e., prior to the Concordia 
judgment).215 The Court adopted the Commission’s terminology in setting limits for 
environmental criteria, while reserving its right to interpret this concept. A number of 
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amendments aimed at including social and employment related matters in the list of 
acceptable award criteria were rejected in the process leading to the 2004 directives, despite 
the Court’s apparent support for this in Nord-Pas de Calais.216 In 2011, the Commission’s 
Green Paper raised the question of whether the link to the subject-matter requirement ought 
to be dropped. The test had met with criticism on the grounds that it potentially restricted 
the ability to address environmental and social criteria in tenders. For example, the 
requirement of a subject-matter link appeared to prevent public authorities from awarding 
marks based on the existence of a general corporate social responsibility policy, if this went 
beyond the scope of the contract. This interpretation of the limits set by the subject-matter 
link requirement was confirmed by the Court in 2012 in Max Havelaar.217 That case 
concerned a tender for the supply of tea and coffee in which a Dutch authority awarded 
marks to products carrying fair trade and organic certification. It also applied criteria 
relating to the ‘sustainability of purchases and socially responsible business’ of bidders.  
The Commission challenged these criteria on the basis of a lack of transparency and 
the authority’s restrictive references to particular labels, as well as the lack of a subject-
matter link. Although the Court upheld the Commission’s claim on the transparency 
grounds, it rejected the argument that organic and fair trade criteria were not linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract. This was significant because previous Commission 
communications had sought to limit the use of criteria which related to the production 
process rather than to the end product.218 Such a strict interpretation of the subject-matter 
link would effectively preclude many environmental and social production techniques, 
including renewable generation of electricity and organic or fair trade production of food and 
textiles. While the judgment in EVN had appeared to approve award criteria linked to 
renewable electricity production (which does not leave any discernible ‘mark’ on the end 
product), the wording of the 2004 directives suggested that award criteria must relate to 
characteristics of the end product itself. The 2004 directives also excluded any reference to 
social award criteria. 
The Court’s judgment in Max Havelaar clearly endorsed the use of both 
environmental and social award criteria, even where these had no discernible impact on the 
end product. It was quickly recognised both by civil society groups and by the European 
Parliament219 as an important development which could be built upon in the reform of the 
directives. In the compromise text published by the Council secretariat in July 2012, new 
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references to fair trade and social award criteria can be found, along with a proposed 
definition of the link to the subject-matter which makes clear that this includes criteria 
which apply at the production phase, even if they have no impact on the ‘material substance’ 
of what is being purchased.220 These provisions were largely unchanged during the 
remainder of the reform process and can be found in the 2014 directives. The reference to 
‘material substance’ is particularly puzzling to anyone unfamiliar with the legislative and 
judicial history of this provision, however it is a clear codification of the Court’s judgment in 
Max Havelaar and rejection of the ‘impact on the end product’ requirement once espoused 
by the Commission. The definition of the link to the subject-matter, on the other hand, 
represents a modification of the Court’s judgments in Concordia and EVN – the Court had 
declined to provide any definition of the concept in either case. 
Cases concerning labour protections in public procurement 
While the Court’s endorsement of fair trade award criteria in Max Havelaar opened 
the door to their inclusion in the 2014 directives, its approach to other social aspects of 
public procurement was less encouraging. In particular, its case law in relation to the 
application of labour conditions under the Posted Workers Directive221  (PWD) cast doubt 
upon the ability of contracting authorities to enforce wage agreements in public contracts. 
The Court had previously displayed a willingness to acknowledge the wider social function of 
public procurement, beginning with the Beentjes judgment in 1988.222 That case concerned a 
tenderer for a Dutch works contract who had lost out to a more expensive bid which was 
considered by the authority to be more advantageous. One of the reasons for this was the 
preferred bidder's ability to meet a condition included in the tender documents regarding the 
employment of long-term unemployed persons in executing the works. The Court held that 
such a condition was acceptable provided it had no direct or indirect discriminatory effect on 
tenderers from other Member States, and was mentioned explicitly in the contract notice.223 
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the Commission challenged the award of a number of school-
building contracts in the French region which included an 'additional award criterion' 
relating to local employment.224 The criterion was based upon an inter-ministerial circular 
setting out French government policy on reducing unemployment, which required this to be 
taken into account when evaluating two tenders of equal value. The Court accepted that such 
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a criterion could be applied, provided it was consistent with the fundamental principles of 
Community law, in particular the principle of non-discrimination.225  
By the beginning of the current century then, the Court had recognised a limited 
scope for social considerations, particularly those related to employment, to be incorporated 
as award criteria and/or contract performance clauses in procurement procedures. It was 
clear however that where such provisions were found to be discriminatory they would not 
survive scrutiny.226 Given that schemes to combat unemployment are generally national or 
regional in character, such measures and related schemes such as sheltered workshops for 
disabled workers were vulnerable to challenge. Kilpatrick (2012) points out that the 
Commission and Council did not feel obliged to implement the Court’s case law on social 
award criteria in the 2004 directives. Instead references to social matters were relegated to 
the recitals and provisions on contract performance conditions. This omission became 
significant when the application of wage conditions in public contracts was challenged under 
the PWD, leading to the Rüffert judgment. The wider context of this judgment is worth 
recounting, as it illustrates the highly politicised territory into which the Court entered. 
The 1996 Posted Workers Directive - intended to determine which employment terms 
would apply to workers temporarily working in other Member States - came under 
considerable strain in the period following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the Union. 
There was a 45% increase in the number of posted workers between 2004 and 2007.227 The 
basic tension between member states with high wages and social security costs and newer, 
poorer member states tested the principle of free movement underlying the PWD. Unions 
and political parties objected to the 'social dumping' associated with companies using low 
cost workers to fulfil contracts while avoiding contributions to the pension funds and other 
entitlements long enjoyed by workers in richer countries.228 The newer accession states for 
the most part supported the right of their companies to rely upon their cost advantages, 
especially where these companies made social security contributions and paid taxes in their 
home countries. CJEU case law, in particular the Laval quartet discussed below, served 
primarily to highlight the need for a more comprehensive political settlement which 
balanced free movement of workers with social protections. 
In its 2007-2008 term the ECJ delivered four significant judgments dealing with 
various aspects of the relationship between EU law and collective bargaining rights. The first 
of these, the Viking case, arose out of the attempted reflagging of a ferry between Finland 
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and Estonia, with the intention of reducing wage costs. The Court held that measures taken 
by the International Transport Workers Union to prevent this amounted to a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment under the Treaty. Such a restriction could be justified by an 
overriding reason of public interest, such as the protection of employees, but only if the 
restriction was proportionate to the objective pursued. In the Laval judgment, delivered one 
week later, the Court held that attempts by a Swedish trades federation to ensure the 
application of a local collective agreement to Latvian workers constituted an unjustified 
restriction on the freedom to provide services. As Sweden lacked both a minimum wage and 
a mechanism for making collective agreements universally applicable, negotiated wage rates 
did not fall within the scope of minimum conditions which could be enforced under the 
PWD. Both judgments were delivered by the Grand Chamber, underlining their political 
importance in the context of Estonia and Latvia's recent accession to the EU alongside ten 
other central and eastern European countries.229   
The Laval judgment met with strong resistance in Sweden and Denmark, in part due 
to the reliance on collective agreements rather than a statutory minimum wage in these 
countries to regulate wage levels (Blauberger 2013b). It was however supported by interest 
groups such as the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, which helped to fund the case 
brought by the Latvian company. The Commission did not take immediate action to enforce 
the Laval ruling in Denmark or other states where similar practices restricting the rights of 
foreign trade unions were the norm. Nevertheless, the Danish and Swedish governments, 
seeing little chance of legislative override at EU level, appointed commissions to advise on 
the scope of domestic legislative change needed to comply with the Court’s judgment. Both 
countries adopted such legislation in 2008-2009 which allowed them to preserve their 
models of collective bargaining while accepting the right of companies to employ workers on 
other terms where these fell outside of the minimum permissible protections under the PWD 
as interpreted in Laval. 
Neither Viking nor Laval dealt with contracts subject to the public procurement 
rules,230 however the Court had an opportunity to consider this in the Rüffert judgment 
delivered in April 2008.  Since 2004, the recitals to the Procurement Directives had referred 
to the PWD in the context of determining which employment terms could be applied in 
public contracts. Rüffert concerned a works contract which had been terminated by a 
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German authority due to the failure of a subcontractor to comply with minimum rates of pay 
set out in a collective agreement. Public authorities are obligated under German law to 
comply with such agreements and to ensure compliance by contractors and subcontractors. 
The case turned upon the compatibility of this obligation with Article 3 of the PWD and 
Article 49 of the Treaty, on freedom of establishment. The PWD requires that where workers 
are posted from one Member State to another, they must be guaranteed certain minimum 
terms and conditions of employment. The minimum terms are those set out in laws, 
regulations, or administrative provisions, as well as those contained in collective agreements 
which have been declared universally applicable, meaning they must be observed by all 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned. The 
Court held that as the German law in question referred to collective agreements which were 
not universally applicable, and did not itself fix minimum wage rates, the authority was not 
entitled to impose the higher rate of pay on posted workers.231 
Article 3(7) PWD provides that the above-mentioned ‘minimum conditions’ shall not 
prevent the application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable to 
workers. This clause points to the tension at the heart of the PWD: is it about worker 
protection or is it about allowing access for posted workers to host state markets? While the 
answer is undoubtedly 'both', the approach taken by the CJEU in the Laval quartet of cases 
(including Rüffert) focused on the latter element, effectively removing the ability of host 
states to apply higher levels of protection to posted workers. The Court in Rüffert 
emphasised that imposing higher wage requirements on posted workers had the potential to 
undermine the competitive advantage of undertakings based in lower-wage member states 
and to impede the free movement of services. It did not consider case law arising under the 
procurement directives such as Beentjes and Nord-Pas-de-Calais—which point to a wider 
discretion over terms and conditions of employment in the context of public contracts. 
Criticism of the judgment emphasised this omission as well as the Court’s failure to consider 
the equal treatment implications where collective agreements are binding only on domestic 
contractors.232 Prior to the Laval quartet, many host member states understood the PWD as 
setting a floor, rather than a ceiling, for the working conditions applicable to posted workers.  
The impact of Rüffert was to cast doubt upon the relatively widespread practice of 
requiring that contractors pay collectively agreed wages to all employees on public contracts, 
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and to alert unions and other bodies to the risk that EU law would undermine collective 
agreements and conditions of employment in richer countries. In Germany, where many 
Länder had similar laws to that challenged in Rüffert, responses to the case varied according 
to political stripes. Compared to the Viking and Laval rulings, the Commission appeared 
more actively to support the Court’s analysis in Rüffert, raising the risk of infringement 
actions. The initial reaction from the Länder was to disapply the contested provisions; 
several then sought to revise them to make them compatible with the ruling while preserving 
the principle of collectively agreed wages being mandatory in public sector contracts. In the 
longer term, right and centre-right administrations generally abolished wage requirements 
in public contracts, whereas left and centre-left ones maintained them (Blauberger 2013b). A 
federal minimum wage was also introduced in Germany in 2015. The European Parliament 
adopted a resolution in 2008 directly challenging the Court's PWD jurisprudence and calling 
upon the Commission to adopt new legislation safeguarding the rights of workers.233 It 
subsequently made revision of the PWD a condition of its support for Barroso’s re-election to 
the Commission presidency. However, the PWD enforcement directive, adopted in 2014, 
merely provides for more uniform application of the minimum working conditions which are 
enforceable under the PWD, without attempting to redefine the scope of enforceable 
conditions as interpreted by the Court.234  
At the same time, the Rüffert judgment and the failure to significantly reform the 
PWD meant that the question of which labour conditions could be enforced in public 
contracts was foremost in the mind of some member states and MEPs during the process 
leading to the 2014 directives. Compared to the Commission’s initial draft, the final texts 
adopted by the Council and Parliament contain a number of new provisions relating to 
enforcement of labour law, including collective agreements.235 There is no explicit 
requirement that the collective agreements be universally applicable, although the recitals to 
the directives do state that this provision must be applied in conformity with EU law in 
general and the PWD in particular.236 Regarding subcontractors, Article 71 of Directive 
2014/24/EU makes clear that contracting authorities may require compliance with 
applicable labour and social laws and collective agreements on the part of subcontractors, 
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and require tenderers to replace any subcontractors who do not so comply. Member States 
are also free to enforce more rigorous systems for the supervision and joint liability of 
subcontractors in their implementation of the directives under the terms set out in Article 71. 
While far from amounting to codification of the Court’s case law in this area, the new 
provisions also do not aim to modify it. Rather they skirt around it and confine direct 
references to the Court’s case law to the recitals – amounting to non-adoption. The clear 
implication is that a new political settlement was expected, although not yet achieved, at the 
time of the reform. 
The outpouring of criticism of the Laval quartet, it should be noted, was primarily 
confined to Northern and Western European circles with more sympathy for the Court's 
rulings evident in the newer accession states.237 Nevertheless, sustained criticism combined 
with wavering commitment to free movement in the wake of the eurozone and migration 
crises left the Laval quartet open to retrenchment. This appears to have taken place, at least 
in part, with the Court's judgment in the RegioPost case in late 2015.238 In March 2016, the 
Commission published proposals for revisions to the PWD which would enhance the ability 
to apply host Member State conditions.239 This lead 11 national parliaments to invoke the 
'yellow card' procedure seeking to stop the proposals on the grounds that they infringed the 
principle of subsidiarity.240 The Commission issued a response in which it rejected the 
subsidiarity argument, on the basis that the posting of workers necessarily involved cross-
border transactions which were best regulated at EU level.241 At the time of writing, the 
Commission's proposals look likely to win the necessary support within the European 
Parliament and Council. If adopted, the changes to the PWD would enhance the ability of 
host states to enforce wage requirements, including in respect of subcontractors.  
Would this amount to a legislative override of the Court’s PWD jurisprudence? In 
part yes, but the Court appears to have already embarked upon this process itself with the 
RegioPost judgment. In this challenge to a new law in Rhineland-Palatinate requiring 
application of collectively agreed wages in public contracts, the Court held that it was 
possible to justify a measure restricting free movement based upon the objective of 
protecting workers, even where the measure in question applied only to public sector 
                                                          
 
237 See for example Carevic, Kis, and Kuhta (2008)  
238 Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz. For discussion of this case see Sanchez 
Graells (ed) (2018). Note that not all commentators see this case as a significant change in direction.  
239 European Commission (2016d) 
240 The parliaments were mainly from Member States responsible for sending posted workers:  Poland, Romania, 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary. The Danish Parliament also objected 
on the grounds that the proposal did not make explicit reference to the competence of Member States to define 
pay and terms and conditions of employment.  
241 European Commission (2016e) 
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contracts. It thus distanced itself from its more restrictive interpretation of which labour 
conditions can be enforced in public contracts in Rüffert. While in strict legal terms the 
Court was able to distinguish rather than overrule Rüffert, it is hard to imagine that the 
Court was not conscious of the emerging political consensus in favour of changing the PWD. 
It is sometimes suggested that the Court has no ‘reverse gear’ and is only capable of pushing 
towards deeper integration. In its PWD jurisprudence at least, it appears that the Court is 
capable of more politically nuanced positions – although this does not resolve the question of 
whether it adopts these positions as an autonomous supranational entrepreneur, as an agent 
of the member states, or whether neither of these concepts fits its role in furthering EU 
integration.   
Testing the Hypotheses 
 Applying Martinsen’s taxonomy to the procurement cases discussed above gives the 
following results: 
Case Legislative response in 2014 directives 
C-513/99 Concordia Modification 
C-448/01 EVN Wienstrom Modification 
C-246/06 Rüffert Non-adoption 
C-368/10 Max Havelaar Partial codification/modification 
Figure 4.1 Legislative response to CJEU cases on non-market considerations 
Other than the lack of legislative override, there is no consistent pattern in these responses, 
nor notable differences between the 2004 and 2014 legislative reforms. The latter might be 
expected if the presence or absence of a qualified majority on the Council willing to overturn 
social and environmental rulings by the Court was a significant factor. Does the above 
analysis say anything about the relationship between the member states and the Court, and 
specifically about our four hypotheses? If the Court were acting as a supranational 
entrepreneur, meaning it was the first to champion a particular policy, any of Martinsen’s 
four responses might apply – depending on the substance of the policy put forward by the 
Court. But if it were acting as an agent of the member states, we would not expect to see 
either modification or non-adoption amongst the responses, as these suggest that the Court’s 
position differed from a qualified majority of member states. On this basis, the above results 
may be seen to falsify the agency hypothesis (H2) without necessarily falsifying the 
supranational entrepreneur hypothesis (H1). However as noted in Chapter 2, applying the 
description of ‘supranational entrepreneur’ to the Court is somewhat problematic because i) 
it does not control which cases come before it and ii) it does apply at least a loose precedent 
doctrine, preferring to distinguish previous cases (as in Regiopost) rather than explicitly 
reverse them. Both these factors limit its ability to exploit policy windows or to take the type 
of risks which supranational entrepreneurship implies.  
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 Turning to the second two hypotheses, are the Court’s judgments here better seen as 
irreversible or subject to recall by the member states? While all four of the judgments invoke 
the fundamental Treaty principles of non-discrimination and transparency, the decisions 
rest upon the wording of the specific directives they interpret. The fact that the link to the 
subject-matter requirement, which formed the crux of the Concordia and EVN judgments, 
was subject to modification in the 2014 directives clearly indicates that the legislature did 
not feel constrained to defer to the judicial interpretation put forward in these cases. 
Likewise, while the 2014 do reflect the Court’s ruling in Max Havelaar to the effect that 
social considerations could form part of award criteria, the rules on labels modify the Court’s 
ruling by allowing references to labels themselves, rather than just their underlying 
specifications. Finally, both the non-adoption of the Rüffert judgment and the imminent 
reform of the PWD indicate that the Court’s interpretation of the minimum labour 
conditions which can be applied to posted workers in the context of public contracts is 
subject to recall by the member states. This means that the Court’s judgments were not 
irreversible (H3) and were subject to recall (H4). 
The below table summarises the evidence in relation to each of the four hypotheses as 
evaluated in this chapter: 
Hypothesis Falsified by analysis of CJEU 
jurisprudence and legislative 
response? 
(H1) The Court acted as a supranational 
entrepreneur in the reform of environmental 
and social aspects of public procurement law 
Not falsified – some positive evidence 
based on partial codification of Max 
Havelaar in rules on award criteria 
(H2) The Court acted as an agent of the member 
states in the reform 
Falsified 
(H3) The Court acted in a way which was 
irreversible by member states 
Falsified 
(H4) The Court acted in a way which was subject 
to recall by member states 
Not falsified – some positive evidence 
based on non-adoption of Rüffert and 
subsequent proposed reforms of PWD 
Figure 4.2 Summary of hypotheses in relation to CJEU 
The two falsified hypotheses (H2 and H3) emanate from intergovernmental and 
supranational theory respectively, meaning that analysis of the Court’s role alone does not 
allow us to prefer either theory as a means of making predictions about EU integration in 
this particular area. Although the sample is small, it is clear that one of the central 
mechanisms proposed by each theory – agency (intergovernmentalism) and irreversible 
constitutionalised Court judgments based on Treaty interpretation (supranationalism) - are 
absent in an area where clear political importance was attached to judicial pronouncements. 
The importance which member states attach to the Court’s jurisprudence on 
procurement can be seen in a case brought by Germany in 2006 seeking to annul a 
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Commission interpretative communication on the scope of public contracts subject to EU 
law.242 Germany, supported by six other Member States and the European Parliament, 
brought an application for the annulment of the Commission’s 2006 Interpretative 
Communication on the Community law applicable to contracts not or not fully subject to 
the directives, which purported to clarify the rules on low-value contracts, service 
concessions, and other forms of contract not explicitly covered by the 2004 directives, based 
upon the Commission’s interpretation of the Court’s case law on this topic. Germany argued 
that the Interpretative Communication in fact went beyond the Court’s jurisprudence and so 
should be annulled. In a lengthy ruling dismissing the challenge, the General Court reviewed 
the content of the Interpretative Communication against previous jurisprudence and found 
that it did not create any new legal obligations, and so Germany’s action was inadmissible.  
The significance of this case is that it illustrates the paradox of trying to characterise 
the Court as either an agent of the member states or a supranational entrepreneur. While 
Germany and other countries clearly favoured the Court’s rulings over the Commission’s 
perceived attempts to expand the scope of the public procurement rules, they ultimately did 
not receive the support of the Court in their attempt to establish limits to the Commission’s 
alleged entrepreneurship. A Court acting as an agent of the member states might be expected 
to uphold the interests of its principals against any alleged usurpation of power by another 
EU institution. A Court acting as a supranational entrepreneur might be expected to defend 
its own remit against such usurpation, by actively reaffirming its own case law rather than 
deeming the case inadmissible. In this case, as well as the environmental and social cases 
considered above, portraying the Court as either an agent or a supranational entrepreneur 
fails to capture its distinct role in developing EU law. In Chapter seven I examine the idea 
that the Court acts as trustee, exercising powers delegated by the member states for the 
benefit of European citizens and being answerable to standards of legal professionalism, the 
rule of law and separation of powers, rather than to the preferences of member states or to 
its own policy agenda.  
Conclusions 
The United Kingdom’s adoption of a ‘red line’ regarding future CJEU jurisdiction in 
the Brexit negotiations points to the perceived importance of the Court as a source of 
integration which is outside of immediate political control. Independent courts are an 
essential part of any democracy – courts which lack independence from the political organs 
of the state are not able to uphold constitutional principles and individual rights where these 
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conflict with majoritarian or executive preferences. While the strength of judicial review 
power varies between jurisdictions, the basic principle of majoritarian legislatures and 
executives being subject to the rule of law, rather than defining the rule of law, is an essential 
tenet of liberal democracy. The separation of powers between the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches aims to prevent the dominance of any one organ of the state. Courts 
operate in a political setting, but this is not the same as saying they are subject to political 
control. Kelemen (2001) argues that compared to the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, the 
CJEU is relatively well-insulated from various forms of political interference such as 
jurisdiction stripping, resource deprivation or court packing. He finds that: 
adjudication by supranational courts does not simply bend with the political winds. 
Rather because of the need to maintain their status as neutral, independent arbiters, 
supranational courts also strive to make decisions that are consistent with well-
established legal norms and case-law precedents.243 
Wasserfallen (2010) suggests that the importance of the CJEU in integration can be 
measured by the extent to which ‘its considerations and doctrines become incorporated in 
the policy-making process’ and it is able to ‘promote distinct European policies and 
eventually shape legislative outcomes.’ By these less onerous measures, the Court’s 
jurisprudence on environmental and social aspects of procurement was certainly influential 
on the legislative process. However, when more granularity is sought, this influence appears 
to be both transient and inconsistent. The Court’s major role in this area, as in others, is to 
evaluate the specific meaning of legislative provisions and to apply these to the facts of cases 
brought before it. To say that it does so in a political context is trite; when stronger 
hypotheses about the precise nature of political influence on the Court, or the Court’s 
influence on politics, are put forward it becomes possible to test these both on a large-scale 
quantitative and small-scale qualitative basis. As both the discussion of large n empirical 
studies and the examination of specific legislative responses to case law in the procurement 
context have shown, there is no easy answer regarding the Court’s political role. But serious 
doubts are raised about the central mechanisms proposed by intergovernmental and 
supranational theory – the Court-as-agent and Court-as-entrepreneur hypotheses. This 
suggests that neither theory is entirely able to account for the Court’s role in EU integration.  
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Chapter 5 – Domestic Policy Preferences and Interest Groups 
This chapter explores the policy preferences of the three largest EU member states - 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom - concerning the reform of public procurement 
law in the period 2011-14. The focus is on the positions taken on environmental and social 
aspects of procurement regulation, both during the EU legislative process and in the context 
of domestic political debates. While these positions were to some extent made public during 
the reform process itself, further documents relating to the procedure at the national and EU 
levels have been obtained via freedom of information requests, and interpretation of this 
material has been aided by interviews carried out with individuals involved in the process. 
Statistical and media reports concerning procurement policy and practices in each member 
state have also been consulted. While the focus here is on the three largest member states, I 
also consider the views put forward by other national governments where these were 
particularly influential or differed significantly from the ‘big three’, as was the case for the 
Scandinavian countries in relation to environmental aspects of the reform and the 2004/7 
accession states in relation to social aspects. Beyond national governments, I examine the 
key role played by a number of interest groups active during the reform, including the 
Right2Water European Citizens’ Initiative which succeeded in amending the scope of the 
Concessions Directive.  
The size and nature of government procurement in each of the three member states 
at the time of the EU reform is first set out. I then turn to the specific views put forward at 
national level during the Green Paper consultation run by the Commission, analysing the 
level of support expressed for environmental and social proposals. Finally, I look at the 
choices made in the national implementations of the directives, which provide further clues 
regarding domestic preferences. As will be seen, the priorities and the preferences of the 
three largest member states on environmental and social questions diverged, pointing to the 
need for compromises to be made during the negotiation. Evidence regarding how these 
positions evolved during the course of the reform is presented here and in Chapter six, which 
focuses on the role of the Council and European Parliament. Identifying the preferences of 
member states is critical to testing the hypotheses regarding agency and supranational 
entrepreneurship. If the EU institutions acted only within the bounds of member states’ 
preferences, this tends to falsify the supranational entrepreneurship hypothesis. Conversely, 
if the EU institutions acted outside of the bounds of member state preferences, understood 
collectively according to the requirements of a qualified majority within the Council, then 
this tends to falsify the agency hypothesis.  
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Germany 
The largest economy within the EU, spending on public contracts in Germany 
amounts to some €434.5 billion per year, or 15.1% of German GDP.244  This represents about 
23% of total public sector spending on goods and services across the EU. However, as a 
federal state with highly devolved administrations, the vast majority of public procurement 
in Germany occurs below the EU thresholds. This does not mean it is not affected by EU law, 
as the Treaty principles of transparency and equal treatment apply to all contracts which are 
of ‘certain cross-border interest’ as interpreted by the CJEU. It does mean that many 
German public authorities are not directly concerned with applying the rules set out in the 
directives in most of their procurements.245 This can be seen in the value of German notices 
published in the Official Journal, which is less than half of those published by France and the 
UK, despite the total value of German public contracts being considerably higher than either 
country.246 On the other hand, German businesses are disproportionately affected by the EU 
public procurement rules, as many of them operate on a cross-border basis in sectors where 
public spending is significant, such as transport, infrastructure, defence, and pharmaceutical 
products. Some 26% of contracts awarded directly on a cross-border basis under the EU 
rules between 2007 and 2009 were awarded to German companies.247 The German Federal 
government might well be expected then to take an interest in how the EU procurement rules 
are applied in other EU countries, as well as at home.  
 Coalition governments lead by Angela Merkel’s centre-right CDU party were formed 
in Germany in 2009 and 2013. Responsibility for procurement policy at Federal level 
primarily rests with the Ministry for Economy and Energy (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Energie or BMWi), which also plays a key role in EU affairs including 
instructing the German representative on Coreper I. The Ministry was held by the FDP 
(Rainer Brüderle; Philipp Rösler) from October 2009 through December 2013 and by the 
SDP (Sigmar Gabriel) from December 2013 until January 2017. During most of the relevant 
period for this study then, responsibility for Federal procurement policy vested in a liberal 
                                                          
 
244 European Commission (2016), p 8-9. The figures are averaged across the years 2012-2015 and exclude utilities 
and defence spending.  
245 5.7% of public expenditure in Germany is published in the OJEU, compared to the EU average of 25.7% (Ibid, 
p 14) 
246 Ibid, p 10. The OJEU publication rate for German expenditure on goods and services is by far the lowest in the 
EU. In addition to the devolved structure of procurement, this can be partly accounted for by the inclusion of 
certain reimbursement payments (e.g. for health insurance taken out by citizens) which are not covered by the 
procurement rules in the German total public expenditure on goods and services.  
247 Sylvest et al (2011), p 48. Direct cross-border procurement is measured by the number of contract award 
notices showing a winning bidder located in another member state. The same report also measured indirect 
cross-border procurement, where award is made to a local affiliate of a company based in another member state. 
German companies won 25% of indirect cross-border awards 2007-2009. A more recent study of cross-border 
procurement shows that German companies continued to win the highest number of contracts from other EU 
countries between 2009 and 2015 (European Commission (2017), p 44-45) 
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party supporting free markets and broadly in favour of further EU integration. EU 
integration enjoyed relatively widespread support across the political spectrum in Germany 
during the period in question, despite concerns about fiscal irresponsibility in other 
eurozone countries and Germany’s potential liability for bailouts.248 Public support for 
environmental and social policies, such as those in the Europe 2020 targets, was also high in 
Germany according to the Eurobarometer survey carried out in May 2011.249 Energy policy 
was under intense focus in Germany following the Merkel government’s adoption in 2010 of 
legislation to support the Energiewende, or transition to renewable energy. In addition to 
climate change concerns, support for the Energiewende increased following the Fukushima 
disaster in March 2011, which lead to Germany abandoning nuclear as a bridging technology. 
This posed a considerable policy challenge; nuclear power accounted for 18% of the German 
grid in 2011 and phasing this out at the same time as reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
strained capacity. As Germany imported more than half of its energy, support for a common 
EU energy policy including ambitious targets for renewables made sense. 
 The EVN case (discussed in chapter four) had established the principle that public 
procurement could be used to support the development of renewable energy capacity, but 
within the relatively strict bounds of the link to the subject-matter requirement. Many 
German public authorities specified energy from renewable sources in their own contracts, 
an approach supported by the common EU GPP criteria developed in 2012.250 Beyond energy 
supply, concern about the life-cycle environmental impact of goods and services purchased 
by the public sector – in particular food, timber products, IT equipment, buildings and 
cleaning products – was clear in the GPP/SPP policy commitments undertaken by local and 
regional authorities.251 At Federal level, rules on life-cycle costing and procurement of 
energy-efficient products were adopted in 2008, 252 and mandatory criteria for sustainable 
timber products in 2010.253 The Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt or UBA) 
took responsibility for developing common GPP criteria, which drew heavily on the German 
national eco-label Blue Angel. Uptake of these criteria by public authorities was middling, 
                                                          
 
248 Behr and Helwig (2012), p 5.  
249 Standard Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011. The survey found for example high levels of support in Germany for 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and for reducing the number of Europeans living below the poverty line 
(74% supported the Europe 2020 targets under these headings or thought they should be more ambitious). 43% 
of Germans thought the first priority for EU spending should be climate change and the environment, compared 
to 22% across the EU-27. (Eurobarometer 75 Key Indicators Results for Germany, pp 3-4) 
250 European Commission (2012) EU GPP Criteria for Electricity 
251 In particular in Berlin, Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia. See Schmidt and Dubbers (2014) 
252 Federal Gazette of Germany (2008), Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zur Beschaffung energieeffizienter 
Produkte und Dienstleistungen (AVV-EnEff) (General administrative regulation for the procurement of energy 
efficient products and services). 
253 Federal Gazette of Germany (2010) Gemeinsamer Erlass zur Beschaffung von Holzprodukten (Joint decree 
on the procurement of wood products) 
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with some 46% of German tenders being ‘green’ according to a 2010 evaluation.254 
 On the social side, the varying reaction at Länder level to the 2008 Rüffert judgment 
has been noted in Chapter four. By 2011, several Länder had new laws in place which aimed 
to ensure the continuing application of collectively agreed wages to workers on public 
contracts. Wage guarantees in public contracts had been in use in Germany from the early 
twentieth century at least.255 Beyond wage guarantees, provisions requiring the delivery of 
apprenticeships or other vocational training on public works contracts had also long been 
included in public contracts. Dubbers and Schmidt (2014) identify a marked increase in both 
the number and range of policies and laws at Länder level promoting social procurement 
following Rüffert. These related not only to wages and apprenticeships but to equal pay, 
equal opportunities, employment of the long-term unemployed, enforcement of the ILO 
conventions, fair trade, family-friendly work policies and measures aimed at the inclusion of 
disabled people.256 By 2014, 14 of the 16 Länder had public procurement laws including such 
social criteria. At Federal level, social criteria did not play a prominent role in procurement 
policy, however the ability of the Länder to legislate in this area was recognised.257 The 
Bundesrat, which represents the Länder at Federal level and in some EU negotiations,258 took 
an active interest in the reform of the directives, submitting a response to the Green Paper 
and issuing a number of recommendations seeking clarification and expansion of the 
possibilities under EU law for social criteria to be included in public procurement. The 
individual responses to the Green Paper submitted by certain regions, such as North Rhine-
Westphalia, also emphasised the need for an EU legal framework to support application of 
social criteria, including fair trade and reservations for sheltered workshops.259  
The German Federal government response to the Green Paper consultation expressed 
the view that simpler and more flexible EU legislation was needed. It identified the 
promotion of competition as a core objective of public procurement and endorsed a 
conservative approach to changing EU law in this area – arguing that this should only be 
                                                          
 
254 Evans, Ewing, Nuttall, and Mouat (2010), p 40 
255 According to Schulten (2012): “As long ago as 1907, the German Imperial Statistical Office produced 
comprehensive documentation that included dozens of regional and municipal procurement regulations, all of 
which had some reference to the pay and working conditions of workers under public contracts (Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt 1907). Most of these procurement provisions required contracting companies to pay 
“prevailing” wages, and some of already referred to existing collective agreements.” 
256 Ibid, p 10. 
257 In part IV of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB). For discussion of the role of the 
Bundesrat in inserting this provision in the GWB in the 1990s, see McCrudden (2011). 
258 Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, the Act on Co-operation between the Federation and the Federal States in 
Matters concerning the European Union (EUZBLG) and the Agreement between the Federation and the Federal 
States (BLV), the Bundesrat can appoint Länder representatives to participate in negotiations in the EU Council 
where fundamental interests of the Länder are at stake. Where an EU proposal relates solely to an area of Länder 
authority, no Federal representative will take part in the negotiations.  
259 North Rhine-Westphalia (2011) 
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done where analysis of the existing regime revealed specific gaps or shortcomings. The 
government’s response does express support for environmental and social goals in public 
procurement: 
…provided this does not detract from the efficiency of procurement procedure[s] and 
cost-effective purchasing, there is a link with the contract subject matter and 
compliance is assured with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination. At 
the same time, procurement law must remain understandable and practicable. It can 
and should not prescribe the pursuit of other policy goals, but only facilitate their 
implementation. 
 
The submission goes on to note that the 2004 directives already allowed environmental 
objectives to be pursued, but called for more legislative support for life-cycle costing, high 
energy efficiency standards and for use of eco-labels in procurement. As has been seen these 
are areas in which German legislation already existed – German businesses would therefore 
be well placed to respond to such requirements. The response also canvasses the idea of 
regional or seasonal food being specified in procurement procedures for environmental 
reasons. The response contains a single reference to social criteria: 
 
The Federal Government supports the consideration of social criteria in awarding 
contracts (such as accessibility), provided these are linked with the contract subject 
matter. 
 
It goes on to emphasise that such criteria should not be used to ‘seal off markets or restrict 
competition’. The absence of any reference to wage guarantees in public contracts is striking 
given the heated debate in Germany over Rüffert. Overall then, the initial position set out by 
the Federal government supports the idea of limited reforms to support environmental and 
social criteria in procurement, but rejects the idea of mandatory measures which might 
interfere with competition and avoids the controversial territory of wage guarantees. The 
link to the subject-matter is presented as a bulwark against discriminatory procurement.  
Did the German government’s position evolve in the course of negotiations over the 
directives? The opacity of the trilogue process makes it difficult to identify the positions 
taken by individual member states within the Council at each stage. Some clues emerge from 
close analysis of the successive ‘compromise texts’ published by the Council during 2012, and 
from interviews with individuals directly involved in the process.260 A freedom of information 
request to the BMWi also lead to the release of documents prepared and received by the 
Ministry during the legislative process.261 These sources point towards an active hostility 
within BMWi towards the objective of supporting environmental and social policies via 
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procurement. This is presented as antithetical to the objective of increasing efficiency and 
flexibility in procurement, and the risk of new mandatory measures increasing burdens on 
bidders or contracting authorities is clearly set out. 262 Strong support for such measures did 
not appear to be forthcoming from other political quarters: a ‘Kleine Anfrage’  (written 
parliamentary question) submitted by members of the Green Party to the Cabinet in April 
2011 was primarily concerned with the scope of the Concessions Directive,263 which was to 
become the key German political battleground during the procurement reform following the 
Right2Water European Citizens’ Initiative, discussed below. The provisions on public-public 
cooperation (or ‘in-house’ contracts) were also of key concern both at Federal and Länder 
level due to a series of CJEU judgments which cast doubt upon the ability to award such 
contracts without competition.  
The Commission’s initial proposal for the directives in December 2011 aligned 
relatively well with the positions expressed in the Federal Government’s Green Paper 
submission on environmental and social aspects of procurement.  It did not include any new 
mandatory measures but encouraged the use of life-cycle costing and other non-cost criteria 
in procurement. It also extended the ability of contracting authorities to insist upon third 
party certification in the form of eco-labels, although as has been seen the final text of the 
directives went further in endorsing the use of social criteria and labels based in part on the 
Court’s judgment in Max Havelaar. An information note prepared by BMWi for its Minister 
in March 2012 highlights the potential for political conflict regarding the environmental and 
social aspects of the draft public sector directive, including the question of whether 
minimum wage clauses comply with the link to the subject-matter requirement and the risk 
of protectionism associated with exclusion of bidders who violate environmental and social 
obligations.264 An update issued in July 2012 noted strong support in the European 
Parliament for such measures and ongoing concern that these would result in new 
administrative burdens on contracting authorities.265  
In November 2011, a further BMWi memo was prepared outlining progress within 
the Council working group and the intention to proceed to trilogues based on an agreed 
compromise text. The memo notes that while the draft had been improved, it does not meet 
the objective of simplification and more thorough and lengthy discussions within the 
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other policies’ marked “Schlechte Idee!” 
263 BMWi (2011b) 
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working group would have been desirable.266 It also states that German approval for the 
directive within Coreper will be dependent on the Federal government’s preferred position 
on in-house contracts being included in the draft.267 The memo is more concerned with 
internal divisions amongst Federal government departments than those on the Council, 
including the view of the Ministry for Family Affairs that the link to the subject-matter 
requirement should be dropped to allow the gender balance of companies bidding for public 
contracts to be taken into account. It notes a lack of support for this position amongst other 
member states. The Ministry of the Interior had also argued for an exemption from the 
directives for certain contracts deemed ‘secret’ (such as the printing of identity cards) but 
BMWi rejected the idea of making its approval of the compromise text dependent on this. 
The final text of the directives, by including the mandatory social clause set out in 
Article 18.2, explicitly contradicts the preferences expressed by the German Federal 
government. The evolution of this clause is traced in Chapter 6, highlighting the role of the 
European Parliament in introducing it. In implementing the 2014 directives Germany 
limited the scope of the discretionary exclusion for non-compliance with environmental, 
social and labour law by only referring to non-compliance in public contracts.268 This is 
particularly notable given the general German approach to transposition which is to 
maintain strict parity with the directives. The national implementing laws at Federal level269 
do not introduce any new specific environmental or social criteria, leaving this to the 
discretion of the Länder and/or individual contracting authorities. In other areas such as 
life-cycle costing, the final text of the directives largely aligns with German interests as 
expressed at the outset of the process. Germany did not succeed however in achieving special 
treatment in respect of regional food procurement, which would have conflicted with the 
agricultural export interests of other member states, including France, and threatened the 
single market in a key sector.  
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267 The preference related to the proportion of private business which can be undertaken by an entity while still 
remaining eligible for the in-house exemption from the procurement rules. Germany, together with the UK, 
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France 
Public spending on goods and services in France amounts to some €316.6 billion per 
year, or 14.9% of French GDP.270  This represents about 16% of total public sector spending 
on goods and services across the EU. France publishes by far the highest number of OJEU 
contract notices, averaging over 42,000 per year between 2012 and 2015.271 Less than 2% of 
these contracts are awarded directly to companies outside France, although a further 17.6% 
are awarded to French subsidiaries of international companies.272 Only 5% of EU contracts 
awarded directly on a cross-border basis between 2007 and 2009 were awarded to French 
companies, despite the international success of firms such as Veolia, Alstom and Airbus.273 
Procurement policy is coordinated by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Minefi), which 
produces regulations, provides legal advice to other government departments and agencies, 
and collects data on procurement. Other major spending departments, such as the Ministries 
of Defence and Transport, are also closely involved in the development and implementation 
of procurement policy. As in Germany, the award of public contracts is highly dispersed 
amongst a large number of local and regional authorities – although two central purchasing 
agencies also play a key role.274 The Secrétariat general des affaires européennes (SGAE) is 
responsible for interministerial coordination of EU policy dossiers, including on public 
procurement, and sits within the Prime Minister’s office. 
Presidential elections were held in France in April-May 2012, resulting in a shift in 
power from the centre-right government of Nicolas Sarkozy to the socialist government of 
François Hollande. The premiership passed from François Fillon to Jean-Marc Ayrault, who 
had been convicted of a corruption offence in relation to the award of a public contract while 
Mayor of Nantes in the 1990s.275 Both Sarkozy and Hollande were highly critical of the EU in 
the 2012 presidential election campaign, evidently in an effort to court potential Front 
National voters. Sarkozy threatened to withdraw from the Schengen agreement if efforts to 
stop illegal immigration were not stepped up, and Hollande argued that the recently agreed 
Fiscal Compact should be renegotiated.276 Sarkozy also argued for tighter restrictions on 
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companies from third countries accessing EU public procurement markets.277 However 
during his presidency, Sarkozy had largely supported deeper EU integration, securing 
agreement on a new climate and energy package during France’s 2008 Council presidency  
and arguing in favour of qualified majority voting within the Eurogroup.278 Hollande’s 
presidency in contrast was marked by frustration with EU policies which were seen to 
provide insufficient incentives for growth, as well as long-running splits within the Parti 
socialiste regarding France’s role within Europe. Hollande appointed two prominent 
socialist supporters of the ‘non’ side in the 2005 referendum, Laurent Fabius and Bernard 
Cazeneuve, as his Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs respectively. Whereas the 
Franco-German relationship had been paramount during Sarkozy’s tenure, Hollande sought 
to align France with Spain and Italy on questions of EU policy. 279   
French popular support for further EU integration stood at 40% in 2012, with 65% 
wishing to retain the euro.280 On environmental issues, support for the Europe 2020 goals on 
renewable energy was even higher than in Germany, although fewer thought it should be the 
top priority for EU spending.281 The 2012 elections to the Assemblée nationale returned 17 
Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV) members, making them the third largest party and 
essential to Hollande’s parliamentary majority. EELV was formed in 2010 and lead by Eva 
Joly, an MEP who was able to build upon the Greens’ success in local, regional and European 
elections. Broad participation by NGOs, unions and business associations, as well as the 
various tiers of government, in the 2007 Grenelle de l’environnement initiative had led to the 
adoption of a law in 2008 promoting extensive reforms to energy and consumption policies 
in France, including requirements for public contracts.282 A national action plan on 
sustainable public procurement had been adopted in 2007 and in December 2008 État 
exemplaire guidelines were issued by the Prime Minister to all Ministries setting targets for 
SPP in specific product groups.283 The Ministry of Ecology was responsible for monitoring 
implementation and publishing official reports, methods and practical tools on a dedicated 
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platform. However much of the momentum for SPP came from regional and municipal 
governments, with a number of voluntary networks actively supporting this activity.284  
On social issues, the use of public contracts to address wage issues and local and 
regional unemployment had a long history in France.285 In the 1990s, two inter-ministerial 
circulars encouraged the use of award criteria and contract clauses to address 
unemployment,286 although an attempt to place this on a statutory footing was rejected by 
the Conseil Constitutionnel.287 In 1998, the Commission challenged the employment 
measures in various public works contracts for the construction and maintenance of school 
buildings in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Region and the Département du Nord.288 The Court of 
Justice upheld the Commission’s complaint on transparency grounds, but also found that 
criteria addressing unemployment could be included in the determination of the most 
economically advantageous tender.289 Article 5 of the Code de marchés publics, updated in 
2006 to implement the 2004 procurement directives, specifically required sustainable 
development considerations to be taken into account in defining the requirements of public 
contracts.290 Article 15 referred to the employment of disabled and unemployed workers on 
public contracts, and a separate law made it mandatory to include accessibility 
considerations in public contracts.291 Ethical issues such as fair trade and concerns about 
factory conditions in developing countries were also prominent at both local and national 
level, leading to the adoption of a decree in 2014 requiring contracting authorities spending 
over €100 million per year to take social responsibility into account in their procurement.292 
France’s Green Paper response was submitted by the SGAE. Compared to the German 
and British responses, SGAE’s submission is longer and more detailed, expressing definite 
preferences on a greater range of topics linked to the proposed reform. It is also more clearly 
the product of consultation with contracting authorities at various levels. It opposes any 
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major changes in the scope of EU public procurement law but supports additional flexibility, 
such as by permitting greater use of the negotiated procedure. On environmental and social 
matters, the SGAE submission argues in favour of dropping the link to the subject-matter 
requirement,293 in contrast to German and UK support for maintaining this. 294 It explains 
that the requirement appears to restrict use of production-phase environmental and social 
criteria, and argues that the rules on technical specifications should specifically refer to 
conditions of production.295 The French submission also suggests that a number of new 
‘supplemental’ award criteria be introduced, for example linked to employment, climate 
change and energy, education, or poverty eradication.296 It opposes new rules on contract 
clauses, but supports the development of common EU rules on social services, provided 
these take into account the need to ensure quality. All of these provisions should be 
voluntary for contracting authorities.297 
Does the final text of the 2014 procurement directives reflect French preferences 
regarding environmental and social concerns? The link to the subject-matter requirement 
has been retained, and in fact extended to apply explicitly to selection criteria, technical 
specifications and contract clauses as well as to award criteria. At the same time however, the 
definition adopted in Article 67.3 makes clear that specific processes of production, provision 
or trading, and other life-cycle stages are to be considered as linked to the subject-matter, 
meaning fair trade and other similar criteria can be used. Article 42 on technical 
specifications also allows production or other life-cycle phase considerations to be included, 
although it stops short of the French preference to explicitly include social conditions. The 
wording on contract performance clauses has also been revised contrary to the position set 
out in the SGAE paper, although in this case the new restriction implied by the link to the 
subject-matter requirement is balanced by an acknowledgement that social and 
employment-related considerations may be included in contract clauses.298 While the French, 
like the Germans and British, originally opposed any new mandatory environmental or social 
provisions, their opposition to Article 18.2 appears to have been less pronounced. This is 
evident in the choice to make exclusion for violations of labour law mandatory in its national 
transposition, whereas under the directives these are discretionary.299 This contrasts sharply 
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with the UK approach, which omitted Article 18.2 from the 2015 Public Contracts 
Regulations. 
United Kingdom 
Spending on public contracts in the UK amounts to some €309.5 billion per year, or 
13.9% of GDP. 300  This represents about 16% of total public sector spending on goods and 
services across the EU. Seventeen percent of contracts awarded directly on a cross-border 
basis under the EU rules between 2007 and 2009 were awarded to British companies – the 
second highest percentage after Germany. The UK awards just 2% of public contracts to 
foreign companies, but when indirect awards (for example, via subsidiaries) are included this 
increases to 22%, compared to 19% for France and 17% for Germany.301 In contrast to 
Germany and France, there is a tendency in the UK to aggregate requirements leading to 
very large value contracts – in 2015 the UK alone accounted for 70% of contract awards over 
€100 million advertised in the OJEU.302 The majority of procurement spending occurs within 
local government and the National Health Service, as opposed to central government 
departments. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010-2015) 
adopted a policy to increase the proportion of public contracts awarded to SMEs across 
central government to 25% (from 6.5%), while also introducing rules to ensure the prompt 
payment of subcontractors.303 An Efficiency and Reform Group was set up within the Cabinet 
Office to generate cost savings and encourage greater cooperation between government 
departments on procurement. The reform of the EU directives was seen as an opportunity to 
simplify procedures while also pursuing specific government policies linked to supporting 
SMEs and public service mutuals – employee-owned organisations spun out of the public 
sector which continued to provide public services. 
Despite the coalition’s embrace of green policies in other areas such as energy and 
finance, support for GPP/SPP at central government level was minimal during this period. 
This contrasted with the establishment and funding of a dedicated central government 
sustainable procurement team within the Department for the Environment (Defra) during 
the previous Labour government, and adoption of common criteria and targets for GPP.304 
Overall responsibility for procurement policy transferred to the Cabinet Office in 2010, led 
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by Conservative Minister Francis Maude. This marked a shift in priorities towards cost-
cutting and efficiencies, and away from environmental and social aspects of procurement. At 
local government level, and in Scotland, SPP remained a policy priority, supported by 
voluntary networks and initiatives such as the Living Wage movement.305 As in Germany and 
France, there was a substantial ‘pre-history’ in the UK regarding the issue of fair wages in 
public sector contracts, with a Fair Wages Resolution adopted by Parliament in 1891 aimed 
at preventing sweatshop conditions on contracts for the supply of army and navy uniforms, 
as well as public works.306 In the 1960s and 1970s, linkages were developed between 
procurement and racial and gender equality legislation, as well as with anti-discrimination 
legislation in Northern Ireland. While the pursuit of social policies via procurement was 
substantially restricted by the Local Government Act 1988, the Equality Act 2010 
reintroduced a public sector equality duty which extended to procurement. In 2012, the 
Social Value Act created an explicit responsibility for public bodies to consider the 
environmental and social impact of public contracts, although it did not prescribe mandatory 
standards, targets or reporting requirements.307  
The UK government’s priorities for the reform of the EU directives were driven by a 
cost-saving and pro-business agenda, with environmental and social objectives firmly in the 
background. The UK submission in response to the Green Paper expresses scepticism about 
the role of procurement in supporting broader societal objectives, as this creates “a risk that 
decisions could undermine value for money and impose uncompetitive requirements on 
contracting authorities and businesses.”308 It states that such objectives are best achieved 
through efficient use of public money, stimulating private sector growth and allowing 
flexibility for contracting authorities. On the link to the subject-matter requirement, the UK 
argues in favour of maintaining this on the basis that: 
 
Procurement is about buying goods/services that are needed and if you lose the link 
to the subject matter of the contract, then there is a risk that procurement becomes 
more about pursuing other agendas rather than serving the purpose of procuring the 
good/service that is needed. Procurement should remain about what is being 
procured, but if other policy aims that are relevant to the procurement can be 
achieved at the same time, then that is a bonus. We do not think that procurement 
should be used as a main lever to achieve a particular policy line.309 
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The submission does express support for clarification of the rules on life-cycle costing, while 
rejecting the idea of a mandatory or common EU methodology for this. It also rejects the 
idea of any common EU rules on social issues in procurement. The government’s preference 
for a dedicated provision to allow direct award of contracts to public service mutuals is set 
out – a policy which was to find little support from the EU institutions or other member 
states until late in the negotiation process.  
A Cabinet Office Procurement Policy Note (PPN) published in August 2011 stated 
that the government wanted a “radical simplification of the public procurement regime to 
free up markets and facilitate growth.”310 It reiterated the priorities of enabling public service 
mutuals and SMEs to win contracts, but mentioned broader environmental or social goals 
only in the context of value for money. The note explicitly calls upon organisations and 
individuals to promote the UK’s objectives, while indicating that the government was 
engaging with ‘key strategic EU stakeholders’ and other member states. A further PPN 
published in December 2011 acknowledged the Commission’s legislative proposal and sought 
input in order to further develop the UK’s negotiating position.311 It welcomed a number of 
the proposed reforms but expressed uncertainty regarding the sustainable procurement 
measures and disappointment at the lack of any provision on public service mutuals. The 
coalition government had set a target for one million public sector workers to be shifted to 
mutuals by 2015. The majority of these operated in the health sector, education and social 
housing. By 2012, it was clear that the target would not be met without further specific 
support measures for mutuals.312 
Meanwhile the Commission’s proposal to require national oversight bodies for 
procurement to be set up had attracted the ire of the House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Committee, leading it to issue a reasoned opinion in March 2012 that this violated the 
subsidiarity principle.313 Eventually this provision was amended to avoid the obligation to set 
up any new national bodies.314 While many EU countries already had a dedicated oversight 
body for public procurement which was also responsible for adjudicating complaints, in the 
UK and Ireland procurement challenges can only be brought in the higher courts. The 
Committee objected to the combination of administrative and judicial functions in the 
proposed oversight bodies, which could be seen to usurp the role of the courts. There was no 
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appetite in the UK for establishment of a new quasi-judicial body to superintend public 
procurement. In his evidence to the Committee (chaired by prominent eurosceptic Bill 
Cash), Francis Maude suggested that this might set a precedent for EU interference in 
national judicial systems. The reasoned opinion also objects to the Commission’s proposed 
light touch regime on the basis that this would apply to a smaller set of services than the 
previous ‘non-priority’ (Part B) designation, reducing flexibility for contracting authorities.  
In August 2012, the Cabinet Office published an update on the negotiations to date, 
stating that a number of the UK’s priorities had been achieved in the Council’s compromise 
text, linked primarily to the ‘simplification’ agenda.315 It also set out the government’s 
support for the draft life-cycle costing provisions while rejecting the idea of mandatory 
measures on SPP. On the light touch regime for social and other specific services, the note 
states that the UK did not originally support this change, but given the support of a strong 
majority of other member states, it would focus on avoiding any reduction in the flexibility 
available to contracting authorities. The final Cabinet Office update published during the 
negotiations, in July 2013, states that “The revised package represents an excellent overall 
outcome for the UK, with progress achieved on all of our priority objectives.”316 While noting 
the new environmental and social provisions in the agreed text, these are presented as 
discretionary on the part of buyers with no reference to the mandatory social clause or 
obligation to seek explanation of abnormally low tenders and reject these if they violate 
environmental, social or labour laws or collective agreements.   
Drafting of the UK implementing regulations began in 2013, before the directives had 
even been adopted by the Council and Parliament. This eagerness, which lead to the UK 
being the first member state to implement the new directives in early 2015, demonstrates the 
extent to which the government felt it had succeeded in achieving its objectives in the 
negotiation. Was this feeling justified? The inclusion of several provisions pushed for by the 
UK, such as the public service mutuals clause (Article 77 of the Public Sector Directive) 
certainly lends some credence to this view. However, most assessments of the 2014 
directives concur that, far from being a simplification of the rules, they introduce significant 
new complexities – something the UK very much wished to avoid. On social and other 
specific services, while ‘light touch’ rules were adopted, these apply to a smaller set of 
contracts than were covered by the non-priority regime under the 2004 directives, 
representing a reduction in flexibility.317 Most tellingly, the UK government chose to exclude 
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the mandatory social clause from its transposition in the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, 
suggesting that it did not agree with this provision.318 This does not in fact deprive it of its 
effect due to the primacy of EU law and the cross-references to the specific environmental, 
social and labour laws included in Article 18.2 elsewhere in the Regulations, including the 
provisions on exclusion of bidders, rejection of abnormally low tenders and scrutiny of 
subcontractors. This suggests that in pursuing a small number of priorities for the reform, 
the UK either consciously sacrificed or was inattentive to social and environmental measures 
which went against its express preferences for simplicity and flexibility. 
Other Member States 
 Strong support for enhanced environmental and social provisions in the new 
directives existed in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. These countries had begun 
implementing GPP in the late 1990s or early 2000s and had developed national criteria 
which set extensive minimum mandatory standards for the environmental performance of 
goods and services. Concern about social aspects of procurement had grown in the wake of 
the Laval quartet of ECJ decisions, reflecting widespread fears regarding cheap labour from 
eastern Europe. A centre-left coalition took power in Denmark in 2011, whereas in Sweden 
and Finland centre-right governments were dependent upon the Greens for support. A 
Committee of Inquiry had been established in Sweden in 2010 chaired by former MEP 
Anders Wijkman, tasked with evaluating the public procurement rules from an economic 
and social policy perspective. In its response to the Green Paper, this Committee argued in 
favour of clarification of the EU rules and compulsory life-cycle costing for energy-using 
products, but was in favour of maintaining the subject-matter link.319 It also called for 
clarification of the relationship between the procurement rules and Posted Workers Directive 
– views echoed in the separate submission of the Swedish Department for Social Affairs.320 
Interviews with representatives from the Commission and Parliament indicated that strong 
support from Scandinavian countries was one of the factors driving this aspect of the reform. 
However, it should be noted that in Sweden at least there was an ongoing debate about the 
legitimacy of including environmental and social aspects in tenders.321 
 Conversely, several of the newer accession states had made their opposition to the 
inclusion of social, and in particular wage requirements, in public contracts clear in the run 
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up to the reform. This can be seen for example in the Green Paper submission of the 
Romanian Ministry of Justice, which calls for the reform to focus on free competition, 
transparency and simplification of the rules rather than any ‘supplemental’ considerations.322 
The Polish government appeared more open to inclusion of environmental and social aspects 
in procurement, although it did not see the need for changes to the rules on award criteria or 
technical specifications.323 Cyprus, which held the Council presidency during the second half 
of 2012 when the Council’s negotiating mandate was being agreed, supported the idea of 
relaxing the link to the subject-matter requirement for the selection stage only, while 
maintaining it for technical specifications and award criteria.324 A common theme in the 
responses from newer member states is a sense of being overwhelmed by the existing EU 
procurement acquis, and a desire to avoid complex new rules or major changes. In theory 
most of the older member states shared this desire for a simpler regime, but in practice this 
was counterbalanced by their wish to achieve specific policies via procurement – whether 
environmental and social or quasi-industrial such as support for SMEs and public service 
mutuals. The perception that environmental or social criteria might be used to conceal 
corrupt practices was also of broader concern in the new accession states, with lowest price 
awards seen (usually inaccurately) as a bulwark against favouritism or discrimination.  
Interest Groups 
Over 245 businesses or business associations, and 100 civil society organisations 
responded to the Green Paper consultation.325 92 of these were from transnational business 
associations or NGOs, with the UK, France and Germany leading the way on single-country 
submissions. While the majority of business responses opposed new rules on environmental 
or social elements of procurement, the majority of civil society organisations supported this, 
and many argued for dropping the link to the subject-matter requirement or developing 
common mandatory EU standards for green and social procurement.326 A number of NGOs 
and local government associations had become actively involved in promoting sustainable 
procurement – for example ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) and the World 
Wildlife Foundation – and submitted detailed comments on the Green Paper. Unions were 
also well represented amongst the respondents, expressing strong support for social aspects 
of procurement. The GMB union (UK) called for removal of the link to the subject-matter 
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requirement based on the following reasoning: 
There needs to be more scope to include social and environmental objectives at 
various stages of the contracting process and the current Directives and practice 
interprets [the link] to the subject-matter far too narrowly. To drop this condition 
will create greater transparency of what the purpose, aims and objectives of the 
contracting authority are, rather than them having to do this “through the back door” 
and in less effective ways.  
Contracting authorities at every level have a wide range of policy objectives and 
commitments in the area of social, employment or environmental protection, which 
are publicly known, and are often generated in response to democratic choices – 
elections, or community/citizen pressures. It has been wrong for these commitments 
to be suppressed or restricted in public contracting procedures.327 
In contrast, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) opposed any 
relaxation of the link to the subject-matter rule: 
We are strongly against dropping or loosening this link with the subject matter and 
believe that no corrective mechanisms exist to correct the loss of competition and 
creation of discrimination.328  
The Federation of German Industry (BDI) opposed compliance with the International 
Labour Organisation conventions becoming mandatory.329  
Given the importance of public contracts as a source both of employment and of 
sales, ongoing lobbying at the EU and national levels on these and other aspects of the 
reform was to be expected. The European Parliament held public hearings on the 
procurement reform in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Environmental and social interest groups were 
particularly well-represented at these hearings, and their influence can be seen in the reports 
adopted by the Parliament. For example, the environmental law firm Client Earth presented 
detailed positions and even proposed wording in relation to technical specifications, award 
criteria and other areas – some of which were included in the Parliament’s proposed 
amendments.330 The Network for sustainable development in public procurement (NSDPP), 
comprising a number of unions, environmental and fair trade groups, published a joint letter 
to the Council working party in September 2012331 which also proposed a number of specific 
amendments. The influence of these groups upon the Parliament and Council during the 
legislative process is considered in Chapter six.  
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There is less evidence regarding the lobbying efforts and impact of business, 
environmental or social groups at national level. The preferences for the reform adopted by 
the United Kingdom and Germany in particular can be seen as pro-business inasmuch as 
they sought to avoid the introduction of ‘red tape’ and to simplify procedures, as well as 
allowing negotiation of contracts. However the benefits of such flexibilities from the point of 
view of businesses tendering for public contracts depends on whether they are used in a way 
which is perceived as fair (to them)– which in turn often depends on whether an individual 
business or its competitors benefit from the discretion available to local or national 
procuring bodies. In other words, both the benefits and costs of procurement regulation for 
smaller companies, which tend to be those operating only at local, regional or national level, 
are both more diffuse and more uncertain than those which operate at transnational level. 
The latter expect to benefit from procurement rules which are clear and consistently applied 
across the EU, even if this means that they are more rigid than those which might otherwise 
apply under national practices. Combined with the greater resources available to larger 
companies to engage in lobbying, this helps to explain the relative lack of involvement in the 
reform by smaller businesses. To the extent that the latter did become involved, the objective 
of facilitating SME participation in procurement, rather than the environmental or social 
aspects of the reform, provided a natural focal point.  
 The impact of non-state interests on the reform at EU level is perhaps most clearly 
seen in the Right2Water initiative, led by the European Federation of Public Service Unions 
(EPSU).  This was the first successful European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), a mechanism 
established under the Treaty of Lisbon which allows citizens to call upon the European 
Commission to legislate in a particular area. To do this, a minimum of one million signatures 
is required from at least seven member states, with quotas based on the population of each 
member state. Right2Water was registered as an ECI in April 2012, and by September 2013 
had gathered almost 1.9 million signatures and met the required quotas.332 Its objectives 
were that:  
(1) The EU institutions and Member States be obliged to ensure that all inhabitants 
enjoy the right to water and sanitation;  
(2) water supply and management of water resources not be subject to ‘internal 
market rules’ and that water services are excluded from liberalisation; and  
(3) the EU increases its efforts to achieve universal access to water and sanitation.333  
The ECI reflected concern about the privatisation of water services in Germany and other EU 
                                                          
 
332 The majority of the signatures (1,341,061) were from Germany, however national quotas were ultimately met 
in 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Source: www.right2water.eu (accessed on 23 March 2018) 
333 Ibid. 
129 
 
countries, and a growing movement to return these services to the public sector. Grenoble, in 
France, had re-municipalised its water utility in 2000, followed by Paris in 2010 and Berlin 
in 2013 (Bieler 2017). EPSU had been active in promoting re-municipalisation in Germany 
and elsewhere in central and eastern Europe through the Reclaiming Public Water Network. 
The EU procurement directives, as well as the 2002 Services Directives, were seen as 
promoting the privatisation of water services. This was based on a misunderstanding of the 
public procurement rules, which do not require or promote privatisation of any service. 
Where a public authority decides to outsource a service, the procurement rules do set 
requirements regarding transparency and competition – but it has always been open to 
governments to provide water directly or through publicly owned utilities, and many 
continue to do so. Nonetheless there was concern about the role of the proposed new 
Concessions Directive on the quality and affordability of water services.  
 In February 2013, Commissioner Barnier went to Berlin to discuss the Commission’s 
response to the ECI with Chancellor Merkel. Right2Water had become a campaign issue in 
the 2013 German elections, with both the CDU and SPD committing to keep water services 
public. The possibility of an exemption from certain aspects of the Concessions Directive for 
Germany was discussed. However ultimately the Commission decided to exclude water 
services entirely from the Concessions Directive – despite widespread objections and 
lobbying from water industry companies.334 This was met with surprise by the BMWi and 
others involved in the negotiation of the directives.335 Commissioner Barnier’s statement 
emphasised that there had never been an intention to ‘privatise water services through the 
back door’, while accepting that exclusion of water services from the Concessions Directive 
was the most effective way of providing reassurance.336 Ironically, this means that where 
member states do choose to outsource water services, the absence of EU publication 
requirements means a lower level of transparency and public scrutiny for such contracts. 
Nevertheless, the success of Right2Water demonstrates both the prominence of 
environmental and social concerns during the reform process and the influence of political 
actors beyond national governments and the EU institutions.  
Conclusions 
A close look at German, French and British priorities and preferences for the 
procurement reform shows a number of commonalities, as well as some divergences. All 
                                                          
 
334 See for example AquaFed (2013) Concessions Directive: European Commissioner renounces transparency 
and equity in public water services to please German public lobbies  
335 BMWi (2013g) 
336 Statement of Commissioner Barnier, 21.6.2013, archived at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-
2014/barnier/headlines/speeches/2013/06/20130621_en.html (accessed 23 March 2018) 
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three member states were committed, at least in theory, to simplification of the rules and to 
maintaining or enhancing the flexibility available to contracting authorities to choose how to 
take other policy considerations into account. Although varying levels of commitment to 
environmental and social objectives existed in Germany, France, and the UK, all were keen 
to avoid the introduction of any new mandatory requirements at EU level. Importantly for 
the consideration of where a qualified majority lay within the Council, they were supported 
in this view by the new accession states. In the terminology of the Green Paper, they were 
opposed to rules on ‘what to buy’ as opposed to ‘how to buy’. France did express support for 
removing the link to the subject-matter requirement, but was largely isolated in this position. 
Other member states, as well as the Commission and business associations, saw this as an 
important safeguard to avoid discrimination in procedures and to ensure procurement was 
carried out on commercial principles. Ultimately the link to the subject-matter requirement 
was strengthened in the 2014 directives, although it remains open to interpretation by the 
Court of Justice, which may opt for a strict or more flexible approach in cases coming before 
it. However, the inclusion of Article 18.2 in the final text of the directives does create new 
mandatory obligations on member states to ensure compliance with environmental, social 
and labour laws in public contracts – including some, but not all, of the ILO conventions337 - 
and collective agreements. 
The extent to which the Parliament and Council acted as supranational entrepreneurs 
on environmental and social matters, or as agents of the member states, will be considered in 
the next chapter. Does detailed examination of national preferences regarding procurement 
reform suggest that either the Commission or Court acted as agents of the member states? It 
is clear from the responses to the Green Paper that the three largest member states broadly 
welcomed the direction for the reform set by the Commission, but were wary regarding 
mandatory as opposed to facultative rules and did not seek greater harmonisation of 
approaches to SPP, although clarity and guidance were called for. The draft text published by 
the Commission in December 2011 eschewed common mandatory SPP measures, but also 
proposed relatively complex new rules on eco-labels and life-cycle costing, as well as on 
production phase considerations. Ultimately these rules will be interpreted by the Court, 
although member states had the chance to refine them during the negotiation process. This 
falls short of evidence of the Commission acting against the revealed preferences of the 
member states, so it remains plausible that it acted as an agent – albeit one with multiple 
                                                          
 
337 ILO Convention No. 94 on Labour Clauses in Public Contracts is not included. Convention No. 94 requires that 
public contracts include clauses to ensure that wages (including allowances), hours of work and other conditions 
of labour are not less favourable than those established for work of the same character in the trade or industry 
concerned in the district where the work is carried out. This has been ratified by ten EU member states, excluding 
Germany and the United Kingdom (which denounced Convention No. 94 in 1982).  
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principals and a mandate to develop the internal market which goes beyond the immediate 
interests of those principals. The decision to exclude water services from the scope of the 
Concessions Directive also demonstrates the limits to the Commission’s ability to advance an 
internal market agenda in the face of political opposition. 
A striking feature of the Green Paper submissions is the lack of references to CJEU 
case law on public procurement, including recent and controversial decisions such as 
Rüffert. This could demonstrate acceptance of the Court’s jurisprudence and a reluctance to 
revisit such questions in the reform of the directives. Alternatively, it could reflect a political 
calculation on the part of the three largest member states that any attempt to override the 
Court’s interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive in procurement legislation would 
meet with strong opposition from the newer accession states, possibly supported by Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. Whichever interpretation is correct, it remains difficult to describe the 
Court as either a supranational entrepreneur or agent of the member states in its 
procurement jurisprudence. The member states’ support for the link to the subject-matter 
requirement, which the Court had developed in the Concordia and EVN cases, suggests that 
it had gained acceptance (except in France) as a means of reconciling the freedom of 
contracting authorities to include other policy considerations in procurement with the 
principles of transparency, equal treatment and proportionality. But there is little to suggest 
that any of the member states anticipated the Court’s next major intervention in the effort to 
reconcile market and non-market objectives, in the Max Havelaar case. Rather they were 
forced to consider how to incorporate this latest development in the thick of negotiations 
over the new directives.  
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Chapter 6 – Negotiating the Directives: The European Parliament and 
Council 
This chapter focuses on the role of the European Parliament and Council in the reform of the 
public procurement directives. Although the main work in negotiating the directives took 
place during the first half of 2013, the Parliament in particular had invested considerable 
time and political capital in the topic from 2010 onwards. These early attempts to shape the 
agenda are analysed here, together with the committee process during 2012 and the trilogues 
held under the Irish presidency of the Council which lead to a compromise text being agreed 
in July 2013. This chapter evaluates the hypotheses that the Parliament and Council 
respectively acted either as supranational policy entrepreneurs (H1) or as agents of the 
member states (H2) during the reform, and that their actions were either irreversible (H3) or 
subject to recall by the member states (H4). The approach taken to falsify these hypotheses is 
the same as in previous chapters – namely looking for evidence that the Parliament and 
Council, in the form of their respective negotiating parties, acted either only within the 
bounds of member state preferences or outside of these preferences; and that their actions 
were subject to reversal by member states or that there was no realistic prospect of member 
states reversing decisions taken by the negotiating parties. Documentary evidence has been 
supplemented by interviews with individuals directly involved in the process. Interviews 
proved particularly useful in helping to trace the origins of individual provisions which 
appear within the documents, as well as in understanding the informal and formal political 
and organisational context in which the negotiation took place. 
Overview of process 
Before turning to the specific roles of the Parliament and Council, a few observations 
regarding the overall process will provide orientation. The three directives to be negotiated 
(public sector, utilities and concessions) had many overlapping provisions and were largely 
negotiated in parallel.338  Whereas the public and utilities sector directives would replace the 
2004 directives, the concessions directive was new – and proved controversial in a number 
of respects, not least the question of inclusion of water services as discussed in Chapter five. 
For the purpose of the negotiation, ten thematic clusters were identified by the Council 
working party and provisions from all three draft directives were grouped within these. The 
most important for the purpose of this study is Cluster 2 on “Strategic use of public 
procurement.” This covered both environmental and social provisions and included most of 
                                                          
 
338 As noted in the introduction, the focus here is on the public sector directive, as it was in the negotiation of this 
directive that the new environmental and social provisions were agreed. 
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the areas identified in Table 3.1.339 Following publication of the Commission’s proposal in 
December 2011, both the Council and Parliament expressed the intention to reach agreement 
by the end of 2012. However, it took until the end of 2012 for the Council to confirm its 
general approach, and for the Internal Market and Consumer Affairs Committee (IMCO) to 
adopt the report put forward by its rapporteur, tabling a large number of amendments to the 
Commission’s proposal. Agreement on the text followed a total of 17 trilogue meetings held 
between March and June 2013. After a further six months of legal tidying and translation, 
the three directives were adopted at first reading by the plenary Parliament in January 2014, 
and by the General Affairs Council in February 2014. A timeline showing the relevant stages 
and activities by all three bodies is given below, and Appendix B contains an index of the key 
documents produced during the reform. 
                                                          
 
339 In addition, Cluster 3 included subcontracting issues; Cluster 8 abnormally low tenders and Cluster 10 the 
light touch regime.  
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Figure 6.1 Timeline of European Parliament, Council and Commission activities related to public procurement reform, 2010 -2014
Trilogues 
 HY1 2010             HY2 2010             HY1 2011             HY2 2011                 HY1 2012                 HY2 2012                 HY1 2013                  HY2 2013                   HY1 2014 
 
 
 
 
Poland Denmark Cyprus Ireland Lithuania Greece 
Own initiative 
report on new 
developments 
in public 
procurement 
Resolution 
adopted 
18.5.10 
Own initiative 
report on 
modernisation 
of public 
procurement 
Resolution 
adopted 
25.10.11 
Rapporteurs 
and shadow 
rapporteurs 
appointed 
30.11.11 
Legislative 
proposals 
21.12.2011 
 
Green Paper 
consultation 
Monti 
Report Evaluation of 2004 directives 
IMCO draft 
report on 
proposal (166 
amendments) 
3.5.12 
IMCO 
vote on 
report 
18.12.12 
Directives 
adopted by 
EP plenary 
first reading 
15.1.14 
Public 
hearing 
Public 
hearing 
Public 
hearing 
COMPET 1st 
orientation 
debate 
20.2.12 
COMPET 2nd 
orientation 
debate 
30.5.12 
Agreement 
on general 
approach 
10.12.12 
Directives 
adopted by 
Council (GAC) 
11.2.14 
Commissioner 
Barnier statement 
exclusion of water 
from concessions 
directive 21.6.2013 
 
 
Translation + legal checks 
Report 
tabled   
by EP 
plenary  
13.1.13 
Opinions     
from 7 EP 
committees 
(1400+ 
amendments) 
 
135 
 
Agreement on first reading – theory and practice of trilogues 
Relations between the Council and Parliament have often been associated with 
mutual antagonism and competition – however given the predominance of the ordinary 
legislative procedure (codecision), effective cooperation between the two institutions has had 
to be cultivated. In the 2009-14 legislative session, 85% of all codecision procedures were 
concluded at first reading.340 The procurement directives followed this trend, although as can 
be seen from Figure 6.1 this did not mean a rapid process or one which excluded deliberation 
or public scrutiny. It did mean that closed-door trilogues played a pivotal role in agreeing the 
final text of the directives, although these came towards the end of the procedure and 
focused on a relatively short list of amendments compared to the number tabled within 
Parliament prior to adoption of its report. Trilogues have been the subject of criticism both 
by academics and by the European Ombudsman due to their perceived lack of transparency. 
Reh (2014) evaluates democratic critiques of the use of trilogues, finding that the control 
mechanisms developed under successive changes to the Parliament’s rules of procedure only 
partially address such critiques. She sees trilogues as part of informal politics defined as 
“restricted and secluded decision-making that is structured by informal institutions and that 
generates outcomes which require formalization.” She identifies the potential benefits of 
trilogues in terms of flexibility and discretion, but also the challenges they pose in terms of 
democratic accountability – particularly in the process for selecting rapporteurs/negotiators 
within EP committees, and for reporting on and monitoring negotiations. 
Originally trilogues were thought to empower the Council over the Parliament, in 
part because it was assumed to have greater diplomatic skills and closed-door meetings were 
seen as a potential way of sidestepping EP committees (Shackleton and Raunio 2003; Farrell 
and Héritier 2004). However, there is evidence that this balance may have shifted towards 
EP negotiating parties since 2009, as explored below. Council negotiating parties for 
trilogues are usually much smaller than those of the Parliament and even those of the 
Commission (Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood 2015). While the Council decides when to 
open trilogues, Parliament effectively controls many other aspects, including hosting them. 
Negotiating mandates must be approved by Coreper and the relevant EP committee 
respectively. Bilateral meetings between the country holding the rotating Council presidency 
and EP representatives may take place before, during or after political and technical 
trilogues. A typical legislative file might require 10-15 trilogue meetings, the majority of 
which are technical in nature. These are attended by the EP negotiating party (comprising 
rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs and chair of the responsible committee), the Council 
                                                          
 
340 European Parliament (2014) Activity Report on Codecision and Conciliation 14 July 2009 – 30 June 2014 (7th 
Parliamentary Term) at p 8.  
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working party (comprising civil servants from the country holding the Council presidency), 
and Commission representatives.  
In recent years, there has been a push for greater transparency in EU decision 
making, including in the context of trilogues. Reforms to the Parliament’s rules of procedure 
in 2012 aimed to increase accountability, by tightening the mandates given to rapporteurs 
and formalising the role of shadow rapporteurs within negotiating teams. A majority 
decision within the responsible committee would henceforth be required to authorise early 
agreement, set the rapporteur’s mandate and to open negotiations.341 Four-column 
documents had to be circulated to the negotiating team at least 48 hours before trilogues, or 
24 hours in cases of urgency.342 Negotiating teams had to report back to the committee after 
each meeting and make copies of negotiated texts available.343 These amendments were 
agreed in September 2012 and came into effect in December 2012, meaning they applied 
during the public procurement trilogues.344 However, the process leading to agreement on 
first reading still provides a lower standard of accountability than full public debate in 
committees of all aspects of legislation. Reh argues that the process lacks narrative 
accountability because negotiating parties only provide an account of trilogues to the 
committee and plenary, rather than having to fully explain and justify any compromises 
made. She also finds that the process of report allocation falls short of good deliberation; 
neither the committee nor the plenary debate openly which MEP should lead on a dossier, 
and formal votes or consultations with rank-and-file party members are rare. Report 
allocation is based on a relatively obscure system in which parties bid for individual reports 
using points based on the size of their faction within the Parliament. Even prior to the 2012 
rules of procedure providing more institutional control over rapporteurs and their mandates, 
there was an incentive not to deviate too far from the agreed mandate due to the repeated 
process of report allocation and the need to maintain trust. The possibility to remove an 
errant rapporteur or to reappoint a diligent one also serves to reinforce accountability. 
Reappointment of a specialised rapporteur to similar future dossiers is relatively frequent; 
deselection is less common but does occur.345  
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 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 25.9.2012, Report on amendment of Rule 70 of 
Parliament's Rules of Procedure on interinstitutional negotiations in legislative procedures (2011/2298(REG)).  
342 Ibid, Amendment 5 (Rule 70 paragraph 2b – new). Note however that where four-column documents are very 
long (650 pages for the public procurement directive) 24 or 48 hours may still be insufficient for detailed review.  
343 Ibid, Amendment 6 (Rule 70 paragraph 3) 
344 Further reforms to the EP Rules of Procedure were adopted in January 2017; these extend greater control over 
trilogues by allowing a vote in plenary on the decision by a committee to authorise such negotiations (rule 69c).  
345 Reh (2014) cites examples from the 2007 Advanced Therapies Regulation and 2009 Social Security 
Regulation.  In 2017, S&D rapporteur Adam Gierek was replaced as the rapporteur on the recast energy efficiency 
directive due to his proposal of amendments which directly contradicted his party’s own position (Euractiv, 5 
December 2017 “Controversial MEP replaced as lead on energy savings file” accessed on 17 April 2018) 
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Following the European Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry into trilogues in 2015, 
some additional transparency and control measures are being adopted by the Parliament and 
Council. The bodies have committed to development of a joint database to provide access to 
documents and updates on legislative procedures, and the Council intends to publish the 
name of the Minister, (Deputy) Permanent Representative and Council configuration 
responsible for each legislative file under negotiation.346 The EP already publishes its 
negotiating mandates, and the Council is considering doing so. While the Ombudsman 
recommended publication of four-column documents and lists of other documents tabled as 
soon as possible after negotiations conclude, the institutions demurred pending the General 
Court’s ruling in case T-540/15 De Capitani v Parliament, which touches upon these points. 
Judgment in that case was delivered at the end of March 2018, with the Court ruling that 
access to trilogue documents should be governed by the same rules which apply generally to 
EU documents, and that they should be disclosed on request unless there is a very clear 
threat to the decision-making process from doing so. The Court noted that the compromise 
text set out in the fourth column is usually adopted by the co-legislators without substantial 
amendment, meaning trilogues constitute ‘a decisive stage in the legislative process.’347 The 
effect of the ruling is that the four-column documents will be subject to disclosure during 
procedures, although it remains to be seen whether the Parliament and Council will publish 
them in the absence of specific requests.  
It is likely that the co-legislators will continue to resist full publication of four-column 
documents while procedures are ongoing, as this could constrain negotiating tactics and 
interfere with the ability of the negotiating parties to make compromises. The relative 
secrecy of trilogues can be seen as a factor which enhances the autonomy of negotiating 
parties – potentially increasing their ability to act as policy entrepreneurs. Where the 
relevant EP committee or Council configuration has not expressed a definite preference in 
relation to an aspect of legislation, negotiating parties often identify solutions which they 
expect will be approved by these bodies as part of a broader package. There are risks 
associated with this approach, but also potential gains in the form of expedited agreement or 
avoidance of deadlock. For example, in the course of negotiating the procurement directives 
the Irish presidency agreed to a number of compromises which were not explicitly mandated 
in advance.348 This type of compromise may be less likely if details of trilogues are made 
public while procedures are still underway, particularly where they are politically sensitive. 
                                                          
 
346 European Ombudsman (2017) Strategic inquiry on the transparency of trilogues: follow-up and first results 
347 General Court of the European Union, Press Release No 35/18 of 22.3.2018 Judgment in Case T-540/15 De 
Capitani v European Parliament 
348 Interviews C, D, E. The significant delays in national implementation of the procurement directives may be 
linked to deviations from member states’ express preferences during trilogues. 
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While a normative argument in favour of greater transparency in trilogues can therefore be 
made, this must be balanced against the benefits of relative secrecy regarding the details of 
negotiated compromises. Secrecy has long been the norm in international negotiations, 
although the Commission has recently adopted an enhanced degree of transparency in trade 
negotiations, apparently in response to public criticism.349 In the legislative context, the main 
arguments made in favour of secrecy are that this enhances efficiency and increases 
‘negotiating space’ (Leino 2017). The CJEU however rejected these arguments in Council v 
Access Info Europe,350 concerning release of Council documents which contained individual 
member state positions. The judgment drew upon Article 15 TFEU and Regulation 
1049/2001 which both endorse the principle of transparency in legislative procedures, 
subject to a number of exceptions.  
Agency and entrepreneurship in interinstitutional negotiations 
The relative secrecy of trilogues presents a challenge in terms of the empirical 
observation of policy entrepreneurship and agency on the part of Council and Parliament 
negotiating parties. From an agency perspective, the negotiating party appointed by the 
Parliament can be seen as a collective agent of the responsible committee. Laloux (2017) 
looks at the loss of control for principals where they rely upon a collective, rather than 
individual agent. A collective agent comprises multiple actors with different preferences 
(e.g., the rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs and committee chair) but which is bound by a 
single contract to the principal. No member of the negotiating party enjoys veto power. 
Laloux suggests that the reforms to the EP’s rules of procedure have actually increased the 
discretion of negotiating parties, because the presence of representatives from different 
political parties means they are perceived as a subset of the committee. Prior to the adoption 
of the reforms, rapporteurs were seen as a potential threat to the balance of power within 
committees and so may have been subject to increased scrutiny from political opponents. 
Both the selection process and monitoring arrangements now serve to ensure that the 
negotiating party reflects the preferences of the committee as a whole - and to a lesser extent 
the plenary Parliament (which must approve both the initial report and final legislative text). 
This has also increased the credibility of EP negotiating parties in the eyes of the other 
trilogue participants, as they are understood to act with political authority.  
The agency relationship is structured differently in the case of Council working 
                                                          
 
349 This can be seen in particular in the Commission’s publication of details regarding the negotiation of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in response to growing public opposition to the 
agreement in 2014-15. Similar levels of transparency have been adopted by the Commission in subsequent trade 
negotiations and in relation to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.  
350 Case C-280/11 P Council of the European Union v Access Info Europe 
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parties, due to the preeminent role played by the country holding the rotating presidency at 
the time that trilogues are held, which chairs these meetings. The presidency country may be 
seen as a single agent working on behalf of a collective principal, the member states. Coreper 
acts as an intermediary agent also responsible to the member states, superintending the 
work of the chair. In contrast to the Parliament’s reformed procedures, which in formalising 
control mechanisms over negotiating parties may actually have given them greater 
autonomy, the Council and Coreper exercise control over the chair in a more ad hoc, but 
potentially more constraining manner. The actual levels of scrutiny and control within 
Coreper and the Council are likely to depend upon the overall levels of trust which other 
member states have in the presidency country to conduct negotiations responsibly, the 
political prominence of the file, and the extent of disagreement amongst member states on 
the draft legislation. Control mechanisms over the chair include the ability of other member 
states to reject compromises reached during trilogues, and less immediate responses such as 
the presidency scorecard. Bilateral, confidential feedback is also provided by national 
delegations to the Council President and Secretariat.  
Laloux and Delreux (2018) argue that delegation in the context of trilogues inherently 
implies deviation by the agents, as concessions must be made to reach agreement. They 
devise an index to measure this deviation based on the distance between the initial mandates 
of the Council and Parliament and the final agreement reached. Applying the index to all 
trilogues held in 2012-2016, they find that the agents frequently deviate more than the 
amount required to reach an interinstitutional compromise, and that this tendency is more 
pronounced amongst EP negotiating parties351 than it is amongst Council presidencies. They 
also find that the degree of deviation is not linked to the level of support for the initial 
mandate by the principals or to the size of the agent. Laloux and Delreux acknowledge that 
deviation is not always undesired by the principals, but that it may nevertheless pose 
problems in terms of democratic accountability. As a creature of the Treaties, Parliament up 
to and including its committees may be understood as an agent of the member states who 
created it. But this link breaks down if negotiating parties deviate from mandates set by 
committees, and particularly if they serve interests which are outside of the institutional 
structures prescribed by the Treaties, and which directly conflict with the interests of the 
member states as expressed via the Council.  
 From the perspective of the hypotheses I address, deviation in itself does not 
necessarily falsify the principal-agent relationship; but where such deviation is characterised 
by risk-taking and brings benefits to the agents as distinct from the principals, I argue that it 
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is better characterised as supranational entrepreneurship. The key risks which I look for in 
the analysis below are the introduction of compromises which explicitly contradict the 
preferences of the member states (as opposed to merely deviating from them),352 and the 
corresponding risk of rejection by the principals. In terms of benefits to the agents, I 
examine whether such risk-taking might be expected to bring political rewards outside of the 
principal-agent relationship, for example within the party grouping of the rapporteur or the 
domestic political order of the country holding the Council presidency. I also consider the 
potential political rewards for both the Parliament and Council associated with trade-offs 
between concessions on the public procurement dossier and other legislative files which 
were under consideration at the same time.  
The European Parliament 
The responsible committee within the European Parliament was the Internal Market 
and Consumer Affairs committee (IMCO), chaired by Malcolm Harbour, a British MEP 
belonging to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) grouping. As shown in 
Figure 6.1, work on the public procurement directives within IMCO began more than 18 
months prior to the publication of the Commission’s legislative proposal. In May 2010 an 
own-initiative report was produced by Heide Rühle, a Green MEP from Baden-Württemberg, 
calling for a resolution ‘on new developments in public procurement’.353 The report 
highlights that the proliferation of case law and interpretative communications from the 
Commission since 2004 had created a very complex set of rules on procurement, which local 
and regional public bodies in particular were struggling to implement. This legal complexity 
deterred public authorities from implementing other policies via procurement, resulting in 
contracts being awarded on the basis of lowest price. The draft resolution calls for greater 
clarity and enhanced opportunities to apply environmental and social criteria, including 
those linked to fair trade and payment of standard wages.354 The report also notes the 
                                                          
 
352 Deviation is measured by Laloux and Delreux by comparison of the initial mandates of the Parliament and 
Council and the final negotiated text. Using a text-mining algorithm, they compare this deviation with the 
minimum deviation needed to reach an inter-institutional compromise, based on the difference between the two 
mandates. They validate their method by reference to case studies in selected areas, finding that these 
corroborate the level of deviation as indicated by the index. A shortcoming of this approach is that the index itself 
does not identify the substantive weight of textual amendments. For example, the addition of an ‘including’ or 
even a comma may radically alter the meaning of a legal text, and the significance of such changes would be 
missed by most text-mining algorithms. While the index still provides a valuable starting point for large n 
analyses of legislative negotiations, further and better validation might be achieved by comparing the deviation 
index to the amount of time taken to reach interinstitutional agreement, with longer negotiations suggesting that 
the mere degree of textual changes may not fully capture the level of deviation. This could then be cross-
referenced with case studies for greater accuracy. For the purposes of this study, I evaluate the individual legal 
significance of all changes in the draft text related to environmental and social provisions, an approach which 
gives greater accuracy, but is not well suited to large n analyses.  
353 European Parliament (2010). The report was preceded by a public hearing held by IMCO in January 2010.  
354 Ibid, p 12. 
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comparative lack of Commission support and guidance on socially responsible procurement 
compared to GPP. Despite this, the explanatory memorandum indicates that the rapporteur 
considered revision of the procurement directives to be premature at that point.355 IMCO 
held public hearings on procurement in 2010, 2011 and 2012 – with strong representation 
from environmental groups, local and regional government, business associations and 
unions. The hearings also included a number of legal experts, suggesting that from an early 
stage the Parliament was not willing to leave the legal detail of the directives to the 
Commission.  
A further resolution relating to public procurement was adopted by the Parliament in 
October 2011, following the Commission’s Green Paper consultation and a second report by 
Ms. Rühle.356 This goes further in calling for specific environmental and social measures to 
form part of any new directives, including life-cycle costing and production-phase criteria. It 
also expresses concern that the rules should be simplified and made more flexible, whereas 
the Green Paper suggested the Commission was in favour of the ‘micro-regulation’ of public 
procurement.357 This mantra regarding simplicity and flexibility would come to be repeated 
many times by all parties involved in the reform process, but ex post evaluation of the 
procurement directives suggests that they have in fact introduced significant additional 
complexity, due in part to the interinstitutional compromises made on the environmental 
and social provisions. Ultimately the burden of this complexity is borne at national level. It is 
one of the reasons for the delays in transposition of the new directives in a majority of 
member states: 21 missed the deadline for transposition in April 2016 and 15 had still not 
implemented them by December 2016, leading to reasoned opinions being issued by the 
Commission. It is notable that while the Parliament made several attempts to engage 
national interests in its work on procurement, including through an inter-parliamentary 
forum and the public hearings to which national representatives were invited, there was 
relatively little interaction with national governments, compared to that with local and 
regional governments, civil society groups and business associations.358 
In November 2011 Marc Tarabella, a Belgian member of the Party of European 
Socialists from Wallonia, was appointed as rapporteur for the forthcoming legislative 
process. Shadow rapporteurs were assigned from each of the other political groupings within 
IMCO, who together with the chair Malcolm Harbour brought the size of the negotiating 
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party to eight. A working document identifying priorities for the negotiation was produced in 
February 2012 included the following objectives linked to Cluster 2: 
• Enhancing respect of social rights and working conditions, health and security at 
work, compliance with social security protection as defined by European and 
national legislation as well as by collective agreements; 
• Making the exclusion grounds related to non-compliance with social, labour or 
environmental law mandatory and adding a reference to ILO Convention 94; 
• Extending environmental and social sustainability conditions to sub-contractors; 
• Further developing labels and certification for social concepts; 
• Further developing the light touch regime for social services, including careful 
assessment of the list of services included.359  
Work within IMCO on these and other points lead to the publication of its draft report on the 
Commission’s proposal in May 2012, which contained an initial 166 amendments to the 
text.360 This was circulated amongst other EP committees, seven of which appointed their 
own rapporteur and produced an opinion containing further amendments to the text.361 By 
September 2012 a total of 1593 amendments had been tabled,362 and the task fell to the 
negotiating party to consolidate these into their report. A working document identifies the 
Cluster 2 issues as highly controversial, with almost half of the tabled amendments relating 
to this cluster or other areas linked to social and environmental considerations.363 Amongst 
the proposed amendments were the removal of lowest price awards and strengthening of the 
rules on abnormally low tenders, as well as the mandatory exclusion of bidders who had 
violated environmental, social or labour obligations - including those under collective 
agreements. 
Following a series of meetings between the shadows and committee, the consolidated 
report was adopted by IMCO on 18th December 2012 in a vote which lasted some 3.5 hours, 
with 23 members in favour, 8 against and 7 abstentions. The amendments had been whittled 
down to 253, however several far-reaching social and environmental measures had survived 
the committee process. Rapporteur Tarabella drew attention to these measures in his final 
report which was tabled by the plenary Parliament in January 2013: 
The rapporteur considers that the Commission proposal does not go far enough, 
particularly on social aspects. He therefore wishes to ensure compliance with social 
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361 The committees providing opinions were International Trade (INTA); Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL); 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI); Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE); Transport and 
Tourism (TRAN); Regional Development (REGI); and Legal Affairs (JURI).  
362 The majority of these were tabled by members of the negotiating party or other IMCO members. But ENVI, 
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standards at all stages of the public procurement procedure.  
…The rapporteur also reinforces the grounds for exclusion by requiring the exclusion 
from public procurement contracts of any economic operator which has breached its 
obligations under social, labour and environmental law as defined by national and 
European legislation and collective agreements which have been concluded in 
accordance with Union law. Similarly, the contracting authorities may not award the 
contract to the tenderer making the best bid if the economic operator in question is 
unable to provide up-to-date information on the payment of his social security 
contributions.  
Finally, at the award criteria stage for public procurement contacts, the rapporteur 
considers that the notion of the ‘lowest price’ should finally be scrapped in favour of 
that of the ‘most economically advantageous tender’ (MEAT). Given that price is also 
taken into account in the MEAT, this would allow contracting authorities to make the 
most appropriate choices in relation to their specific needs, including the 
consideration of strategic societal aspects, social criteria and environmental criteria 
and, in particular, fair trade.364 
Key amendments to the Commission’s proposal included the mandatory social clause 
inserted as Article 15(2) (later becoming Article 18.2) and the exclusion of bidders for 
violations of ILO Convention 94. The latter was guaranteed to be controversial during the 
trilogue stage given that not all member states had ratified this Convention, under which 
public contracts must include clauses ensuring that workers receive the same wages and 
benefits as apply under local collective agreements. The potential for conflict with the Court’s 
Rüffert jurisprudence was also clear.  
Green and socialist representatives within the Parliament thus largely succeeded in 
framing the debate and setting the agenda for the negotiations under Cluster 2. But this took 
place in an environment characterised by multilateral debate and extensive, detailed review 
of the tabled report by MEPs of various political orientations, as well as public scrutiny. 
Going into the trilogues, the negotiating party could be characterised as an agent which had a 
heavy influence over its own mandate. While rapporteur Tarabella clearly sought to give a 
social flavour to the directives, he was also obliged to promote amendments which focused 
on innovation, promotion of small businesses and various other agendas within the 
Parliament. But the agency model starts to look strained when we consider the final 
negotiated outcome of the directives, and even the report with its 253 amendments. These 
clearly reduce flexibility and add complexity, contrary to the intentions expressed in IMCO’s 
initial reports on public procurement. They also cross a key ‘red line’ set out in national 
responses to the Green Paper, by introducing new mandatory measures. This can be seen as 
the rapporteur and negotiating party taking risks in order to serve an agenda of their own, 
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which aligns better with the idea of a policy entrepreneur. The negotiating party was the first 
to recognise and exploit policy windows linked to socially responsible procurement in 
particular, in the sense described by Kingdon (1984).365 This second analysis is supported by 
the lack of consensus within IMCO regarding the report, as evidenced by nearly 40% of the 
members either voting against it or abstaining.  
The negotiating party may have acted as a policy entrepreneur rather than as an 
agent, but can it be seen as supranational? The idea of supranational entrepreneurship has 
been developed largely with reference to the Commission and the Court, as explored in 
Chapter two. It tends to be associated with monolithic, technocratic institutions which are 
able to exercise power outside of explicit democratic mandates. The Parliament is more often 
depicted as transnational than supranational, but the distinction is largely moot from the 
perspective of the competing hypotheses examined here – which test what I have argued are 
the core incompatibilities of intergovernmental and supranational theory. Either the 
Parliament is answerable to national interests or it is not; if it is not, and yet it wields 
considerable power over the nature and extent of EU integration, then this is a problem for 
intergovernmental theory. It is less of a problem for supranational theory because the 
Parliament’s powers can be explained as part of the EU’s distinct polity which has become 
increasingly independent from purely national interests over time. As contemplated in 
Chapter two, Parliament may be most influential where its political orientation is distinct to 
that of the Commission and Council, both of which were dominated by centre-right interests 
in 2011-14. While the basic elements of policy entrepreneurship appear to be present in the 
public procurement case, how much power did the Parliament’s negotiating party really 
exercise? Were any of its actions in amending the legislation irreversible or were all subject 
to recall by member states acting through their agent in the Council? To answer these 
questions, we must turn to the process within the Council itself.  
The Council 
The draft procurement directive was discussed at three meetings of the 
Competitiveness Council held in February, May and December 2012. At the last of these, the 
Council adopted its general approach, shortly ahead of the European Parliament tabling its 
report. These meetings provided political direction on issues which had been identified as 
                                                          
 
365 As set out in Chapter 2, while principal-agent theory can account for many actions on the part of the agent 
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particularly salient within the reform, including the light touch regime, flexible procedures, 
e-procurement and governance. During early 2012 the Commission produced several ‘non-
papers’ which were circulated to the working party and which explained various aspects of 
the proposed legislative text, including the new environmental and social provisions.366 The 
working party under the Danish and Cypriot presidencies produced a series of compromise 
texts amending the Commission’s draft throughout 2012, with Cluster 2 issues receiving 
particular attention. Most of the Council’s amendments within Cluster 2 aim to increase the 
flexibility of the social and environmental provisions, in contrast to the Parliament’s 
amendments which seeking to make these more binding.367 Following the Court’s judgment 
in Max Havelaar in May 2012, the working party incorporated explicit references to fair 
trade and social award criteria into the compromise text.368 While the Council repeatedly 
expressed its intention to adopt the directives within 2012, work was slowed in the second 
half of 2012 and the first three months of 2013, due in part to the introduction of the draft 
concessions directive, and the controversy over the inclusion of water services arising from 
the Right2Water campaign.  
The first of 17 trilogue meetings eventually took place under the Irish presidency on 6 
March 2013. How much independent power does the chair country wield over legislative 
files? Neither the treaties nor the Council’s rules of procedure grant the rotating presidency 
much in the way of formal powers. Nevertheless, the role is central to the day-to-day 
workings of the Council and has a large effect on both the volume and content of legislation 
adopted. Countries are expected to ‘leave their mark’ on the presidency by achieving progress 
on topics which reflect their national priorities, as well as those of the EU as a whole. 
Analysing a dataset of all Council working party meetings from 1995 to 2014, Häge (2017) 
found that “the [rotating] Presidency has substantial scope for agenda-setting by 
determining what issues are being discussed, when they are being discussed and how much 
time is devoted for their discussion.” He concludes that the presidency is able to direct the 
political attention of the Council in line with its own priorities, however this effect varies 
between policy areas. Previous scholarship had tended to emphasise the constraints placed 
on the presidency by the Commission’s legislative programme and other inherited agendas. 
Quantitative studies have found that holding the presidency at the time that EU legislation is 
adopted is associated with an increase in national preferences being realised, although the 
effect is relatively modest (Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2008). Other studies have analysed 
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variations in the effectiveness of presidencies, with Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006) 
finding that expertise in EU affairs, political credibility, and attitudes towards European 
integration have a greater impact than traditional measures of power such as country size, or 
economic and political weight. 
As Laffan (2014) points out, Ireland’s weak economic position at a time of its 2013 
Council presidency (it was in receipt of an EU bailout), meant that the budget was half of 
that allocated in 2004 for the previous Irish presidency. It also meant that the presidency 
was focused on achieving progress on measures linked to stability, growth and jobs – of 
which public procurement reform was one, albeit much less prominent than the Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020 and legislation related to the ongoing euro crisis. 
Public procurement was just one of 80 legislative files on which agreement was reached 
during the Irish presidency, which chaired over 374 trilogues (Laffan 2014). Relations with 
the Parliament were key to the success of several sensitive and important files, including the 
MFF, with the Parliament rejecting the version approved by the Heads of State and 
Government in March 2013.  This lead to fraught last-minute negotiations by the Irish 
presidency in an attempt to salvage agreement on the MFF, which was eventually reached in 
June. Given this context, a willingness on the part of the presidency to make concessions to 
the Parliament on less politically prominent dossiers such as procurement, as well as a lack 
of detailed supervision by Coreper and the Council of Ministers, is understandable. Put 
simply, the Council was distracted and keen to maintain good relations with the Parliament 
in order to smooth the passage of more important legislation. Nevertheless, for countries 
outside of the eurozone or which were not feeling the effects of the crisis as profoundly as 
Ireland, such as the UK, Germany and France, public procurement remained an important 
policy area and one in which the outcomes of the negotiations did not match their express 
preferences as analysed in Chapter five. 
There is scope then to question the strength of the principal-agent relationship 
between the Council as a whole and the working party of the rotating presidency. However, 
this does not point towards the supranational entrepreneur hypothesis in the same way as 
the questionable agency of EP negotiating parties does. This is because where working 
parties deviate from the preferences of the Council as a whole, they are likely to move closer 
to the domestic policy preferences of the country holding the presidency. Technically as 
chairs they are expected to be both neutral and impartial, but in the absence of clear political 
mandates from the Council on specific questions which arise during trilogues, national 
agendas may intervene. This involves risk-taking which might be characterised as policy 
entrepreneurship, but not of a kind which undermines intergovernmental theory. On the 
contrary, it suggests that national preferences can prevail in the gaps between the EU’s 
institutional architecture within the Council. However, there is little evidence in the case 
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examined here to support the idea that the Irish presidency prioritised national preferences 
over those of other member states. Unlike the UK, Ireland was one of the countries which 
was late in its transposition of the directives, and environmental and social measures did not 
form an important part of national procurement policy either before or after the negotiation. 
While the various pro-SME measures adopted accord more closely with Irish public 
procurement policy in this period, these were actually weakened during the negotiation.369 
The relationship between the working party lead by Ireland and the Council as a whole can 
perhaps best be described as a principal-agent relationship with relatively little deviation, 
but also relatively little influence on the final text in the areas examined here, compared to 
the EP negotiating party.  
The trilogues involved a gruelling schedule of meetings, which intensified in the final 
two months of the Irish presidency. A team of just two civil servants was responsible for 
chairing the meetings, preparing documents before and afterwards, and reporting back to 
Coreper.370 Two main sticking points emerged: the inclusion of water services in the 
Concessions Directive and the Article 18.2 social clause. The former was a particular problem 
for Germany, the latter for the new accession states – who saw it as a form of social 
imperialism.371 The working party and Commission proposed a number of different 
compromise wordings in order to soften the effect of the mandatory social clause, and 
several recitals were inserted to clarify that this clause should be interpreted in line with 
CJEU case law. However the mandatory nature of Article 18.2, and the reference to national 
laws and collective agreements remain in the final text. The EP negotiating party also 
succeeded in revising the UK’s public service mutuals reservation (Article 77) in a way which 
ensures organisations benefitting from this clause have an explicitly social purpose and are 
governed by employees. There was concern within the Council about the complexity of the 
wording of the provisions on labels and life-cycle costing – these were not eliminated in the 
final text.372  
On 21 June and 25 June 2013, four final trilogues took place and provisional 
agreement was reached on the text for the three Directives. Coreper was debriefed in detail 
on the outcome of the trilogues on 26 June.373 Because of the volume and complexity of the 
proposals, additional technical meetings were held on 27 and 28 June and on 1, 2, 3 and 4 
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July to complete the texts. Key provisions under Cluster 2 where the Council differed 
substantially from the Parliament are shown in the below table, with the position of the 
respective co-legislators going into the trilogues shown as well as the final outcome in the 
negotiated text. The bracketed (EP) or (C) indicates whether the final outcome is closer to 
the Parliament or Council position, with (EP/C) used where the outcome amounts to a draw.  
 
Provision Parliament 
Position 
Council Position Final Outcome 
Mandatory 
social clause 
Proposed Art. 15(2) 
including 
compliance with 
collective 
agreements 
No mandatory social 
clause 
Mandatory social 
clause including 
compliance with 
collective agreements 
(EP) 
Exclusion 
grounds 
Mandatory exclusion 
for child labour and 
human trafficking 
No mandatory 
exclusion for child 
labour and human 
trafficking 
Mandatory exclusion 
for child labour and 
human trafficking (EP) 
Award criteria MEAT to be only 
basis of award 
Lowest cost award to 
be retained 
MEAT only basis of 
award, but cost may be 
sole criterion (EP/C) 
No definition of link 
to the subject-matter 
Definition of link to 
the subject-matter 
 Definition of link to 
the subject-matter (C) 
Life-cycle 
costing 
Limit to costs borne 
by contracting 
authority 
Include costs borne by 
other users 
Includes costs borne by 
other users (C) 
No requirement for 
established method 
Requirement for 
established method 
No requirement for 
established method 
(EP) 
Abnormally low 
tenders (ALTs) 
Mandatory 
explanation of ALTs 
Discretionary 
explanation of ALTs 
Mandatory explanation 
of ALTs (EP) 
Mandatory rejection 
of ALTs for non-
compliance with 
collective 
agreements  
No obligation to reject 
based on non-
compliance with 
collective agreements  
Obligation to reject 
ALTs for non-
compliance with 
collective agreements 
(EP) 
Contract 
performance 
clauses 
May include 
innovation and 
employment-related 
considerations 
No reference to 
innovation or 
employment-related 
considerations 
Includes innovation 
and employment-
related considerations 
(EP) 
Subcontracting Obligation to 
identify 
subcontractors in 
tenders 
Option to require 
identification of 
subcontractors in 
tenders 
Optional identification 
of subcontractors (C) 
Liability of 
subcontractors for 
breaches of 
environmental and 
social obligations 
No liability of 
subcontractors for 
breaches of 
environmental and 
social obligations 
Liability of 
subcontractors, but 
subject to national 
rules (EP/C)  
Light touch 
regime 
Reference to 
disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups 
No reference to 
disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups 
Reference to 
disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups (EP) 
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Restriction on lowest 
cost award 
No restriction on 
lowest cost award 
Partial restriction on 
lowest cost award 
(EP/C) 
Public service 
reservation 
Limited to 
organisations which 
have explicitly social 
purpose, reinvest 
profits and include 
employees in 
governance 
Not limited to 
organisations which h 
have explicitly social 
purpose, reinvest 
profits and include 
employees in 
governance 
Limited to 
organisations which 
have explicitly social 
purpose, reinvest 
profits and include 
employees in 
governance (EP) 
Reference to 
ILO Convention 
94 in Annex X 
In favour Against Not included (C) 
Figure 6.2. Parliament and Council negotiating positions and final outcome 
Net result: EP 9; Council 4; Draw 3 
 
Of greater significance than the overall tally for each body is the presence of three 
new mandatory provisions which were proposed by the EP negotiating party and which 
contradicted the clear preferences of the largest member states. These are: the mandatory 
social clause (Article 15.2 in the draft, now Article 18.2 of Directive 2014/24/EU); the 
requirement to exclude bidders convicted of child labour or human trafficking offences 
(Article 57.1(f) of Directive 2014/24/EU); and the obligation to seek explanation of 
abnormally low tenders and to reject them where they do not comply with applicable 
environmental, social or labour laws (Article 69.3 of Directive 2014/24/EU). While these 
provisions may seem relatively uncontroversial on their face, in practice they pose a 
considerable challenge for implementation at national level and have the potential to result 
in national champions being excluded from contracts.374 While governments may agree with 
their general intent, both the scope of the social compliance obligations (which extends to 
collective agreements), and the possibility for other bidders to enforce these provisions 
directly where contracting authorities fail to apply them, mean they create new 
administrative burdens and potential liability on the part of states. Germany, France and the 
UK were all against the creation of any such ‘red tape’ – both publicly in their Green Paper 
submissions and privately in the documents and strategies prepared by the departments 
responsible for overseeing negotiation of the reform. Their presence in the final directives is 
one of the factors behind the delay in transposition in many member states, as they add to 
the overall complexity of the legislative package. While the UK adopted a ‘short cut’ by 
simply leaving Article 18.2 out of its transposition, this approach is not legally robust and 
does not deprive the mandatory social clause of effectiveness due to the supremacy of EU 
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law, for at least as long as the UK remains a member.375  
 The UK did achieve one of its clear policy goals by securing the inclusion of the 
Article 77 reservation for ‘public service organisations’ – accommodating the then 
government’s desire to award public contracts to employee-led mutuals which had been spun 
out of public sector bodies. This provision was initially greeted with scepticism by the 
Commission; the potential for it to lead to numerous demands for special treatment of 
particular types of social enterprises which varied in form across the member states was 
clear. The final version of this article is much more explicitly social than the UK had 
originally envisioned, due to the intervention of the EP negotiating party, making it 
appropriate for use in other member states as well. The Commission did succeed in including 
several limitations on the reservation in terms of the number and duration of contracts 
which could be awarded to public service organisations, as well as a somewhat unusual 
requirement for its use to be reviewed by the Commission within five years.376 However in 
comparison to the provisions inserted by the Parliament, the reservation is relatively 
insignificant. It is optional for member states to implement, and only applies where it is 
specifically invoked by contracting authorities – in contrast to the mandatory social clause, 
exclusion for child labour and human trafficking, and rules on abnormally low tenders which 
apply to all contracts covered by the directives. It thus represents a small additional measure 
of flexibility in comparison with far-reaching new social obligations on member states and 
contracting authorities. 
 As noted in the introduction, this study focuses on the environmental and social 
aspects of the 2014 procurement directives.  These were focal points of the reform – but they 
were not the only focal points. For member states, avoiding an overall expansion of the scope 
of the procurement rules, relaxing access to the negotiated procedure, clarifying the rules on 
public-public cooperation and encouraging SME participation and innovation were equally if 
not more important than environmental and social topics. However, in these areas the 
differences between the positions of the member states, Commission and Parliament were 
small. In several of these areas, the final provisions adopted by the Council and Parliament 
were extremely similar to the text originally proposed by the Commission.377 As the most 
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the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. However given the importance attached to access to European public contracts 
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Procurement Agreement and many bilateral trade agreements, it is unlikely that the UK will opt to eliminate or 
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other hazards associated with free trade outside of Europe.  
376 Article 77(2)(d), (3) and (5) of Directive 2014/24/EU 
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controversial area of the procurement reform (outside of the debate on inclusion of water 
services in the Concessions Directive, discussed in Chapter five), the outcome of the 
negotiation on the environmental and social provisions tells us more about the way power 
was exercised by the various actors involved in the process than areas which were less 
controversial. The clearly differentiated views of the Parliament negotiating party and the 
Council working party on these questions offer an opportunity to meaningfully test the 
hypotheses relating to supranational entrepreneurship and agency, and strongly suggest that 
where an outcome matches the preferences of one of these two groups, there is a causal 
connection with its actions. Tracing the origins of specific provisions allows this to be 
validated, but it does not in itself allow us to control for the influence of other actors such as 
the Commission, Court of Justice or interest groups. The role of these actors has been 
explored in Chapters three, four and five; in the concluding chapter I evaluate their overall 
impact on the reform in comparison with the Council and Parliament.  
Conclusions 
 In tracing the evolution of the environmental and social provisions of the 
procurement directives, the broader context of Parliament and Council deliberations needs 
to be considered. In 2012-13, this was characterised by three developments: the Parliament’s 
adoption of greater formal control over negotiating parties, the Council’s preoccupation with 
the ongoing fallout from the financial crisis, and the need to reach agreement on the 
Multiannual Financial Framework. I have argued that, paradoxically, the enhanced 
supervision of negotiating parties under the Parliament’s reformed rules of procedure may 
actually have given them greater room for manoeuvre, due to the formal representation of 
opposing political factions within the negotiating party in the form of shadow rapporteurs, 
and the requirement for majority approval within committees to authorise early agreement, 
set the rapporteur’s mandate and open negotiations with the Council. These controls lead to 
a more labour-intensive process within the Parliament prior to the opening of negotiations, 
but seem also to have strengthened the hand of negotiating parties once mandates are 
approved. Support for this analysis comes from the large n study carried out by Laloux and 
Delreux of the outcome of all interinstitutional negotiations in 2012-2016, which shows 
extensive deviation from mandates by EP negotiating parties.  
 Combined with the relative lack of political priority attached to the procurement 
directives by the Council, and especially its wooing of the Parliament over the MFF in the 
                                                          
 
is very similar to the Commission’s proposed Article 44. Article 12 on public-public cooperation is also very 
similar to the Commission’s proposal (which aims to codify the Court’s case law in this area), despite some 
tinkering with the percentage of independent business which can be carried out and the nature of permissible 
private capital participation.  
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first half of 2013, these contextual factors may explain why the Parliament negotiating party 
succeeded in achieving a number of reforms which ran counter both to the specific 
preferences of the largest member states and to the overall political orientation of the 
Commission and Council at the time. Does this mean the EP negotiating party acted as a 
supranational policy entrepreneur? It is certainly difficult to falsify this hypothesis based on 
the account given here, while the agency model appears rather less convincing as an 
explanation of the actions of the negotiating party. While the EP’s amendments could have 
been reversed by the Council (and indeed this took place in a number of cases), the broader 
context discussed above meant that the final outcome of the negotiations strongly reflects the 
Parliament’s social and environmental priorities as championed by the negotiating party. 
These priorities directly conflicted with the ‘red lines’ identified by the three largest member 
states by introducing new mandatory provisions and reducing flexibility. To describe the 
European Parliament as an agent of the member states in such cases stretches the principal-
agent concept beyond the point where it has any explanatory power.  
Agency implies that the principal is in some way able to realise its preferences 
through the actions of the agent. This requires an element of control, or sanctions for 
deviations from these preferences. In the case of negotiating parties and arguably the 
Parliament as a whole, the control and sanction mechanisms available to member states, as 
well as the threat of ‘re-contracting’ (through Treaty changes) are too intangible to effectively 
moderate the behaviour of the ‘agent’ in any way. Even accepting the long-range theory put 
forward by Rittberger (2005) that the EP acts as a legitimacy shield to replace that provided 
by national parliaments, this initial rationale for creating the Parliament does not mean that 
the preferences of national governments continue to provide a meaningful explanation for its 
actions. The EP-as-agent-of-the-member-states model is thus of limited value in 
understanding who exercises power over EU legislation in cases such as the one analysed 
here. At best, it is no more convincing than the idea of the EP as an agent of the European 
citizens forming its electorate and the interest groups who lobby it, who have more tangible 
influence over its members.  
 The agency model holds up better in the case of the Council working party. Given the 
arms-length nature of political supervision by Coreper and the Council of Ministers, the 
compromise texts developed by the working party do contain a number of innovations for 
which no clear political mandate can be found – based on wording proposed by the 
Parliament or Commission. But none of the Council’s own amendments introduce new 
mandatory provisions or reduce the flexibility available to member states or contracting 
authorities, in contrast to the amendments proposed by the Parliament. They thus stay well 
inside the red lines set by the largest member states, although the same cannot be said of the 
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final negotiated text. In terms of irreversibility and recall by member states, formally all of 
the amendments were subject to approval of the Council (and the Parliament) at the end of 
the process, and to interim approval via Coreper. In practice, these bodies were unlikely to 
unpick the bargains struck in the course of the trilogues, due to the imperative to reach 
agreement and the overall positive orientation of the member states towards procurement 
reform. The delays in implementation of the new directives suggest that member states may 
not have fully appreciated the scope of the changes, including those under the environmental 
and social banner. While the agreed directives cannot be reversed in the short-term, future 
renegotiations are guaranteed, and will be informed by the experience of negotiation during 
the 2011-14 process. The policy innovations and compromises of the EP negotiating party are 
thus subject to recall in the longer-term. In my concluding chapter I analyse the significance 
of recall/reversibility in terms of how legislative power is exercised in the EU, the 
implications for supranational and intergovernmental theory and democratic legitimacy. 
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Chapter 7 – Supranational or Intergovernmental Policy-making? 
The preceding chapters have traced the process by which environmental and social 
obligations came to be embedded in the 2014 EU procurement directives. By setting out 
common rules for SPP, the directives create both vertical linkages between the EU 
institutions which enforce the rules and the national and sub-national authorities who must 
apply them, and horizontal linkages between authorities in different member states and 
businesses tendering on a cross-border basis. This chapter begins by summarising my 
findings in relation to the four hypotheses developed to test the applicability of 
intergovernmental and supranational theory to the case of public procurement reform. 
Based on these results, I evaluate the robustness of the concepts of supranational 
entrepreneurship and agency as means of understanding the powers exercised by EU 
institutions. I argue that neither concept provides a sufficient or accurate explanation for the 
role that the Court of Justice and European Parliament played in the reform. I then turn to 
the alternative concept of trusteeship as developed by Karen Alter (2008) in relation to 
international courts and ask whether this might provide a better explanation for the powers 
exercised not only by the Court, but also by the Parliament. Evaluating the evidence collected 
on public procurement suggests that these bodies may have acted as trustees of the member 
states, drawing upon their own sources of legitimacy, making decisions independently, and 
serving third-party beneficiaries. In order to establish the broader applicability of trusteeship 
to the study of EU integration, I outline testable hypotheses which distinguish it both from 
agency and supranational entrepreneurship. The ability of member states to reverse 
decisions and recall powers from EU institutions means that they should still be considered 
the principals within the trusteeship model. The chapter concludes with consideration of the 
implications of my findings for questions of democratic legitimacy and institutional design 
within the EU, and potential directions for future research informed by the trusteeship 
model.  
Findings 
H1 - EU institutions acted as supranational policy entrepreneurs in the reform of 
environmental and social aspects of public procurement law 
The idea that EU institutions – in particular the Commission and Court – act as 
policy entrepreneurs is a cornerstone of supranational theory. A policy entrepreneur 
promotes its own agenda, as opposed to the preferences of a principal, usually by 
marshalling relevant interest groups. It exploits policy windows by being the first to 
recognise and/or act on a given problem, taking risks in doing do (Kingdon 1984; 1995). 
Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) characterised the Commission’s role leading to the adoption of 
the 1992 programme in the Treaty of Maastricht as one of policy entrepreneurship, and the 
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model persists in many analyses of the Commission’s activity.378 In the case of the Court, the 
idea of ‘activism’ often stands in for policy entrepreneurship, and has engendered a lively 
debate in both legal and political science literature.379 Proponents of supranational theory 
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1997, 1998, 2012) have emphasised the role of private litigants 
in empowering the Court, including through the preliminary reference procedure as well as 
the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, all of which create a link with national courts 
and mean the Court is often not dependent on national governments to enforce its 
judgments. While the notion of the Parliament as a policy entrepreneur is less developed, 
recent scholarship emphasises the ability of individual MEPs to provide policy leadership in 
the context of codecision procedures (Wilson, Ringe & van Thomme 2016; Thierse 2017) as 
well as its vigorous use of powers which member states may not have intended to grant it, 
exemplified by the Spitzenkandidat process in 2014. Some have ascribed supranational 
activism on environmental and social policy to the Parliament even prior to the first direct 
elections in 1979 (Meyer 2014; Roos 2017).  
Regardless of the exact form which supranational entrepreneurship may take in the 
various EU institutions, I argue that H1 is falsified if the EU institutions acted only within 
the preferences of member states, as this precludes the idea that they were the first to exploit 
a particular policy window and took risks in doing so. It is possible of course that the policy 
preferences of the member states and EU institutions simply coincide in many areas, in 
which case supranational entrepreneurship could not be ruled out even if the policies 
promoted by the Commission, Court, Parliament or Council conformed with member state 
preferences. For this reason, the preceding empirical chapters have focused on areas where 
there was a clear and documented conflict between the views of the largest member states 
and those put forward by one of the EU institutions. A further confounding factor could arise 
if one of the institutions (for example, the Court) pursued policies at the behest of another 
EU body (for example, the Commission) which conflicted with national preferences. In this 
case, it would not itself be acting as a supranational entrepreneur, but rather as an agent of 
another institution which was engaging in entrepreneurship. While this scenario creates a 
risk of false positives (finding supranational entrepreneurship when in fact there was none 
by a particular institution) there is no equivalent risk of false negatives (excluding 
entrepreneurship when in fact it occurred) – which is why the focus here is on evidence 
which contradicts the supranational entrepreneur hypothesis rather than confirming it.  
                                                          
 
378 Including in internal security (Kaunert 2011), higher education (Batory and Lindstrom 2011), energy policy 
(Maltby 2013) and mobile roaming charges (Cini and Šuplata 2017). 
379 For an overview of recent contributions see Howarth and Roos (2017) and others in volume 13(1) of the 
Journal of Contemporary European Research.  
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Detailed analysis of the Commission’s 2011 proposal for the new procurement 
directives reveals that although it contained a number of novel environmental and social 
provisions, these did not cross any of the ‘red lines’ set out by the largest member states in 
their responses to the Green Paper. In particular, it did not introduce any new mandatory 
environmental or social obligations or substantially reduce the flexibility available to 
contracting authorities in this area. As its proposals were aligned with the previously 
expressed preferences of member states, it is difficult to depict the Commission as acting as a 
supranational entrepreneur. While the Commission did play a role during the trilogues in 
developing compromise text, the major changes in the text of the directives during the 
legislative process can all be traced to initiatives by the Parliament or Council, meaning the 
Commission did not exploit its role to further its own agenda in this particular area, even 
when provisions which potentially threatened key internal market principles such as the free 
movement of labour, and which pose considerable difficulties for enforcement, were 
proposed by the Parliament and accepted by the Council. The Commission invested its own 
resources (including credibility) heavily in the procurement reform, and endorsed the 
inclusion of horizontal policies in the directives from the early stages, but it was neither the 
first to do so - the Parliament had already made clear its support for this in its own-initiative 
reports, as had several member states in their national procurement policies - nor did it take 
any appreciable risks in the environmental and social provisions it put forward. In the one 
area where the Commission did attempt to impose significant additional obligations on 
member states during the reform – the creation of national oversight bodies - it was 
unsuccessful.380  
The question of whether the Court acted as a supranational entrepreneur is less clear 
cut. The Court is often cited as the primary force behind public procurement law, driving 
changes including those related to environmental and social policies. Legal commentators on 
the procurement directives have emphasised its influence on many of the new provisions, 
including some in the environmental and social field.381 The Court’s decisions in Rüffert and 
Max Havelaar did form crucial reference points during the reform process, as the Concordia 
and EVN judgments had for the previous generation of directives. However close 
examination of the case law and legislative process leading to the 2014 directives reveals that 
the Court’s influence was limited to areas where a qualified majority of member states 
                                                          
 
380 The draft directive published by the Commission in December 2011 contained a new requirement for national 
oversight bodies on public procurement. This was eventually reduced to a mere reporting requirement, following 
strong objections from the UK and other member states, as discussed in Chapter 5. The Council also inserted a 
provision in Article 83(3) restricting the frequency of reports to the Commission on national strategic 
procurement policies to no more than once every three years.  
381 See for example Bovis (2012) and Caranta (2015). 
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accepted its rulings. A key consideration in this regard is the non-adoption of Rüffert in the 
binding text of the directives; if the Court attempted to act as a supranational entrepreneur 
in this case it was an unsuccessful one. Despite issuing a prominent judgment which clearly 
restricted the scope to enforce collective agreements in public contracts, and despite this 
judgment forming part of a coherent body of case law rather than being an anomaly, there 
was no attempt to codify Rüffert in the binding text of the directives.  By the time the 
Commission was developing its proposal, it had become clear that at least a blocking 
minority of member states was unhappy with the position in Rüffert. On the other hand, a 
qualified majority had not yet emerged to support an alternative position. The result was 
non-adoption of Rüffert, with only an oblique reference to the Court’s case law being 
included in the recitals.382 Non-adoption is very different to legislative override – it left this 
key battleground open for a new judicial or political settlement. In the event, both began to 
emerge shortly after the directives were adopted, with the Court relaxing its position in 
RegioPost in 2015, and the Commission proposing major revisions to the PWD in 2016.  
In contrast, the less controversial judgment in Max Havelaar did directly influence 
the text of the directives. The rules on award criteria effectively codify the Court’s finding 
that fair trade considerations could form part of the evaluation of tenders, while the rules on 
labels reflect a light modification of the Court’s position. Neither the Council nor Parliament 
attempted to water down the Court’s ruling to the effect that social and trading conditions 
could be addressed in award criteria, opening the door to fair trade procurement. While the 
Commission opposed this, having brought the case against the Netherlands, it also does not 
appear to have attempted to limit the impact of the ruling during interinstitutional 
negotiations.383 The Court can thus be seen as having a strong influence over this aspect of 
the reform, with its position endorsing a requirement to pay wage premiums to producers – 
provided these workers were safely located in third countries and not within the Union. 
However, it must be recalled that even where the Court acts boldly, it always does so in 
response to litigation which is brought before it, limiting its ability to set the agenda for such 
policy changes.384 The fact that the Max Havelaar judgment was readily accepted by the 
political institutions and member states also suggests that the Court did not take significant 
risks in adopting its position in support of this particular form of social procurement. The 
Parliament had signalled its strong support for fair trade, including in public procurement, 
                                                          
 
382 In addition to not being technically binding, the practical impact of the recitals is limited by the fact that they 
are excluded from many national transpositions. Courts do however refer to them as interpretative aids.  
383 It should be recalled that the Commission was largely successful in its action against the Netherlands, with the 
Court ruling that the manner in which labels had been referred to infringed the 2004 directives.  
384 Unlike the US Supreme Court, limited docket control by CJEU 
158 
 
in a series of resolutions, reports and cross-party working groups going back to 2004.385 
In other areas included in the reform - concessions, public-public cooperation, and 
modification of contracts after award - the Court had been the first mover and did take more 
appreciable risks. In these areas a variety of legislative responses are evident, none of which 
amounts to complete codification of the Court’s rulings.386 It is not possible to falsify H1 
based on analysis of the Court’s case law prior to and during the reform process. Unlike the 
Commission, it is clear that the Court acted outside of the preferences of a large bloc of 
member states in Rüffert, and that its decision in Max Havelaar was also not clearly linked 
to member state preferences expressed prior to the judgment. At the same time, there is 
something implausible about applying the supranational entrepreneur label to the Court 
based on its influence on the procurement directives. On the question of the enforceability of 
collective agreements in public contracts, the co-legislators declined to adopt the position 
endorsed by the Court. On the question of fair trade criteria, the Court’s position proved to 
be uncontroversial amongst member states, and also had considerable prior support from 
the European Parliament. While the Court may resemble a supranational entrepreneur more 
than an agent of the member states, both descriptions seem to oversimplify and misconstrue 
the true nature of the Court’s powers – as well as its limitations. I consider the agency model 
in more detail below, before examining the alternative concept of trusteeship.  
The European Parliament displayed many of the classic characteristics of a 
supranational entrepreneur during the procurement reform, and its role in getting new 
environmental and social rules adopted exemplifies this. Through own-initiative reports and 
resolutions prior to the start of the legislative process, IMCO was able to frame the debate 
relating to these questions, and to marshal support from environmental and social interest 
groups. These groups remained involved throughout the reform, and in some cases proposed 
specific amendments to the directives which were ultimately accepted, after being put 
forward by the Parliament’s rapporteur.387 The rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs and chair of 
IMCO all engaged assiduously in the internal and interinstitutional process, consolidating 
over 1400 amendments proposed at committee stage into the 253 which were taken into the 
trilogues – and succeeding in having many of these key amendments accepted by the 
Council. While a cynical view of the Parliament’s success on this file might attribute it to the 
                                                          
 
385 European Parliament (2012) Briefing on fair trade in public procurement in the EU 
386 For example, the definition of concessions in Art. 5 of the Concessions Directive, the minimum percentage of a 
company’s turnover which must be linked to the contracting authority in order to avail of the in-house exemption 
set out in Art. 12(1) of the Public Sector Directive, and several of the permissible modifications set out in Art. 72 of 
the Public Sector Directive, all deviate from the Court’s case law.  
387 For example, those proposed by Client Earth and the Network for Sustainable Development in Public 
Procurement. 
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Council’s desire to secure its agreement for the multiannual financial framework, this neither 
undermines the entrepreneurship thesis nor suggests this is an isolated occurrence. In 
several areas the Parliament’s amendments went against the red lines identified by the 
largest member states, by introducing new obligations and reducing flexibility at national 
level in the name of ensuring more robust enforcement of social and environmental rules. It 
is this ability to act in a way which supersedes national interests which is the hallmark of 
supranational entrepreneurship. However, it must be noted that many of the Parliament’s 
amendments on SPP were also rejected by the Council, meaning that it was only partially 
successful as a policy entrepreneur. 
Turning to the Council, its strongly intergovernmental nature means that its potential 
to act as a supranational policy entrepreneur is underdeveloped in EU integration literature. 
Entrepreneurship on the Council could arise for example where the particular institutional 
dynamics within a working group lead to deviation from the collective interests of member 
states, or where the President or rotating presidency is able to pursue an individual agenda. 
But despite the increasing prominence of the Council President, and occasional departures 
by working groups from political mandates, it seems clear that member states still firmly 
hold the reins of power within the Council. In the case of the procurement reform, the 
trilogues held under the Irish presidency did lead to a number of amendments which 
contradicted the initial preferences of the three largest member states. However, these were 
not introduced by the Council working party and all were ultimately subject to approval by 
Coreper and the General Affairs Council. They thus seem to fall well within the scope of 
bargaining envisioned by intergovernmental theory, and do not suggest the Council working 
party itself acted as a supranational policy entrepreneur. H1 can be considered falsified in 
the case of the Council, because the working group did not itself propose reforms contrary to 
its principals’ collective preferences, as agreed in the Council compromise text produced 
prior to the trilogues.  
 (H2) EU institutions acted as agents of the member states in the reform of environmental 
and social aspects of public procurement law 
In order to falsify the agency hypothesis (H2), I look for evidence that EU institutions acted 
outside of the bounds of member state preferences, understood collectively according to the 
requirements of a qualified majority on the Council. This is the inverse of the evidence 
considered in relation to H1, and so can be summarised briefly. The Commission acted 
within the preferences of (at least) the three largest member states in its proposals relating to 
environmental and social provisions, and so we cannot reject the idea that it acted as an 
agent in this capacity. The Commission largely fulfilled its role as appointed champion of the 
single market, while taking on board clear mandates from the Lisbon Treaty, Europe 2020 
agenda and Monti report to include social and environmental protections in its ‘relaunch’. 
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The Court however cannot be seen as an agent of the member states inasmuch as its Rüffert 
judgment did not align with any qualified majority, and lead to a political stalemate 
regarding social dumping which has not yet been resolved. Plausibly it could have acted as an 
agent in Max Havelaar given the ready acceptance of this judgment by the Council, but this 
consensus seems only to have arisen after the Court’s judgment; this is supported by the fact 
that none of the other member states intervened in the case taken by the Commission against 
the Netherlands.388 The Parliament clearly acted in a way which ran contrary to the express 
preferences of member states, and so cannot be seen as an agent of the member states 
without a number of logical contortions which fatally undermine the predictive power of this 
model. In contrast, the agency model holds up well in the case of the Council. The working 
group only deviated from its initial political mandate after extensive consultation with 
member states, whose collective preferences appear to have shifted over time in order to 
accommodate the Parliament as part of a broader interinstitutional game under the Irish  
presidency. The findings in relation to H1 and H2 are summarised in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 Supranational entrepreneurship and agency 
 
Evaluation of the evidence falsifying and supporting the first two hypotheses indicates that 
neither policy entrepreneurship nor a principal-agent relationship – the two core 
mechanisms proposed by supranational and intergovernmental theory respectively to 
explain the powers exercised by EU institutions – provides a satisfactory explanation of the 
role played by each of the actors in the public procurement reform. While agency provides a 
plausible explanation for the actions of the Commission and Council in this case, it does not 
account for the actions of the Court or Parliament. Supranational entrepreneurship appears 
to fit the Parliament well here, but the evidence for the Court-as-policy-entrepreneur is more 
ambiguous. I now turn to the second two hypotheses regarding the irreversibility of actions 
by the EU institutions and the ability of member states to recall powers exercised by them.  
                                                          
 
388 Denmark originally sought leave to intervene, but later withdrew this (Case C-368/10, para 44 of judgment) 
 H1 – EU institutions act as 
policy entrepreneurs 
H2 – EU institutions act as 
agents of member states 
Commission Falsified Not falsified – extensive 
positive evidence 
Court Not falsified – limited positive 
evidence 
Falsified 
Council Falsified Not falsified – extensive 
positive evidence 
Parliament Not falsified – extensive 
positive evidence 
Falsified 
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(H3) EU institutions acted in a way which was irreversible by member states in the reform 
of environmental and social aspects of public procurement law 
The irreversibility hypothesis (H3) can be falsified by showing either that actions of 
the EU institutions were actually reversed by member states, or that there was a realistic 
chance of this based on the applicable decision rule and other relevant structural factors. The 
focus here is on the decisions made by EU institutions related to environmental and social 
aspects of procurement: in the Commission’s legislative proposal; in the Court’s case law; 
and in the amendments proposed by the Parliament and Council working group as well as 
the compromises agreed during the trilogue. Technically all actions undertaken by the 
institutions are reversible within the EU’s legal order – if by no other means than by Treaty 
change. But for the purposes of distinguishing between supranational and intergovernmental 
dynamics what is of interest is the difficulty associated with reversal. This may be based on 
structural factors – such as the requirement of a qualified majority on the Council, the rules 
of the codecision procedure, or the Commission’s monopoly over legislative proposals – or 
arise due to practical considerations such as the limited time and resources which member 
states have available to influence EU law. Most decisions by EU institutions are irreversible 
by a member state acting alone, unless they require unanimity in order to be implemented. 
In some cases, an individual member state can escape from the full impact of EU law by 
pleading ‘essential national interests’ or ‘mandatory requirements’ – however these 
flexibilities are themselves interpreted by the Court and so do not provide a means of 
reversal which is fully controlled by member states. 
The focus here is on the substantive provisions included in the new directives. These 
typically come with associated powers which can be exercised either by member states, 
contracting authorities, the Commission or the Court. As set out in Chapter one, the new 
environmental and social rules can be divided into four categories depending on their 
addressee and voluntary or mandatory nature. Each of these rule types is associated with an 
increase in integration, as measured by the indicators of precision, formality and authority. 
Even in areas where the directives appear to grant considerable discretion to contracting 
authorities or member states – for example the light touch regime and most of the rules on 
subcontracting -  they regulate the scope of that discretion and establish principles or limits 
to be applied by the Court of Justice, as well as by domestic courts. They also empower the 
Commission to bring actions against member states to enforce the new rules. As noted in 
Chapter four, the scope of public procurement law has expanded considerably since 2004, 
with the Court driving much of this expansion through its case law on cross-border interest, 
concessions, public-public cooperation and modifications to contracts after award. Many 
member states had indicated their apprehension regarding these developments by 
supporting Germany’s challenge to the Interpretative Communication published by the 
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Commission in 2006. The submissions by Germany, France and the UK in response to the 
2011 Green Paper all called for simplification of the rules and additional flexibility. In 
contrast, both the Court’s case law and the European Parliament’s ambitions for the reform 
meant that additional rules and complexity were introduced in the 2014 directives, many of 
which serve environmental and social aims.  
The question is whether the member states had a realistic chance to reverse these 
developments during the reform process, and if so why they chose not to exercise it. In the 
case of the Commission’s initial proposal, it is clear that member states succeeded in making 
a number of changes to bring the text closer to their collective preferences. This included 
removing the requirement to establish national oversight bodies and, in Germany’s case, 
removing water services from the scope of the Concessions Directive. In terms of the 
environmental and social provisions, the Council did not itself make any major changes to 
the Commission’s draft. This reflects the fact that the Commission’s proposals in this domain 
were relatively conservative and avoided introducing any new mandatory provisions. The 
eventual acceptance of new environmental and social obligations in the trilogues indicates 
that member states retained the ability to amend the Commission’s proposals. Ultimately if 
the collective gains under the directives were outweighed by the collective losses from the 
point of view of member states, they could have rejected the Commission’s proposal in its 
entirety. In terms of the Council working group, although there is some evidence that it 
deviated from the initial political mandate granted by the Competitiveness Council, this took 
place within the interinstitutional bargaining environment and can be seen as falling within 
the behaviour of an agent who is empowered to make compromises. The text negotiated by 
the working group was subject to approval by Coreper and to formal adoption by the Council, 
both of which offered opportunities for reversal by member states. H3 is therefore falsified in 
the case of the Commission and Council.  
Did the European Parliament act in a way which was irreversible by member states? I 
have argued above that it displayed many of the characteristics of a supranational 
entrepreneur, successfully exploiting a policy window in order to promote a social agenda in 
the reform of the directives. Again, formally all of its amendments had to be accepted by 
member states, first via their agents the Council working group and Coreper, and then by the 
principals themselves. It is possible that the dynamics of an interinstitutional game such as 
legislative codecision gives rise to a situation where member states are prevented from 
reversing the Parliament’s actions, due to the absence of consensus about a preferable 
alternative. However, in cases where this occurs, the normal tactic is for the Council to delay 
legislation or for it to be rejected by Coreper. This did not occur in the public procurement 
case, with the Council continuing to avow its commitment to finalising the directives even 
once the scope of the Parliament’s amendments had become clear. Acceptance of these 
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amendments was driven by the perception that the overall gains from the directives 
outweighed the new burdens, and possibly by the need to secure the Parliament’s agreement 
on other matters. Nevertheless, the Council did reject or attenuate a number of the 
Parliament’s amendments, including some related to SPP as documented in Chapter six. The 
Parliament’s actions remain subject to reversal by member states, even where it successfully 
exploits a policy window and holds the upper hand in interinstitutional negotiations. This 
undermines the idea that it exercises power independently of member states in the sense 
required by supranational theory, and falsifies H3 in respect of the Parliament.  
Of all actions and decisions by EU institutions, CJEU judgments perhaps have the 
greatest potential to be irreversible by member states. As discussed in Chapter four, the 
occasions on which Court judgments are subject to legislative override are few and far 
between. There are a number of reasons for this, and I argue below that the Court’s own 
sources of legitimacy within a system based on the rule of law and separation of powers 
provides a more convincing explanation than the mere absence of a qualified majority on the 
Council, which may itself be due to the respect accorded to the Court by most member states, 
most of the time. As in many other areas, the Court’s public procurement jurisprudence has 
often been at odds with national political preferences, and this is clearly illustrated by the 
Rüffert case. While the Court frequently invokes the Treaty principles of non-discrimination, 
equal treatment, transparency and proportionality in its procurement case law, in Rüffert the 
most controversial aspects of the judgment were based on the wording of the Posted Workers 
Directive. This lowers the bar for reversal by member states compared to that required for 
Treaty changes. While member states did not in fact reverse Rüffert as part of the 2014 
reform, the approach of non-adoption left this door very much open. The reversal of the 
Court’s interpretation of which labour conditions can be imposed in public contracts now 
looks likely to occur through adoption of the Commission’s 2016 proposal on the PWD, with 
the ground having been softened by the Court itself in RegioPost. The existence of a realistic 
prospect of reversal allows us to falsify H3 in respect of the Court in this case.  
(H4) EU institutions acted in a way which was subject to recall by member states in the 
reform of environmental and social aspects of public procurement law 
H4 is the inverse of H3 and so the same evidence is relevant. The recall thesis (H4) 
can be falsified by showing that there was no realistic prospect of member states reversing 
decisions or actions of EU institutions in the reform process. Recall may take place either 
during the legislative process as discussed above, or subsequently via changes to EU law. It 
may also take place indirectly where member states refuse to implement decisions taken by 
EU institutions. Given that member states did recall power in several areas where the 
Commission had originally sought to extend the scope of procurement law, H4 cannot be 
falsified in relation to the Commission. The volume of changes made to the Commission’s 
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proposal within the Council provides substantial evidence to support the idea that member 
states retained the power of recall. Likewise, as noted above the actions of the Council 
working group were clearly subject to approval by the member states, even if they did not 
withhold this in the circumstances. As far as the Parliament is concerned, the member states 
accepted some but not all of its amendments, suggesting that they retained the power to 
reverse its decisions even as it held the upper hand in the negotiations. However, the positive 
evidence for H4 here is weaker than that for the Commission and Council – suggesting that 
this may not be a key mechanism in explaining the relationship between Parliament and the 
member states. Likewise, while the Court’s judgments in Rüffert and Max Havelaar were 
not subject to legislative override in the 2014 directives themselves, they may yet be. The 
findings in relation to H3 and H4 are summarised in Figure 7.2. 
 H3 – Actions are irreversible 
by member states 
H4 – Actions subject to 
recall by member states 
Commission Falsified Not falsified – extensive 
positive evidence 
Court Falsified Not falsified  
Council Falsified Not falsified – extensive 
positive evidence 
Parliament Falsified Not falsified  
Figure 7.2 Irreversibility and recall  
Agency and Trusteeship 
The agency of international organisations is sometimes treated as an axiom, rather 
than a theory which needs to be tested. Undoubtedly it provides a useful analytic structure in 
many international relations scenarios, but it may also serve to obscure the true nature of the 
power exercised by international organisations. As links between the preferences of states 
and the actual behaviour of these bodies become more contorted, the value of the P-A 
structure diminishes as a means of making predictions about this behaviour. The fact that it 
is possible to make some link to the principal’s preferences does not serve to establish the 
parsimony of P-A theory; other analytical structures may provide a better fit and Occam’s 
razor requires us to consider these. To begin with, we can try discarding the assumption that 
international organisations (in this case, the EU institutions) reduce the transaction costs 
associated with international decision-making, and that this is a primary reason for states to 
delegate power to them. What if the reason for delegation is instead the perceived legitimacy 
which international organisations can bring to decisions, and what if this legitimacy depends 
upon them not being answerable to national preferences or politics? This would lead to a 
very different set of hypotheses about how EU institutions act than those we can derive from 
P-A theory. While bargaining between states would still be understood to play a role in the 
initial establishment of these bodies, the existence or absence of a qualified majority or 
unanimity amongst member states would no longer be posited as an explanation for 
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individual decisions made by them. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the case of the Court of 
Justice large scale studies have failed to establish a convincing or consistent link between its 
judgments and the preferences of a qualified majority of member states. 
Alter (2008) proposes an alternative model for understanding the behaviour of 
international courts based on the idea of trusteeship. She identifies three characteristics 
which distinguish trusteeship from agency. The first is the reason for delegation by the 
principal: trustees are selected because they bring their own source of legitimacy based on 
professional or other credentials, whereas agents are chosen because they are expected to be 
faithful to the principal(s) and to reduce transaction costs. Secondly, trustees are delegated 
the power to make meaningful decisions based on their own judgment, whereas agents are 
expected to implement decisions made by their principal(s). Finally, trustees make their 
decisions on behalf of a beneficiary other than the principal, for example private litigants, 
interest groups, or the general public. Importantly, a trustee cannot place the interests of the 
principal above those of the designated beneficiary without creating a legitimacy problem. 
The three characteristics might be summarised as differences of purpose, capacity and 
constituency between trustees and agents. Alter applies the trusteeship model to 
international courts, including the CJEU. She identifies the ways in which trusteeship 
engenders a different politics to that which characterises principal-agent relationships, based 
primarily on the different role the threat of recontracting by the principal plays. For 
international courts, the threat of recontracting is small because this would undermine the 
legitimacy gains which states seek by delegating power to them in the first place. In the 
international context, collective action problems also reduce the likelihood of recontracting, 
for example by stripping a court of its jurisdiction, reducing its budget or packing it with 
judges more sympathetic to the political projects of elected governments (all of which have 
been known to befall national courts).  
These different politics mean that trustees enjoy greater autonomy than agents, and 
frequently act against the interests of their principal(s). However, they remain subject to 
various forms of control by the principals, and ultimately may have their powers recalled or 
judgments subject to reversal through legislative override. Figure 7.3 illustrates the sources 
of legitimacy, beneficiaries and control mechanisms which apply to the Court and Parliament 
conceived of as trustees. The following sections explore how well the trustee concept fits the 
Court and Parliament respectively.  
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Figure 7.3 The Court of Justice and European Parliament as trustees 
The idea of trusteeship as a form of democratic representation originates with 
Edmund Burke, and specifically his 1774 Speech to the Electors of Bristol. Newly elected to 
Parliament, Burke was responding to the suggestion that MPs ought to consult their 
constituents prior to engaging or voting in parliamentary debates. Burke advised his electors 
that 
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he 
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.389 
 
Burke did not consider that a trustee ought to be strictly accountable to his constituents, nor 
even to the law or constitution – but only to Providence. The idea was further developed in 
the work of John Stuart Mill, in particular his review of Samuel Bailey’s 1835 Rationale of 
Political Representation390 and 1861 Considerations on Representative Government.391 
Mill’s views on the legitimacy of ‘pledges’ to constituents evolved over the period separating 
these two works, from concern that these would undermine the independence of 
representatives to acceptance that elections could not be the only means of holding 
representatives to account. Mill developed the idea of trustees having a moral and political 
obligation to their principals, which must be balanced against their obligation to exercise 
independent judgment. Elections ought not to be the only check or control on trustees. The 
ideal of such ‘conscientious trusteeship’ can be discerned in the British colonial projects of 
                                                          
 
389 Burke, E. (1774) Speech to the Electors of Bristol 
390 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII, p. 15-46 
391 Ibid, Volume XIX, p. 504-519 
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this era, challenging the view that it is benign. Trusteeship has paternalistic implications, as 
trustees are less directly accountable than other delegates. Bain (2003) contrasts trusteeship 
with Mill’s ideal of liberty, linking it instead to earlier Enlightenment ideals such as progress 
and the perfection of humanity. He argues that the paternalistic aspects of trusteeship 
ultimately render it incompatible with the idea of equality.  
The legitimacy of trusteeship in a democratic polity such as the EU depends upon the 
tripartite relationship between the member states as principals, supranational institutions as 
trustees, and citizens as beneficiaries. A starting point is to ask whether beneficiaries are 
voluntary or compulsory recipients of the trust – a question which must be resolved in 
national constitutional orders and which is an ongoing source of controversy in the EU, 
exemplified by the French and Dutch referenda rejecting the constitutional treaty, the Irish 
rejection of the Nice Treaty, and the UK’s Brexit referendum. If citizens are able to reject 
decisions or actions of EU institutions, then this may contribute to the legitimacy of the 
powers exercised by them as trustees. However as set out above the very reason for states to 
delegate powers to trustees is that they bring a form of democratic legitimacy which states 
themselves are not able to supply. Plebiscites which are actually about national politics, or 
which present false choices to voters, may not be an effective means of controlling EU 
institutions. Effective controls may be either non-majoritarian as in the case of the Court, or 
majoritarian as in the case of the Parliament. The powers of a trustee must be appropriate 
based on the form and strength of democratic or other controls to which it is subject. Are the 
controls which apply to the Court and Parliament adequate given their powers? Can their 
mandates be revoked, and if so do EU citizens as beneficiaries play a direct role in this or are 
they merely passive recipients of the trusts established by member states?392 These questions 
are explored in the following sections.  
The Court of Justice as Trustee 
In the trusteeship model, member states as principals delegate powers to the Court 
because they expect it to confer legitimacy on EU law by exercising its independent, 
professional judgment and responding to the needs of its designated beneficiaries, who 
comprise both litigants in cases and EU citizens as a whole – given the erga omnes effect of 
EU law. This role differs fundamentally from the role ascribed to the Court in 
intergovernmental theory as an agent enforcing commitments made by member states, 
because it does not assume that the Court will defer to a qualified majority of member states 
                                                          
 
392 In the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, an interesting debate has arisen regarding the fate of 
British MEPs and CJEU judges – should their mandates end on the date of the UK’s withdrawal or do they retain 
a representative/professional obligation to EU citizens after this date? See Fabbrini (2018) on this question.  
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or that where it fails to do so, member states will threaten to recontract in a way which limits 
the Court’s power. It also differs fundamentally from the supranational concept of the Court 
as a policy entrepreneur, because it does not assume that the Court has a pro-integration 
agenda or will act consistently to augment its own powers. I have argued that both of these 
models fail to capture the Court’s role in the public procurement reform, where its 
judgments neither conformed to member state preferences nor were effective in overriding 
these preferences. They did however shape the positions taken by the Commission, 
Parliament and Council in respect of social and environmental aspects of procurement, by 
drawing attention to the consequences of specific provisions adopted both in the 2004 
procurement directives and in the Posted Workers Directive. The Court exercised judicial 
discretion in interpreting these provisions, adopting an approach which restricted social 
criteria in Rüffert and one which promoted them (subject to transparency and other 
safeguards) in Max Havelaar. The apparent inconsistency between these two cases cannot 
be explained by changes in member state preferences or the Court’s own agenda, but it can 
be explained by the importance attached by the Court to underlying constitutional principles. 
 The Court’s democratic legitimacy arises from two principles which are embedded in 
the constitutional order of the EU as well as of all member states393: the rule of law and the 
separation of powers. The rule of law requires that all people and institutions are subject to 
law, and that no person is above the law.394 It also requires that the law can be known by 
those who are subject to it. Some observers of the CJEU would argue that this second 
requirement is infringed by the Court’s tendency to interpret EU law, and in particular the 
Treaties, in an expansive manner. Oakeshott (1975) developed the idea of international 
regimes as a form of teleocracy based on common objectives and values agreed by their 
members. This contrasts with nomocracy, in which law is based on common history or legal 
tradition. The Court of Justice is often described as operating on teleological principles, 
giving effect to what it perceives to be the overall objectives of EU law. But this does not 
necessarily mean the EU as a whole is a teleocracy, due to the operation of the second 
principle of separation of powers. The separation of powers in a democracy requires that the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches each have circumscribed competences.395 Laws or 
executive actions which are unconstitutional can be invalidated by Courts, but the legislature 
                                                          
 
393 These principles are currently under profound threat in Poland and Hungary due to constitutional changes 
which aim to undermine the independence of the courts. For discussion of this crisis, see Kelemen and 
Blauberger (2017), Börzel et al (2017) and other contributions in Vol 24(3) Journal of European Public Policy 
394 The concept of the Rechtsstaat was developed by Rudolph Gneist in the 1830s. Interestingly both this idea and 
Montesquieu’s separation of powers were based on observation of the legal order in Britain.  
395 This tripartite division was set out by French enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu in The Spirit of the 
Laws (1748), and heavily influenced the 1787 constitution of the United States, amongst other democracies.  
169 
 
and executive may in turn invalidate judge-made law via legislation.396 In the EU context, 
separation of powers refers both to the distinct roles of each EU institution and to the 
delineation of competences between the national and supranational levels. Actions at EU 
level must be justified both by reference to competences conferred by member states in the 
Treaties and with reference to the subsidiarity principle in areas where the EU does not have 
exclusive competence. The principle of proportionality acts as a further check on the actions 
of the EU, as well as on member states.397 
As Moravscik (2005) put it: 
…the EU’s ability to act (even where it enjoys unquestioned legal competence) is 
constrained by exceptional checks and balances among multi-level institutions. The 
EU is not a system of parliamentary sovereignty but one of separation of powers, with 
political authority and discretion divided vertically amongst the Commission, 
Council, Parliament and Court, and horizontally amongst local, national and 
transnational levels.398 
 
While the Court of Justice plays a key role in interpreting and applying these checks 
and balances, it can only do so within the boundaries set by member states in the Treaties 
and in the interests of its beneficiaries: litigants in individual cases and European citizens as 
a whole. It must exercise professional judicial judgment in order to do so, and is held to 
standards of independence and consistency by the community of European and international 
lawyers and judges. This is a very different form of accountability than that which applies to 
majoritarian institutions, but it is not necessarily a less effective one. The Court periodically 
fails to uphold the requirements of the rule of law (in particular, the requirement for law to 
be transparent and knowable to its subjects) and separation of powers (for example, by 
straying into domains which are more properly the preserve of the political institutions). 
What follows in these situations is criticism, rather than sanctions from member states. One 
or several judges on the Court will then adjust their views, and aim to convince their 
colleagues. This process takes place behind closed doors; it may be immediate or gradual 
over many years and subsequent cases. The distinct nature of this process, and the potential 
for it to go wrong, underline why it is important to understand the Court as trustee rather 
than an agent or supranational entrepreneur. It points to a different set of controls and 
institutional design principles to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the Court. 
In considering the appropriate controls and institutional design, the question arises 
of whether the Court should be seen as equivalent to national supreme and constitutional 
                                                          
 
396As discussed below, in the case of constitutional law, ordinary legislation may not suffice to override judicial 
interpretation. 
397 The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are set out in Article 5(3) and Protocol (No 2) TEU.  
398 Moravscik (2005) at p. 370 
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courts or unique. Undoubtedly many of the concerns which apply at national level are 
equally relevant at EU level: that systems for appointment, remuneration and removal of 
judges should be insulated from political interference, and yet robust enough to ensure the 
quality and integrity of the judiciary. Most constitutional orders also provide for the 
possibility of majoritarian override of judge-made law, with rules for how this is done 
varying from a simple majority (or even, in some cases, executive order) through to super 
majority or referendum. Of equal importance to these external controls are the self-imposed 
controls which courts of final instance must adopt in order to ensure the quality, consistency 
and legitimacy of their judgments – including decisions about which cases not to decide. The 
latter, embedded in justiciability principles such as rules on standing or political question 
doctrine, often serve to avert confrontation with the political branches in sensitive areas. The 
CJEU has been criticised for its restrictive approach to individual applicant standing, and the 
difficult balance between its role in upholding individual rights and avoiding trespasses into 
the political domain is often apparent in its case law. The importance of such self-imposed 
controls in maintaining its legitimacy may be likened to Mill’s ideal of conscientious 
trusteeship.  
The European Parliament as Trustee 
The Common Assembly was established under the 1951 Treaty of Paris as a check 
upon the High Authority, meeting only once a year to discuss the latter body’s annual report 
and with the power to dismiss the Authority. It had no legislative role, although an obligation 
to consult it was introduced in the Treaty of Rome. Member states were free to decide the 
basis on which national delegations were sent to the Assembly, and used this power to shape 
delegations according to political preferences.399 The institution which eventually became the 
Parliament has always been able to set its own rules of procedure, and has sought to bolster 
its legitimacy in this way – not least in the changes to the way it conducts interinstitutional 
negotiations discussed in Chapter 6. It has also successfully increased its own powers vis-à-
vis the Council in a process which Roos (2017) traces to the 1950s, when the Common 
Assembly started offering (unsolicited) opinions on a range of EU initiatives, particularly in 
the social policy field. The Council then began seeking its opinion, in order to enhance the 
perceived democratic legitimacy of its own activities. The European Parliament (as it became 
in 1962) also asserted the power to put questions to Council, even though this was not in the 
Treaties. Roos argues that by the 1960s the Parliament had effectively become a co-legislator 
in the social policy field, with the Commission and Council often accepting its amendments 
                                                          
 
399 For example, as noted by Roos (2018), Italy and France blocked representation of their national Communist 
parties in the EP until 1969 and 1973 respectively. 
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to proposals. 
The European Parliament’s powers have continued to grow since the first direct 
elections in 1979, although this progress has been fitful rather than steady. The growth has 
been driven both by formal Treaty changes and by informal practices adopted by the EP. It 
cannot be fully explained by the desire of member states to reduce transaction costs and 
ensure credible commitments. As Pollack (2006) notes: 
In the case of the European Parliament, the member states have delegated 
supervisory powers to a body whose preferences they cannot control – indeed, since 
members of the EP are directly elected in second-order elections that tend to take the 
form of protests against governments in power, the political complexion of the EP 
often runs counter to those of the governments in the Council of Ministers400 
Likewise, attributing the EP’s burgeoning powers to supranational activism misses the 
essential role which formal Treaty changes have played in this, not least the extension of 
codecision in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon. The empowerment of the EP maps well 
onto a graph charting the increase in the breadth and depth of EU activities, supporting the 
idea that it has been used as a means of enhancing democratic legitimacy within the Union. 
As concerns about an EU democratic deficit came to the fore in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
member states and the Commission looked to the Parliament to address this problem. This 
account is supported by comparing the EP with the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC), which has less perceived legitimacy as an unelected body, its members 
being appointed by the Council. The EESC has not seen any appreciable augmentation of its 
powers during the 60 years of its existence.401 The EP has taken on most the role which the 
EESC was originally intended to fulfil, by providing a forum which civil society actors feel 
they can influence. As with the Court, assessments of the Parliament’s success vary, however 
unlike the Court the Parliament as a majoritarian institution is subject to the same type of 
control which member state governments themselves are subject to, in the form of elections. 
It is also subject to control by its principals via codecision with the Council, as well as the 
possibility that its mandate or budget will be reduced – although these threats have become 
less tangible over time. It has slightly more control over its own ‘agenda’ than the Court, 
although the Commission’s ongoing near-monopoly on initiating legislation continues to 
limit this.  
Does conceiving of the EP as a trustee for member states within the EU’s democratic 
order affect the way we conceive of its relationship with the European citizens it represents? 
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401 Although the list of areas in which the EESC must be consulted has expanded under successive treaties, there 
is no obligation on the other EU institutions to respond to these opinions. 
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In the trusteeship model, EU citizens are the co-beneficiaries of the Parliament’s trusteeship, 
alongside interest groups who are able to lobby and influence the EP. But a separate direct 
relationship exists between European citizens and the Parliament which is not mediated 
through the member states, based on the election of its members. Clearly these two 
relationships must interact, and at times will conflict. While detailed consideration of the 
representative role of the EP falls outside of the scope of this case study, a few observations 
regarding its impact on the legislative process can be made. First, the public procurement 
reform was not a prominent issue in the European elections in either 2009 or 2014. To the 
extent that MEPs acted based on a mandate granted by their electors, this was largely 
mediated through the broad political orientations of their party groupings. The impact of 
party orientation upon the committee chair, rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs can all be 
clearly discerned in the public procurement reform. Secondly, while well-organised civil 
society groups appear to have exercised a strong influence on the process via the Parliament, 
the same cannot be said for individual citizens/constituents. In fact, citizens may have been 
more directly influential on the Commission than the Parliament, due to their participation 
in the Green Paper consultation and the effect of the Right2Water initiative. Outside of the 
important role of party politics within the EP then, the direct relationship with voters does 
not appear to offer a more proximate or parsimonious explanation of the Parliament’s 
actions during the reform than the trustee model (which itself incorporates the relationship 
with European citizens as beneficiaries).  
Testing Trusteeship  
The above discussion suggests that trusteeship may provide a more plausible 
framework than agency or supranational entrepreneurship to analyse the behaviour of the 
Court and Parliament and their relationship to member states and citizens. To test this, we 
need to develop falsifiable hypotheses which are distinct to those previously generated by 
intergovernmental and supranational theory. Trusteeship requires i) that the reason for 
delegation of powers is based on perceived legitimacy gains, rather than on an expectation 
that the trustee will act in accordance with the preferences of the principal; ii) that the 
trustee will make decisions in accordance with its own professional judgment and the 
standards implied by its source(s) of legitimacy; and iii) that the trustee will place the 
interests of its beneficiaries ahead of the interests of its principals, where these conflict. 
Determining the reasons for delegation of powers to the Court and Parliament requires 
analysis of successive historical occasions on which this has taken place, but hypotheses 
about this can also aim to make predictions about when future delegation will occur. To test 
this first aspect of trusteeship, the following hypotheses can be made: 
H1(T) Member states have delegated/will delegate powers to the Court and 
Parliament in areas where these bodies have distinct sources of legitimacy; 
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and 
H2(T) Member states have not/will not delegate powers to the Court and Parliament 
where these bodies lack distinct sources of legitimacy. 
H1(T) can be falsified for example by finding areas in which member states have refused to 
empower the Court or Parliament despite the existence of a source of judicial or majoritarian 
legitimacy at EU level which is not replicated at national level. This might be the case if the 
Court’s jurisdiction is excluded in areas where both the rule of law and the separation of 
powers under the Treaties suggest it is best placed to make decisions. Areas such as the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and cooperation in criminal matters would be obvious 
first testing-grounds for H1(T) in respect of the Court – with particular attention paid to 
nature of integration in these areas and the corresponding separation of powers between the 
national and supranational levels. In respect of the Parliament, H1(T) might be tested by 
evaluating areas where its powers remain relatively weak, such as economic governance. A 
finding that the EP had been side-lined despite having a clear source of legitimacy in such 
areas would tend to undermine H1(T). H2(T) is the inverse of H1(T) and so can be falsified if 
member states delegate powers to either institution despite their lack of distinct sources of 
legitimacy in the areas concerned – for example by giving the Court the power to make policy 
or the Parliament powers which duplicate those exercised by national parliaments.402  As 
H1(T) and H2(T) are concerned with the reasons for states empowering EU institutions, 
powers which are asserted by the institutions without an explicit basis in the Treaties or 
another instrument would not in themselves contradict these claims.  
 In terms of the way in which the Court and Parliament exercise power as trustees, 
the following hypotheses can be identified: 
H3(T) Powers delegated to the Court and Parliament will be subject to safeguards 
intended to ensure the application of the professional standards of behaviour 
expected from institutions of their type at national and international level; 
and 
H4(T) Powers will not be delegated to the Court and Parliament without safeguards 
intended to ensure the application of the professional standards of behaviour 
expected from institutions of their type at national and international level. 
Evaluation of these safeguards should take into account their application in practice, as well 
as on paper. However, it is important to note that the member states themselves are not the 
enforcers of these standards. Falsification of H3(T) and H4(T) would involve demonstrating 
                                                          
 
402 The duplication of powers between the EP and national parliaments should not be confused with the exercise 
of a dual mandate (where the same member sits in both assemblies, possible up until 2009) or the requirement 
(for example, in certain trade agreements) for approval by both the EP and national parliaments – where each 
has a separate role in scrutinising the impact of decisions at the EU and national level respectively.  
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delegation in the absence of such safeguards, or where it was clear that they had broken 
down. Finally, to test the tripartite relationship between principals, trustees and 
beneficiaries contemplated by the trusteeship model: 
H5(T): Sanctions will only be applied to the Court and Parliament where their 
decisions or actions harm their beneficiaries; 
and 
H6(T): Sanctions will not be applied to the Court and Parliament where their 
decisions or actions harm member states, but this is outweighed by benefits to 
beneficiaries. 
Testing these last two hypotheses requires elaboration of what is meant by sanctions and a 
way to measure harm to member states and beneficiaries. Sanctions by member states may 
consist of removal of powers, resources or other actions limiting the independence of the 
Court or Parliament. Harm to beneficiaries may be measured in the Court’s case by 
violations of the rule of law, and in the Parliament’s case by failure to respect its own 
democratic mandate. Harm to member states can be measured by violations of the 
separation of powers or subsidiarity doctrines to the extent that these protect the primacy of 
states within the EU’s legal and institutional order.  
 It is worth noting that none of the above hypotheses rely upon the idea that the Court 
or Parliament are ‘good’ trustees. Cases where these institutions act outside of the powers 
delegated to them, violate safeguards or attract sanctions do not fundamentally challenge the 
trusteeship model, any more than an occasionally disobedient agent challenges the principal-
agent model. Trusteeship potentially generates further insight into the ‘why’, ‘why not’ and 
‘how’ of delegation within the European Union’s constitutional order than the principal-
agent model. It also suggests new ways of evaluating and enhancing democratic legitimacy 
within that order, by theorising the direct relationship between EU institutions and citizens 
in a way which accounts for the important role of states, but also for the constraints on their 
ability to control integration. If EU institutions have their own sources of democratic 
legitimacy and are not obliged to place the preferences of states above their direct 
responsibilities to citizens, then this implies both an expansive role for them in integration 
and a need to ensure they are subject to appropriate controls. The next section places this 
analysis in the context of the debate about democratic legitimacy in the EU, and the question 
of how institutions should be designed to assure it. 
Before proceeding a few words should be said about other alternatives to the 
principal-agent model which have been advanced in international relations theory. Abbott et 
al (2016) develop the orchestrator-intermediary model as an alternative to P-A. They define 
orchestration as “mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in 
pursuit of a joint governance goal.” The logic for assignment in the orchestration model is 
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the same as in P-A theory – states expect to realise efficiency gains and secure credible 
commitments from other states by empowering intermediaries. Where orchestration differs 
is in the absence of hard powers of control. Orchestrators look for agreeable third parties to 
act as intermediaries, and exercise soft power over them by providing material and 
ideational support. This leads to “a more horizontal relationship of mutual dependence 
between orchestrator and intermediary” than that posited by P-A theory. Abbott et al argue 
that when principals find it difficult to credibly threaten to rescind powers, orchestration 
provides a better tool to understand the resulting dynamics. This model however lacks 
plausibility as a means of explaining the powers exercised by EU institutions. To begin with, 
they do not ‘voluntarily enlist’ themselves as intermediaries but are assigned powers by 
member states under the Treaties or in secondary legislation. Hard control does exist under 
the Treaties – even if it is only rarely exercised. Crucially, orchestration does not posit any 
role for the beneficiaries/targets of the intermediary’s powers in determining when powers 
will be rescinded or sanctions applied, which I have argued make trusteeship a particularly 
appropriate model for understanding the Court of Justice and European Parliament.   
Democratic legitimacy 
On 15 March 2018, at an event to commemorate the 170th anniversary of the 1848 
Hungarian Revolution which also happened to fall in the middle of an election campaign, 
Viktor Orbán gave a speech which condemned the European Union in the following terms: 
We, the millions with national feelings, are on one side; the elite ‘citizens of the 
world’ are on the other side…On one side, national and democratic forces; and on the 
other side, supranational and anti-democratic forces.403 
A few weeks later Orbán’s Fidesz party won a convincing victory, with just under 50% of the 
vote and turnout above 70%. Orbán’s denigrated citizens of the world appear to be close 
cousins of the ‘citizens of nowhere’ invoked by Theresa May in her speech to the 2016 
Conservative Party conference. Beyond inflammatory xenophobic rhetoric, the 
characterisation of the EU as anti-democratic resonates on either side of Europe. Debates 
about a democratic deficit within the Union are no longer academic, and have the potential 
to derail future integration. The analysis put forward in this study has implications for how 
we understand democracy within the EU, and thus the response to the challenge posed by 
Orbán, May and others. The question of whether EU institutions act as agents, trustees or 
supranational entrepreneurs provides a means by which we can explain their powers, judge 
their democratic legitimacy, and exercise appropriate controls. 
Scharpf (1999) drew a distinction between input and output-based legitimacy, 
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measured respectively by responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and effectiveness in solving 
societal problems. Research by Lijphart (1999) and others has indicated that there is often a 
trade-off between these two forms of legitimacy, with pluralist democracies scoring better on 
input legitimacy and majoritarian democracies better on output legitimacy. Dahl (1999) 
argued that international organisations could not be democratic, inasmuch as they lack 
popular control and protection for the fundamental rights which ensure this. Dahl saw the 
long chain of delegation in international organisations, including the EU, as undermining 
popular control. At the furthest reaches of this chain, Dahl saw delegation as a ‘misleading 
fiction useful only to the rulers.’ But what if institutional design effectively closes the loop by 
providing direct means for citizens to hold EU institutions to account and protection for 
fundamental rights? As outlined above, the trusteeship model as applied to the Court of 
Justice and Parliament emphasises their direct responsibility to citizens as beneficiaries, 
rather than just to member states. Neither of these institutions has been entirely consistent 
in fulfilling this responsibility, but arguably both have improved markedly in the 20 years 
since Dahl made his assessment. Are the issues which the EU deals with inherently more 
complex than national issues and therefore less accessible to citizens? All decisions which 
involve balancing multiple divergent interests are complex. National decisions about how 
much to tax and how much to spend require an understanding of many variables and causal 
relationships, as well as worked out preferences in terms of outcomes. These decisions are no 
less complex than those made at EU level, but are often more tangible to citizens, and more 
familiar due to their centrality within domestic party politics. 
 Determining the general good may also be easier in a more homogenous population, 
as differences in the impact of collective decisions are smaller than in a highly diverse 
population. The EU struggles with input-based legitimacy due to distance, diversity and 
difficulty representing preferences. However, problems in defining the demos are not 
specific to the EU or international polities but are intrinsic to democratic theory (Shapiro 
and Hacker-Cordón 1999). They are salient in the independence movements of Catalonia 
and Scotland for example, amongst many others. Smaller units do not necessarily enhance 
the quality of democracy, partly because what they gain in internal cohesion may be lost in 
the need to relate to a greater number of powerful external actors. Where the EU operates 
under a democratic deficit, it must also be considered whether this is because states have 
jealously guarded the means of generating input and output-based legitimacy.  In order for 
EU institutions to represent a European demos, they need to engage with the questions 
which are central to party politics in most member states, including social policy. De Witte 
(2017) argues that the EU has entered a ‘third wave’ of social policy convergence and that 
this poses particular challenges for the democratic legitimacy of decision making at the 
supranational level. In this third wave, national social policy divergences are seen as 
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problematic in light of the fiscal discipline required to secure monetary and economic 
union.404 As the scope of powers exercised at EU level has grown, there is a need to 
continually assess the adequacy of the checks and balances both amongst the EU institutions 
and between the supranational and national levels.  
These questions figure prominently in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 
(FCC) jurisprudence on the limits of EU integration. Beginning with its decision on the 
Maastricht Treaty,405 the FCC has acknowledged that the exercise of democracy differs 
between the national and supranational levels, but that appropriate standards of judicial 
review must be applied to each level. It has emphasised the delegated nature of the EU’s legal 
authority, without setting fixed limits on the types of powers which could be delegated to it. 
Under Maastricht, the FCC noted that non-economic areas of EU integration remained 
primarily intergovernmental. In its decision on the Lisbon Treaty,406 the FCC further 
developed the idea of limits to the competences which could be delegated from national to 
supranational level – however it did so in a way which leaves ample room for interpretation 
by governments.407 In the FCC’s view, the irreducible core of national sovereignty is linked to 
the history, culture and language of a nation, and the political rights and obligations which 
stem from this under its constitution. Where substantial differences apply between member 
states on these matters, delegation of powers to the EU would lack democratic legitimacy. 
The FCC’s reasoning implies that as a society becomes less homogenous, the scope of powers 
which may legitimately be delegated to the supranational level increases. It also implies that 
as the breadth of the Union increases to include states with highly divergent histories and 
cultures, the depth of integration will be limited.  
 The FCC’s Lisbon judgment raises the question of whether democratic legitimacy at 
national level also necessarily decreases as a society becomes less homogenous. It appears to 
largely ignore the role which the design of representative institutions may play in delivering 
legitimacy even amongst a diverse demos. It also appears to ignore the deep cultural and 
linguistic divisions which have long characterised many European states. Member state 
governments do not have a monopoly on democratic legitimacy in the EU context, but face 
competition from both the subnational and supranational levels. This does not mean they are 
peripheral to the way power is exercised within the EU, or that they don’t have the final right 
                                                          
 
404 This fiscal discipline is exercised in particular via the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), multi-lateral 
surveillance procedure (MSP) and macro-economic imbalance procedure (MEIP).  
405Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89 
406 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfG 2, BvE 2/08. 
407 The FCC identified deployment of the army and certain fiscal and social policies as part of the inalienable 
competence of the state. However, the language used by the court stops short of ringfencing these specific areas in 
perpetuity, rather using them to illustrate the type of decision which may fall within the essentiality principle.  
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of recall in relation to EU law. It does mean that intergovernmental theory which conceives 
of EU institutions purely as agents of the member states is both descriptively and 
normatively incomplete. Equally, supranational theory which ignores the right of recall 
which member states have in relation to actions of the EU institutions fails to fully capture 
the balance between these actors. For either theory to approach descriptive and normative 
coherence, the role of EU institutions in establishing democratic legitimacy must be further 
refined. I have argued that instead of characterising the Court and Parliament either as 
supranational policy entrepreneurs or as agents of the member states, the concept of 
trusteeship better captures their behaviour in the context of the case study presented here – 
and identifies a direct link to citizens. I have also outlined how this concept might be 
operationalised to generate hypotheses which can be tested in future qualitative and 
quantitative research.  
Conclusion 
Public procurement is seldom the stuff of high politics. For many, at best it evokes 
images of government bean counters, and at worst associations with corruption and misuse 
of public funds. National and subnational governments often blame the EU procurement 
rules for increasing bureaucracy,408 while at other times grudgingly accepting their utility. 
Businesses tend to take a similar view. Although public contracts represent a sizeable chunk 
of GDP across Europe, this spending is spread across tens of thousands of local, regional and 
national public and semi-state bodies. Both the costs and benefits of procurement regulation 
are highly diffuse, meaning that the impact of even a major reform such as the 2014 
directives takes some time to become clear. Delays in transposition of the directives in most 
member states have extended this timetable further. Nevertheless, the 2014 reform marks a 
significant departure both in tone and content from previous directives, with social and 
environmental objectives taking on a new prominence. This is not merely cosmetic; the 
directives set far-reaching new requirements in terms of compliance with environmental, 
social and labour law and collective agreements, amongst many other changes.  
Without providing for complete harmonisation, the new directives require public 
authorities, national courts, and ultimately the Court of Justice, to apply common rules 
which balance market and non-market interests. This is a task which speaks to deep conflicts 
currently playing out in national and international politics, and the way they are resolved in 
EU law invites scrutiny of the democratic legitimacy of both the process and outcomes. In 
                                                          
 
408 A clear example of this can be seen in the 2018 collapse of Carillion, a major operator of outsourced contracts 
in the UK. Ministers and senior civil servants alike blamed the EU public procurement rules for preventing 
exclusion of the company from further bids once its financial problems became clear. For discussion of this 
controversy, see Semple (2018) “Carillion – A canary in the coalmine for overextended government contractors?” 
179 
 
seeking to understand these changes, intergovernmental and supranational theory offer two 
distinct explanations for how EU institutions, member states and other actors drive 
integration. Careful analysis of the reform allows us to draw conclusions not only about this 
specific case, but also to suggest refinements to the way in which integration theory 
characterises EU institutions as either agents or supranational entrepreneurs. I have argued 
that neither concept fully captures the influence of the European Parliament and Court of 
Justice in this case, and have developed the alternative concept of trusteeship as a source of 
testable hypotheses regarding their roles. Trusteeship may enable a better understanding of 
the tripartite relationship between member states, EU institutions and citizens – all three of 
which must be fully present in any democratic theory of integration. By continually refining 
theory, the goal is to move closer to a descriptive and normative understanding of EU 
integration which informs the standards by which we judge it, and the majoritarian and non-
majoritarian controls which we apply.  
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Appendix A – Environmental and Social Provisions included in Directive 
2014/24/EU 
Note: Mandatory provisions are highlighted in bold 
Article 18 Principles of procurement 
… 
2. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that in the 
performance of public contracts economic operators comply with applicable 
obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law established by 
Union law, national law, collective agreements or by the international 
environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in Annex X. 
Article 20 Reserved contracts 
1. Member States may reserve the right to participate in public procurement procedures to 
sheltered workshops and economic operators whose main aim is the social and professional 
integration of disabled or disadvantaged persons or may provide for such contracts to be 
performed in the context of sheltered employment programmes, provided that at least 30 % 
of the employees of those workshops, economic operators or programmes are disabled or 
disadvantaged workers.  
2. The call for competition shall make reference to this Article. 
Article 42 Technical specifications 
1. The technical specifications as defined in point 1 of Annex VII shall be set out in the 
procurement documents. The technical specification shall lay down the characteristics 
required of a works, service or supply.  
Those characteristics may also refer to the specific process or method of production or 
provision of the requested works, supplies or services or to a specific process for another 
stage of its life cycle even where such factors do not form part of their material substance 
provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract and proportionate to its 
value and its objectives.  
The technical specifications may also specify whether the transfer of intellectual property 
rights will be required.  
For all procurement which is intended for use by natural persons, whether 
general public or staff of the contracting authority, the technical specifications 
shall, except in duly justified cases, be drawn up so as to take into account 
accessibility criteria for persons with disabilities or design for all users.  
Where mandatory accessibility requirements are adopted by a legal act of the 
Union, technical specifications shall, as far as accessibility criteria for persons 
with disabilities or design for all users are concerned, be defined by reference 
thereto.  
… 
Article 43 Labels 
1. Where contracting authorities intend to purchase works, supplies or services with specific 
environmental, social or other characteristics they may, in the technical specifications, the 
award criteria or the contract performance conditions, require a specific label as means of 
proof that the works, services or supplies correspond to the required characteristics, 
provided that all of the following conditions are fulfilled:  
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(a) the label requirements only concern criteria which are linked to the subject-matter of the 
contract and are appropriate to define characteristics of the works, supplies or services that 
are the subject-matter of the contract;  
(b) the label requirements are based on objectively verifiable and non-discriminatory 
criteria;  
(c) the labels are established in an open and transparent procedure in which all relevant 
stakeholders, including government bodies, consumers, social partners, manufacturers, 
distributors and non-governmental organisations, may participate;  
(d) the labels are accessible to all interested parties;  
(e) the label requirements are set by a third party over which the economic operator applying 
for the label cannot exercise a decisive influence.  
Where contracting authorities do not require the works, supplies or services to meet all of 
the label requirements, they shall indicate which label requirements are referred to.  
Contracting authorities requiring a specific label shall accept all labels that confirm that the 
works, supplies or services meet equivalent label requirements.  
Where an economic operator had demonstrably no possibility of obtaining the specific label 
indicated by the contracting authority or an equivalent label within the relevant time limits 
for reasons that are not attributable to that economic operator, the contracting authority 
shall accept other appropriate means of proof, which may include a technical dossier from 
the manufacturer, provided that the economic operator concerned proves that the works, 
supplies or services to be provided by it fulfil the requirements of the specific label or the 
specific requirements indicated by the contracting authority.  
2. Where a label fulfils the conditions provided in points (b), (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 1 
but also sets out requirements not linked to the subject-matter of the contract, contracting 
authorities shall not require the label as such but may define the technical specification by 
reference to those of the detailed specifications of that label, or, where necessary, parts 
thereof, that are linked to the subject-matter of the contract and are appropriate to define 
characteristics of this subject-matter. 
Article 57 Exclusion grounds 
1. Contracting authorities shall exclude an economic operator from 
participation in a procurement procedure where they have established, by 
verifying in accordance with Articles 59, 60 and 61, or are otherwise aware that 
that economic operator has been the subject of a conviction by final judgment 
for one of the following reasons: 
… 
(f) child labour and other forms of trafficking in human beings as defined in 
Article 2 of Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council. 
… 
2. An economic operator shall be excluded from participation in a procurement 
procedure where the contracting authority is aware that the economic operator 
is in breach of its obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social security 
contributions and where this has been established by a judicial or 
administrative decision having final and binding effect in accordance with the 
legal provisions of the country in which it is established or with those of the 
Member State of the contracting authority. 
… 
Appendix A 
182 
 
4. Contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member States to exclude from 
participation in a procurement procedure any economic operator in any of the following 
situations:  
(a) where the contracting authority can demonstrate by any appropriate means a violation of 
applicable obligations referred to in Article 18(2); 
… 
Article 62 Quality assurance standards and environmental management standards 
… 
2. Where contracting authorities require the production of certificates drawn up by 
independent bodies attesting that the economic operator complies with certain 
environmental management systems or standards, they shall refer to the Eco- Management 
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) of the Union or to other environmental management systems as 
recognised in accordance with Article 45 of Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 or other 
environmental management standards based on the relevant European or international 
standards by accredited bodies. They shall recognise equivalent certificates from bodies 
established in other Member States.  
Where an economic operator had demonstrably no access to such certificates, or no 
possibility of obtaining them within the relevant time limits for reasons that are not 
attributable to that economic operator, the contracting authority shall also accept other 
evidence of environmental management measures, provided that the economic operator 
proves that these measures are equivalent to those required under the applicable 
environmental management system or standard. 
 
Article 67 Contract award criteria 
1. Without prejudice to national laws, regulations or administrative provisions concerning 
the price of certain supplies or the remuneration of certain services, contracting authorities 
shall base the award of public contracts on the most economically advantageous tender.  
2. The most economically advantageous tender from the point of view of the contracting 
authority shall be identified on the basis of the price or cost, using a cost-effectiveness 
approach, such as life-cycle costing in accordance with Article 68, and may include the best 
price-quality ratio, which shall be assessed on the basis of criteria, including qualitative, 
environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject-matter of the public contract in 
question. Such criteria may comprise, for instance:  
(a) quality, including technical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, accessibility, 
design for all users, social, environmental and innovative characteristics and trading and its 
conditions;  
(b) organisation, qualification and experience of staff assigned to performing the contract, 
where the quality of the staff assigned can have a significant impact on the level of 
performance of the contract; or  
(c) after-sales service and technical assistance, delivery conditions such as delivery date, 
delivery process and delivery period or period of completion.  
The cost element may also take the form of a fixed price or cost on the basis of which 
economic operators will compete on quality criteria only.  
Member States may provide that contracting authorities may not use price only or cost only 
as the sole award criterion or restrict their use to certain categories of contracting authorities 
or certain types of contracts.  
3. Award criteria shall be considered to be linked to the subject-matter of the public contract 
where they relate to the works, supplies or services to be provided under that contract in any 
respect and at any stage of their life cycle, including factors involved in:  
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(a) the specific process of production, provision or trading of those works, supplies or 
services; or  
(b) a specific process for another stage of their life cycle,  
even where such factors do not form part of their material substance.  
4. Award criteria shall not have the effect of conferring an unrestricted freedom of choice on 
the contracting authority. They shall ensure the possibility of effective competition and shall 
be accompanied by specifications that allow the information provided by the tenderers to be 
effectively verified in order to assess how well the tenders meet the award criteria. In case of 
doubt, contracting authorities shall verify effectively the accuracy of the information and 
proof provided by the tenderers.  
5. The contracting authority shall specify, in the procurement documents, the relative 
weighting which it gives to each of the criteria chosen to determine the most economically 
advantageous tender, except where this is identified on the basis of price alone.  
Those weightings may be expressed by providing for a range with an appropriate maximum 
spread.  
Where weighting is not possible for objective reasons, the contracting authority shall indicate 
the criteria in decreasing order of importance.  
 
Article 68 Life-cycle costing  
1. Life-cycle costing shall to the extent relevant cover parts or all of the following costs over 
the life cycle of a product, service or works:  
(a) costs, borne by the contracting authority or other users, such as:  
(i) costs relating to acquisition,  
(ii) costs of use, such as consumption of energy and other resources,  
(iii) maintenance costs,  
(iv) end of life costs, such as collection and recycling costs.  
(b) costs imputed to environmental externalities linked to the product, service or works 
during its life cycle, provided their monetary value can be determined and verified; such 
costs may include the cost of emissions of greenhouse gases and of other pollutant emissions 
and other climate change mitigation costs.  
2. Where contracting authorities assess the costs using a life- cycle costing approach, they 
shall indicate in the procurement documents the data to be provided by the tenderers and 
the method which the contracting authority will use to determine the life-cycle costs on the 
basis of those data. 
The method used for the assessment of costs imputed to environmental externalities shall 
fulfil all of the following conditions:  
(a) it is based on objectively verifiable and non-discriminatory criteria. In particular, where it 
has not been established for repeated or continuous application, it shall not unduly favour or 
disadvantage certain economic operators;  
(b) it is accessible to all interested parties;  
(c) the data required can be provided with reasonable effort by normally diligent economic 
operators, including economic operators from third countries party to the GPA or other 
international agreements by which the Union is bound.  
3. Whenever a common method for the calculation of life- cycle costs has been made 
mandatory by a legislative act of the Union, that common method shall be applied for the 
assessment of life-cycle costs.  
A list of such legislative acts, and where necessary the delegated acts supplementing them, is 
set out in Annex XIII. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in 
accordance with Article 87 concerning the update of that list, when an update of the list is 
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necessary due to the adoption of new legislation making a common method mandatory or 
the repeal or modification of existing legal acts.  
Article 69 Abnormally low tenders 
1. Contracting authorities shall require economic operators to explain the price or costs 
proposed in the tender where tenders appear to be abnormally low in relation to the works, 
supplies or services.  
2. The explanations referred to in paragraph 1 may in particular relate to:  
(a) the economics of the manufacturing process, of the services provided or of the 
construction method;  
(b) the technical solutions chosen or any exceptionally favourable conditions available to the 
tenderer for the supply of the products or services or for the execution of the work;  
(c) the originality of the work, supplies or services proposed by the tenderer;  
(d) compliance with obligations referred to in Article 18(2);  
(e) compliance with obligations referred to in Article 71;  
(f) the possibility of the tenderer obtaining State aid.  
3. The contracting authority shall assess the information provided by consulting the 
tenderer. It may only reject the tender where the evidence supplied does not satisfactorily 
account for the low level of price or costs proposed, taking into account the elements referred 
to in paragraph 2.  
Contracting authorities shall reject the tender, where they have established that 
the tender is abnormally low because it does not comply with applicable 
obligations referred to in Article 18(2). 
… 
Article 70 Conditions for performance of contracts 
Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a 
contract, provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract within the 
meaning of Article 67(3) and indicated in the call for competition or in the procurement 
documents. Those conditions may include economic, innovation-related, environmental, 
social or employment-related considerations.  
Article 71 Subcontracting 
1. Observance of the obligations referred to in Article 18(2) by subcontractors is ensured 
through appropriate action by the competent national authorities acting within the scope of 
their responsibility and remit.  
… 
6. With the aim of avoiding breaches of the obligations referred to in Article 18(2), 
appropriate measures may be taken, such as:  
(a) Where the national law of a Member State provides for a mechanism of joint liability 
between subcontractors and the main contractor, the Member State concerned shall ensure 
that the relevant rules are applied in compliance with the conditions set out in Article 18(2).  
(b) Contracting authorities may, in accordance with Articles 59, 60 and 61, verify or may be 
required by Member States to verify whether there are grounds for exclusion of 
subcontractors pursuant to Article 57. In such cases, the contracting authority shall require 
that the economic operator replaces a subcontractor in respect of which the verification has 
shown that there are compulsory grounds for exclusion. The contracting authority may 
require or may be required by a Member State to require that the economic operator replaces 
a subcontractor in respect of which the verification has shown that there are non-compulsory 
grounds for exclusion. 
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Social and Other Specific Services 
Article 76 Principles of awarding contracts 
1. Member States shall put in place national rules for the award of contracts subject to this 
Chapter in order to ensure contracting authorities comply with the principles of 
transparency and equal treatment of economic operators. Member States are free to 
determine the procedural rules applicable as long as such rules allow contracting authorities 
to take into account the specificities of the services in question.  
2. Member States shall ensure that contracting authorities may take into account the need to 
ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness of 
the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups, the involvement and empowerment of users and innovation. Member 
States may also provide that the choice of the service provider shall be made on the basis of 
the tender presenting the best price- quality ratio, taking into account quality and 
sustainability criteria for social services.  
 
Article 77 Reserved contracts for certain services 
1. Member States may provide that contracting authorities may reserve the right for 
organisations to participate in procedures for the award of public contracts exclusively for 
those health, social and cultural services referred to in Article 74, which are covered by CPV 
codes 75121000-0, 75122000-7, 75123000-4, 79622000-0, 79624000-4, 79625000-1, 
80110000-8, 80300000-7, 80420000-4, 80430000-7, 80511000-9, 80520000-5, 
80590000-6, from 85000000-9 to 85323000-9, 92500000-6, 92600000-7, 98133000-4, 
98133110-8. 
2. An organisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall fulfil all of the following conditions:  
(a) its objective is the pursuit of a public service mission linked to the delivery of the services 
referred to in paragraph 1;  
(b) profits are reinvested with a view to achieving the organisation’s objective. Where profits 
are distributed or redistributed, this should be based on participatory considerations;  
(c) the structures of management or ownership of the organisation performing the contract 
are based on employee ownership or participatory principles, or require the active 
participation of employees, users or stakeholders; and  
(d) the organisation has not been awarded a contract for the services concerned by the 
contracting authority concerned pursuant to this Article within the past three years.  
3. The maximum duration of the contract shall not be longer than three years.  
4. The call for competition shall make reference to this Article.  
5. Notwithstanding Article 92, the Commission shall assess the effects of this Article and report 
to the European Parliament and the Council by 18 April 2019. 
ANNEX X 
LIST OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONVENTIONS 
REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 18(2) 
— ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to 
Organise;  
— ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining;  
— ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour;  
— ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour;  
— ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age;  
— ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation);  
— ILO Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration;  
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— ILO Convention 182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour;  
— Vienna Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol on 
substances that deplete the Ozone Layer;  
— Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal (Basel Convention);  
— Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm POPs Convention);  
— Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade (UNEP/FAO) (The PIC Convention) Rotterdam, 10 
September 1998, and its 3 regional Protocols.
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Appendix B – Index of documents produced by EU institutions during the 
reform 
European Commission 
European Commission (2010) Towards a Single Market Act for a highly competitive social 
market economy COM (2010) 608 of 27.10.10 
European Commission (2011) Buying Green! A handbook on environmental public 
procurement (2nd edition) Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
European Commission (2011a) Green Paper on the Modernisation of Public Procurement 
Policy: Towards a More Efficient European Procurement Market COM (2011) 15 of 27.1.11 
European Commission (2011b) Single Market Act: Twelve levers to boost growth and 
strengthen confidence "Working together to create new growth" COM (2011) 206 of 13.4.11 
European Commission (2011c) Evaluation Report: Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public 
Procurement Legislation SEC (2011) 853 of 27.6.11 
European Commission (2011d) Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement 
policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market - Synthesis of replies  
European Commission (2011e) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors COM (2011) 895 of 20.12.11 
European Commission (2011f) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on public procurement COM (2011) 896 of 20.12.11 
European Commission (2011g) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the award of concession contracts COM (2011) 897 of 20.12.11 
European Commission (2012) 5369/12 Non-paper on Cluster 2: Strategic use of public 
procurement 2011/0438 (COD) Communication via the Council General Secretariat of 23.1.12 
European Commission (2014) Communication on the European Citizens' Initiative "Water and 
sanitation are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!" (COM 2014 177) 
European Commission (2014a) Slide Deck on Social and other specific services: Light regime 
presented at Meeting of Commission Government Experts Group on Public Procurement, 19-
20 May 2014 
European Commission (2014b) Slide Deck on Grounds for exclusion presented at Meeting of 
Commission Government Experts Group on Public Procurement, 3-4 June 2014 
European Commission (2014c) Slide Deck on Award Criteria presented at Meeting of 
Commission Government Experts Group on Public Procurement, 11 September 2014 
European Commission (2014d) Slide Deck on Social Aspects presented at Meeting of 
Commission Government Experts Group on Public Procurement, 4-5 November 2014 
European Commission (2014e) Slide Deck on Subcontracting presented at Meeting of 
Commission Government Experts Group on Public Procurement, 4-5 November 2014 
European Parliament 
European Parliament (2010), Report on new developments in public procurement 2009/2175 
(INI) (Rapporteur: Heide Rühle) Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
10.5.10 
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European Parliament (2010a), Resolution of 18 May 2010 on new developments in public 
procurement 2009/2175 (INI) 
European Parliament (2011), Report on modernisation of public procurement 2011/2048 (INI) 
(Rapporteur: Heide Rühle) Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 5.10.11 
European Parliament (2011a) Resolution of 25 October 2011 on modernisation of public 
procurement 2011/2048(INI) 
European Parliament (2012) Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, 
Working document on a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on public procurement (Rapporteur Marc Tarabella) 23.2.2012 
European Parliament (2012a) Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on public procurement (Rapporteur: Marc Tarabella) 
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 3.5.12 
European Parliament (2012b) Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors (Rapporteur: Marc Tarabella) Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection, 14.5.12 
European Parliament (2012c) Fair trade in public procurement in the EU Library briefing of 
12.7.12 
European Parliament (2012d) Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on public procurement – Amendments – Volumes I-V 
(Rapporteur: Marc Tarabella) Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
12.7.12 
European Parliament (2012e) Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors – Amendments – Volumes I-III (Rapporteur: Marc 
Tarabella) Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 3.9.12 
European Parliament (2012f) Working document on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement – Draft list of controversial 
issues by cluster (Rapporteur: Marc Tarabella) Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection 19.9.12 
European Parliament (2013) Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on public procurement (Rapporteur: Marc Tarabella) 
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 11.1.13 
European Parliament (2013a) Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the award of concession contracts (Rapporteur: Philippe 
Juvin) Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 1.2.13 
European Parliament (2013b) Report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors (Rapporteur: Marc Tarabella) Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection, 7.2.13 
Council of the European Union 
Council of the European Union (2012) 5326/12 Note from General Secretariat/Presidency to 
Delegations on Public procurement package – Subject clusters 13.1.12 
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Council of the European Union (2012a) 6060/12 Note from General Secretariat/Presidency to 
Permanent Representative Committee on Proposal for a Directive on public procurement - 
Cluster 2: Strategic use of public procurement 3.2.12 
 
Council of the European Union (2012b) 6240/12 Note from General Secretariat to Working 
Party on Public Procurement - Draft questions for the Competitiveness Council meeting of 20 
and 21 February 2012 7.2.12 
 
Council of the European Union (2012c) 6268/12 Note from General Secretariat/Presidency to 
Permanent Representative Committee on Public procurement package - Orientation debate 
13.2.12 
 
Council of the European Union (2012d) 6436/12 Note from General Secretariat/Presidency to 
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